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This interdisciplinary thesis, an exercise in post-classical narratology that 
draws on “second-generation” cognitive science, phenomenology and semiotics, 
argues for mediation and dynamics as the basis of the experience of reading 
narrative fiction. Chapter One, “Narrative Mediation”, presents the case for seeing 
the primary form of narrative signification as being a triadic mediation (as opposed 
to a dyadic “communication”) involving not just the parties to the communication 
but also their joint attention on (and intentions towards) the object of their 
communication. The narratological implications of this triadic view (which draws on 
recent discussions in developmental and evolutionary psychology) are explored 
through readings of the Decameron and Don Quixote, and through a discussion of 
the semiotics of “character” in fiction. Chapter Two, “Narrative Contexture”, draws 
out the functionalist implications of this view of narrative language, arguing that the 
interaction of reader and narrative text is characterized by a dynamic, “non-linear” 
systematicity in which the non-linearity is constituted by the polyfunctionality 
inherent to language. This dynamic systematicity is termed, following the Czech 
structuralist Jan Mukařovský, its contexture.  
One of the most important features of the contexture is its holistic appeal, 
through the “aesthetic function”, to the entirety and open-endedness of the 
perceiver’s experience. Chapter Three, “Narrative Disclosure”, identifies this 
experientiality as a key feature of modern fiction, and puts forward the argument 
that both the experience of and the experience (“representations of consciousness”) 
in modern narrative involve the bringing to awareness of a fundamental process of 
phenomenological “disclosure” whereby the world is manifested in consciousness. 
This “bringing to awareness” through semiotic mediation is illustrated through 
readings of Lewis Carroll and John Updike, and of narratives by Georges Rodenbach 
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If the object of analysis is indeed to illuminate the conditions of 
existence – of production – of the text, it is not done, as people often 
say, by reducing the complex to the simple, but on the contrary, by 
revealing the hidden complexities that are the secret of the simplicity.  
    Gérard Genette (1980, 137-8) 
This thesis explores the complexities involved in the existence of the narrative text at 
three principal levels. In the first place, it calls into question the “communicational” 
model that has traditionally dominated narrative theory and puts forward instead a 
model of narrative as a form of semiotic mediation. In the second place, it suggests 
that the linear aspect of narrative – the unfolding of the story – can only be 
understood, paradoxically, by incorporating the concept of a non-linear, “vertical” 
dimension to narrative, for it is only through the concept of such a non-linear 
systematicity that one can grasp narrative dynamism. And in the third place it 
proposes that the experience of reading narrative fiction can best be understood in 
terms of the process of phenomenological “disclosure” whereby the world is 
manifested in consciousness. 
 My exploration of these “secret” complexities is intended to provide a 
theoretical framework for a particular approach to narrative fiction that combines 
phenomenology, semiotics and what is sometimes referred to as “second-generation” 
cognitive science. There is a clear theoretical narrative that connects the three parts 
of the thesis, from the concept of “joint attention” presented in Chapter One, through 
the dynamic “systematicity” of narrative in Chapter Two, to the exploration, in 
Chapter Three, of the process of phenomenological “disclosure” involved in the 
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experience of reading narrative fiction. Yet I hesitate to call this narrative a “theory”: 
the terms “Mediation”, “Contexture” and “Disclosure” with which I head the three 
parts have a more systematic interrelation with each other than would be conveyed 
by describing them loosely as “themes”, yet they do not pretend to demarcate 
exhaustively the field, as would a set of categories in a theory. They could, 
alternatively, be thought of as “dimensions”, or as “units” (as opposed to categorical 
“elements”) in Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky’s description of his method in 
Thought and Language (1934): 
We tried a new approach and replaced analysis into elements [element] by 
analysis into units [edinitsy]. Units are products of analysis that correspond to 
specific aspects of the phenomena under investigation. At the same time, 
unlike elements, units are capable of retaining and expressing the essence of 
the whole being analysed. (Vygotsky 1986 [1962], 211) 
I have used the term theoretical “framework” – rather than a term such as 
“dimensionality” – in order to point to the practical function that the terms are 
intended to serve as a heuristic for analysing, in particular, historical changes in the 
forms of narrative fiction. Some instances of this will occur during the course of the 
thesis’ main three chapters, and I will address further the question of the avenues for 
future research opened up by my approach in the Conclusion. In this Introduction, 
meanwhile, I will offer a synoptic survey of some of the main features of the thesis, 
beginning with a brief schematic summary of its argument, then moving on to a 
discussion of the interdisciplinarity of the thesis’ theoretical terms of reference, and 
finally discussing its scope of historical and literary reference. In order to avoid 
unnecessary repetition, I have reserved an ordered breakdown of the various 




A Brief Schematic Outline of the Argument 
Chapter One, “Narrative Mediation”, considers the process of semiosis, of 
signification, that underlies the reading and writing of narrative fiction. The account 
of this process that I propose differs in significant ways from the view, dominant in 
narratology in both its “classical” and “post-classical” phases, that the process of 
semiosis underlying the reading and writing of narrative fiction is captured in the 
paradigm of linguistic communication originally laid down by Saussure (1959 
[1915]). This paradigm conceives of semiosis as a dyadic chain whereby a Sender 
sends a Message to a Receiver:  
Sender → Message → Receiver 
This basic model informs such chains of dyadic relations as the following, familiar 
from classical narratology: 
Author → Implied Author → Narrator → Narratee → Implied Reader → Reader 
(Chatman 1978, 151) 
 
In the basic model of Sender → Message → Receiver, the message is encoded and 
decoded according to rules systematic to the language or wider culture: this is the 
paradigm of semiosis that underlies French structuralism of the 1960s and 1970s and 
that has informed both classical narratology and many of its post-classical 
extensions. 
 What is excluded in this model is any mention of the reference or object of the 
communication – that is, the thing or things that are being referred to both by the 
Sender and the Receiver (and by the Message that passes between them).  By 
contrast, the model that I propose for the semiosis underlying the reading of 
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narrative fiction replaces the dyadic model with a triadic model that includes the 
contextual reference of the communication: 
Reference 
 
        Sender  Receiver 
This model is conceived of as what Charles Peirce referred to as a “genuine triad”, in 
the sense that a connection between any two points of the triangle is only possible 
via the third.1  The receiver’s access to the reference is mediated by communication 
from the sender, and the sender’s by the communication s/he sends to the receiver. 
And the communication between sender and receiver is mediated by the attention 
that they share towards the reference. The key term here is mediation: the sign 
mediates between sender, receiver and reference. Throughout this thesis, with 
misgivings, I reserve the term “communication” for the dyadic model described in 
the previous paragraph, and exclusively use the term “mediation” for the triadic 
model I have sketched above as its alternative.  
 I support this triadic view of signification as mediation with evidence from 
developmental psychology for the importance of “joint attention” in the acquisition 
and development of language. In particular, I focus on how the process of joint 
attention is deeply implicated in the development of narrative as a form of discourse 
                                                 
1 “A Sign, or Representamen [. .] stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 
Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic 
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is 
its three members are bound together by it in a way  that does not consist in any  complexus of dy adic 




understood and used by the young child: narrative is born out of the joint attentional 
situation and is created to be itself an object of joint attention. Furthermore, as I 
show in the course of Chapter One, it develops in its written form (as “narrative 
fiction” in the sense that I am using the term) by reproducing within itself multiple 
embedded versions of the joint attentional situation. As I attempt to demonstrate, 
thinking of narrative as a form of joint attentional mediation sheds light on aspects of 
narrative fiction that have been elided by, or proved problematic for, the traditional 
narratological approach based on a dyadic Saussurean model. The three such aspects 
I focus on are (a) the differences between oral and written narrative, (b) the 
embedding of one narrative within another, and (c) the realization of “character”.  
 Chapter Two addresses the question of the reader’s experience of the narrative 
as a dynamic, cumulative process. Here the key term that I introduce is that of 
contexture, which I draw from the Czech structuralist Jan Mukařovský. The 
contexture is a dynamic and cumulative structure motivated, in Mukařovský’s 
formulation, by the polyfunctionality of language – that is, by the fact language can 
(simultaneously) serve different purposes, can act as a vehicle for varied and 
concurrent intentionalities. Though Mukařovský does not use these terms, I argue 
that the contexture can be thought of as what dynamic systems theorists call a “state 
space” – that is, an n-dimensional space made up of all the possible states of the 
system (in this case, the possible functions of the language): it is this state space that 
constitutes the non-linearity of the system. 
 One of the possible functions of language, according to Mukařovský (and 
fellow members of the Prague Linguistic Circle such as Roman Jakobson), is the 
“aesthetic function”. The aesthetic function is not synonymous with Art – indeed, 
along with his contemporaries such as John Dewey (1934) and twenty first-century 
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phenomenologists such as Mark Johnson (2007), Mukařovský regards it as having 
deep and vital roots in everyday experience – but in works of art the aesthetic 
function is the “dominant” of the system. There are many different kinds of language 
system, according to Mukařovský – systems for communicating scientific ideas, for 
example, or for everyday oral communication – corresponding to different dominant 
functions. But what marks out the verbal work of art – and makes it, of all the 
possible systems, a contexture – is this dominance of the aesthetic function.  The 
aesthetic function does two things: it orients the sign towards the whole of which it is 
a part; and it orients this whole, the contexture, to the whole of the existence of the 
perceiver of the sign.  
 In my extension of Mukařovský’s ideas, through applying them to narrative 
fiction, the dynamic, processual character of the contexture (which Mukařovský 
conceived, at least in theory, in phenomenological terms) is made explicit in the 
concept of series – that is, the experience of temporal and sequential patterns. In 
cognitive science, such patterns go under names such as “image schemata” or “motor 
schemata” (see below). In narrative theory, Menakhem Perry (1979) talks about 
different kinds of “orderings”, while Meir Sternberg (1992) and Raphaël Baroni 
(2007) analyse different patterns of dynamic tension such as curiosity and surprise. 
In the concept of the series these different conceptions of dynamic sequencing are 
brought together and combined with Mukařovský’s concept of the contexture – that 
is of a non-linear system in which the aesthetic function is dominant. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to conceptualize a dynamic system in which the state space is 
made up not of (potential) discrete states, but of concurrent series. Music, I argue, 
provides a model for such a conceptualization, and I point in particular to Fred 
Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff’s (1983; Jackendoff 1987) cognitive theory of music, 
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which provides analogues in particular for the kinds of narrative tension that 
Sternberg and Baroni describe. The musicality of the text, as Barthes (1974 [1970]) 
suggests, lies in the non-linear (“tabular”) concurrence of its series (“codes”). 
 The third part of the theoretical framework uses the phenomenological 
concept of disclosure to address the question of experientiality  in modern 
(nineteenth- and twentieth-century) narrative fiction. Here, crucially, I am 
concerned both with the representation of experience in narrative and with the 
reader’s experience of narrative. Where the first part of my theoretical framework 
drew attention to the capacity of printed discourse to multiply within itself ever more 
complex differentiations of context and attentional framing, this third part focusses 
on how these resources (including, for example, the deployment of graphic 
punctuation) have been used by modern narrative fiction to bring to awareness – to 
realize, that is, in the experience of reading – the relation between different levels of 
consciousness. In particular, I argue, modern fiction articulates a cyclical relation 
between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness – between, in the terms of 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, “core” and “extended” consciousness (Damasio 
1999, 195-200).  
This cyclical dynamic involved in the evocation of consciousness in modern 
narrative fiction can be described, I show, either in third-person” or first-person 
(phenomenological) terms. In third-person terms it can be described as an oscillation 
between expressive and representational elements, between internal and external 
views. In first-person, phenomenological terms it can be described as a process of 
mutual disclosure as between subjectivity and objectivity that brings to awareness 




The Interdisciplinarity of the Thesis 
This thesis is thoroughly interdisciplinary. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, in 
the Preface to The Meaning of Meaning (1923), provide the following justification for 
interdisciplinarity:   
There are some who find difficulty in considering any matter unless they can 
recognize it as belonging to what is called “a subject” and who recognize a 
subject as something in which, somewhere at least, Professors give instruction 
and perhaps Examinations are undergone. These need only be reminded that 
at one time there were no subjects and until recently only five. (Ogden and 
Richards (1946 [1923], vii) 
In thirty, fifty or a hundred years’ time, one can safely predict, the geography of the 
humanities, and their relation to the sciences, will not look as they look today. New 
subjects emerge out of interdisciplinarity: narratology, born out of the conjunction of 
literary theory/criticism and structuralist semiotics, is being transformed not only by 
its confluence with the study of narrative in other media (Ryan 2004; Meister 2005; 
Ryan and Thon 2014), but by its contact with other fields – most notably for this 
thesis, with the cognitive sciences (Crane and Richardson 1999; Herman 2003a; 
Richardson 2004; Zunshine 2012). And the cognitive sciences themselves do not 
constitute a discipline, but, so to speak, an inter-discipline, originating as they did in 
the post-war period in a confluence of Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, 
Neuroscience, Philosophy and Anthropology (Gardner 1985).2   
                                                 
2 The internal geography of the “cognitive sciences” has changed c onsiderably since the early 1990s as 
a result of the turn to “embodied” and “enactive” approaches to mind and advances in neuroscience: 
where the original cognitive revolution (sometimes known simply as “cognitivism”) had Artificial 
Intelligence, Cognitive Psy chology and (Chomsky ean) linguistics at its core, developmental and 
evolutionary psychology and neuroscience today have a greater salience. Thompson (2007, 10 -12) 
uses the term “embodied dynamicism” to draw attention to the importance for the enactive approach 
of “dy namic systems” theory. An important example of the emergence of new forms of 
interdisciplinarity within the cognitive sciences is the growth since the 1990s of “consciousness 
studies” as a field (see Chapter Three, subsection 1 .1, below). 
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Four disciplinary traditions contribute to my exploration of the mediation and 
dynamics of narrative fiction – Post-classical narratology, Second-Generation 
Cognitive Science, Semiotics and Phenomenology: 
1) Post-classical Narratology 
The transition from classical to post-classical narratology can be characterised 
as one between, on the one hand, an approach to narrative that analyses the text in 
terms of its underlying structure, and, on the other hand, an approach to narrative 
that looks to contexts as motivating processes of reception and meaning-formation. 
Angsar Nünning has given a detailed summary in tabular form of the range of 
differences between classical and post-classical narratology (Nünning 2008, 243-4).3  
Of his distinctions, the following are most relevant in the context of this thesis:  
Structuralist (‘classical’) Narratology  New (‘postclassical’) Narratologies  
text-centered context-oriented 
main focus on closed systems and static 
products 
main focus on open and dy namic processes 
“features”, “properties” of a text as main object 
of study  
the dy namics of the reading process (reading 
strategies, interpretive choices, preference rules) 
as main object of study 
ahistorical and sy nchronous historical and diachronous in orientation 
a (relatively) unified (sub)discipline an interdisciplinary project consisting of 
heterogeneous approaches   
 
An inventory of the right-hand side of this table captures some of the main features 
of the approach taken here. The joint attentional approach of Chapter One places 
context, in the form of intersubjective mediation, at the heart of narrative 
                                                 
3 On the differences between classical and post-classical narratology, see also Herman 1997, where the 
term was first coined. 
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signification. In Chapter Two I examine in detail some closed and open forms of 
systematicity and process in relation to narrative, and propose a conception of the 
systematicity of narrative fiction that draws on dynamic systems theory. In both 
Chapters Two and Three I am concerned with what Nünning calls “the dynamics of 
the reading process” – in Chapter Two from the third-person perspective of the 
systematicity of narrative fiction, and in Chapter Three from the first-person 
perspective of the phenomenology of the reading experience. The approach taken 
here is also thoroughly “diachronous” in that it is based on a genetic approach – that 
is, an approach that sees structures as snapshots of genetic, cumulative processes 
(see Chapter One section 1.1). These processes are not just historical (on which, see 
the discussion below), but also evolutionary, developmental and at the level of the 
unfolding of the individual phenomenon. The interdisciplinarity of my approach lies 
in its bringing together narratological concerns (for example, embedded narrative; 
the construction of character; narrative linearity and non-linearity; experientiality in 
narrative fiction) with, as I shall now outline, an approach to the mind and its 
interaction with the narrative text that draws on second-generation cognitivism, 
semiotics and phenomenology. 
2) Second-Generation Cognitivism 
The original cognitive revolution had had at its heart the notion that 
perception and cognition consist in the manipulation, on the model of algorithmic 
digital computation, of mental, symbolic representations of the world and its 
objects.4  The various strands of second-generation cognitivism, by contrast, share an 
                                                 
4 The locus classicus for such an analysis is David Marr’s account of v isual perception and the 
construction of the three-dimensional object through discrete “levels of representation” (“primal 
sketch”, “2½D sketch”, “3D model”) (Marr 2000 [1982]). Ray  Jackendoff, in Consciousness and the 
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opposition to the idea, inherent in this classical cognitivist view, that there is a 
Cartesian divide that can be made between the physical object and its mental 
representation. The philosopher Mark Johnson, in his The Body in Mind: The Bodily 
Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason (1987), calls this view “objectivism” – 
that is, the view that 
[t]he world consists of objects that have properties and stand in various 
relations independent of human understanding [. . .] [that] there is a rational 
structure to reality, independent of the beliefs of any particular people, and 
correct reason mirrors this rational structure. (Johnson 1987, x) 
According to the second-generation cognitivist, by contrast, mental processes cannot 
be abstracted from the body of which the brain is inextricably a part, or from the 
wider contexts in which they take place, such as interactions with the physical 
environment, with other minds, and with external cognitive and cultural tools. 
This Second-Generation view of cognition is sometimes referred to with the 
mnemonic “4E cognition” – that is, “embodied”, “enactive”, “embedded” and 
“extended” (Menary 2010). An example of embodied cognition, which will play an 
important part in the account of the dynamic dimension of narrative in Chapter Two 
(subsection 2.2.), is the role played by “image schemata” in language and thought. 
Image schemata such as SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, CONTAINER, CENTRE-PERIPHERY  and 
SY MMETRY  are, in the words of Beate Hampe, “directly meaningful (‘experiential’/ 
‘embodied’), preconceptual structures, which arise from, or are grounded in, human 
recurrent bodily movements through space, perceptual interactions, and ways of 
manipulating objects”: these structures “exist as continuous and analogue patterns 
                                                 
Computational Mind (1987) compares these “levels of representation” with parallel representational  
structures for the perception of language and music (see Chapter Two, subsection 2.3.).  
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beneath conscious awareness” (Hampe 2005a, 1; emphasis in original).5  This 
formulation of the concept of image schemata also reflects the notions of enactive 
(Varela et al 1991) and embedded (or “situated”) (Robbins and Aydede 2009) 
cognition – that is, of cognition’s being constituted not by static representations, but 
by dynamic contexts of on-going action. According to the enactive view, the nervous 
system is an “autonomous dynamic system” that “actively generates and maintains 
its own coherent and meaningful patterns of activity”: it “does not process 
information in the computationalist sense, but creates meaning” (Thompson 2007, 
13). 
In Chapter One (subsection 3.3), in the context of a discussion of the notion of 
character, I look at how contemporary cognitive narratology  continues to be 
influenced by objectivist assumptions whereby characters are seen as idealized 
objects or entities with attributes that form the basis of mental representations. What 
is missing in this view is acknowledgment of the intrinsic importance of the process 
by which any such representation is arrived at. (A key component of this process, I 
argue, is constituted by the complex, embedded forms of joint attentional mediation 
made possible by written and printed narrative.) Narrative should be seen 
fundamentally as a process rather than a representation: in the words of Viktor 
                                                 
5 Hampe is here summarising definitions from two of the original advocates of the concept of “image 
schemata” – George Lakoff (1987) and Mark Johnson (1987). Modern use of the term can be traced 
back to Kant: in the Critique of Pure Reason, the “schema” is described as a “mediating 
representation” between transcendental categories and phenomena (see especially the chapter “Of the 
Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding” (Kant 1934 [1787], 117-220). It is to be 
distinguished from the image, for Kant, in that while the image is an object of experience, the schema 
is “without any empirical content [. .] and y et must on the one side be intellectual, and on the other 
sensuous” (Kant 1934[1787], 117). Rather than being an object of experience, the schema manifests 
itself in the process of “schematism”, a procedure of the “imagination” whereby the object is related to 
a pure conception through its delineation as a “schema”. “This schematism of our understanding in 
regard to phenomena and their mere form,” writes Kant, “is an art, hidden in the depths of the human 




Shklovsky which I use as an epigraph for Chapter Two, “[a]rt is a device for 
experiencing the process of becoming: that which has already become is of no 
importance for art” (quoted in Perry 1979, 41). This enactive and processual (as 
opposed to representationalist) view is developed in the body of Chapter Two, in the 
form of the concept of “series” – that is, sequences of phenomena (for example, the 
unfolding of schemata, or the movement of different forms of narrative tension such 
as suspense or curiosity) that make up the experience of narrative text’s dynamism. 
To return to the four “E’s” of “second-generation” cognitivism: extended 
cognition refers to the idea that mental processes do not take place simply within the 
confines of the skull, but, rather, are extended across external vehicles or cognitive 
artefacts that play an (inter)active part in shaping cognition (Hutchins 1995; Rupert 
2009; Menary 2010b). In this thesis, the notion of the extended mind is manifested 
in the active part played by semiotics and different forms of semiosis in bringing to 
awareness particular aspects of narrative (its situated quality, for example (Chapter 
One), or its experiential aspect (Chapter Three)): as I.A. Richards suggests at the 
opening of Principles of Literary Criticism, a book is a “machine to think with” 
(Richards 1960 [1924], “Preface” (n.p.)). I turn now to this semiotic aspect of my 
argument. 
3) Semiotics 
Two aspects of the argument put forward in this thesis draw on semiotics. In 
Chapter One, narrative signification is derived from a general theory of the origins of 
sign-use in current developmental and evolutionary psychology: this theory centres 
on the concept of “joint attention” (Scaife and Bruner 1975; Moore and Dunham 
1995; Tomasell0 1999; Eilan et al 2005). Though the concept of joint attention has 
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much to say about the origins and function of language, it applies to all human sign-
use: when applied to the study of narrative, it can elucidate aspects of narrative that 
escape theoretical approaches derived from a purely linguistic, oral model. Thus in 
Chapter One I show how the writing and printing of narrative offers affordances for 
multiple levels of joint attentional embedding (that is, making a joint attentional 
situation the object of framing acts of joint attention): this capacity for internal 
differentiation of embedded joint attentional situations, I argue, plays a crucial part 
in the development of “character” in fiction. In Chapter Two, where I discuss the 
linear and non-linear facets of narrative, I make a link between, on the one hand, the 
idea (famously put forward by Edgar Allan Poe) that a short story springs from (or is 
directed towards) an image, and, on the other hand, the semiotics of the photograph 
(Chapter Two subsection 3.1). The connection is possible, I argue – against Lessing’s 
famous division between the temporal and spatial arts (Lessing 1984 [1766]) – 
because, on the one hand, the photograph is not “timeless” , but has different 
concurrent temporalities contained within it, and, on the other hand, because the 
short story has a spatial, imagistic and ekphrastic quality. This sub-theme of the 
relation between narrative and photography continues in the last chapter (subsection 
3.2), where, in the context of a discussion of the relations between expressive and 
representational forms of discourse, I consider the use of photographs in works by 
W.G. Sebald and Georges Rodenbach. In both cases – in the case of the imagistic 
notion of the short story and of the incorporation of photography into narrative 
fiction – a semiotic perspective is adopted that goes beyond the oral communicative 
model. 
 In Section 4 of Chapter One, I draw out the implications of the joint 
attentional approach for the semiotics of narrative fiction. In particular, I draw 
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attention to historical alternatives to Saussure’s dyadic model of communication in 
the form of triadic models (Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923]; Bühler 1990 [1934]) 
that situate the sign in relation not only to the participants in the act of 
communication, but also with respect to the reference of the sign – in other words, in 
relation to the sign’s intentionality  towards, action upon, or interactivity with, a 
context: language, according to this view, is a tool, an instrument – and as such, it 
can simultaneously serve different functions. This, simultaneity of function, this 
polyfunctionality, as it is developed by the Prague structuralists, forms the basis of 
the concept of a non-linear dimension to narrative put forward in Chapter Two: any 
individual segment of narrative may stand at the confluence of multiple streams of 
intentionality: a description in a novel of a man entering a building, for example, may 
tell us about the kind of man he is (his social class, for example, his occupation, his 
looks), it may tell us about the kind of building it is, how it fits into the social and 
physical geography of the city. But at the same time it may be serving a different 
function – for example it may be set up, in context, to arouse the reader’s curiosity, to 
create narrative tension: What is the man going to do inside the building? What will 
he discover? 
Roland Barthes gestures towards this kind of non-linearity at the beginning of 
S/Z, where he discusses the interrelation between the five codes by which he analyses 
Balzac’s Sarrasine. “The five codes,” he writes, “create a kind of network, a topos 
through which the entire text passes (or rather, in passing, becomes text)” (Barthes 
1974, 20). At another point he describes the text as being “comparable at every point 
to a (classical) musical score” (28), as being “polyphonic”, as being endowed by the 
five codes “with a kind of plural quality” (30). “The classic text,” he writes, “is 
actually tabular (and not linear), but its tabularity is vectorised, it follows a logico-
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temporal order” (30). Barthes develops these thoughts no further. But they indicate a 
direction that had already been taken earlier by the Prague structuralists, especially 
Mukařovský, who had evolved a concept of systematicity that that was able to 
account for the “vectorization” of the “tabularity” of the text (in other words, for the 
interdependence of linear and non-linear dimensions) in a way that Barthes’ 
fragmentary and impressionistic comments were unable to do.  
A key concept in Chapter Two, which I draw from the Prague structuralists, is 
that of the aesthetic function in relation to language and other signs. According to 
Mukařovský, in a piece of discourse in which the aesthetic function is dominant 
(such as a narrative fiction, for example), there is an increase in the polyfunctionality 
of the language subsumed under the aesthetic function: this is because whereas a 
purely representational use of language directs attention towards specific aspects of 
reality, the aesthetic function is oriented towards the whole of the subject’s (that is, 
the reader’s or perceiver’s) existence. A natural consequence of this expansion in 
point of view is a greater latitude as to the functions that may be conceived: a 
dominance of the aesthetic function increases the polyfunctionality of the language 
over which it operates. 
The term function is used by the Prague structuralist Mukařovský in a 
different sense from the way it is used, for example, by the Parisian structuralist 
Barthes: 
The end of all structuring activity [. . .] is to reconstitute an ‘object’, in such a 
fashion as to manifest in this reconstitution the rules of function (the 
“functions”) of this object. The structure is thus made into a simulacrum of the 
object, but a simulacrum which is directed, interested, since the imitating 
object makes something appear which remained invisible, or if one prefers, 
unintelligible in the natural object. (Quoted in Magliola 1977, 85-6) 
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A function, for Barthes, is a rule governing the internal operation of an ideal object (a 
“simulacrum”): in terms of the analogy famously made by the Russian Formalists, 
the function is like the role that a particular part plays in a machine. For 
Mukařovský, by contrast, the function represents a particular mode by which 
language mediates between self and world. These terms self and world are 
phenomenological in orientation, and it is the influence of phenomenology 
(specifically, of Husserl) that (as I shall explore in Chapter Two subsection 1.1.) 
marks the crucial difference in conceptions of semiotics, function and system 
between the Prague and Parisian versions of structuralism.6  
4) Phenomenology 
As I show in Chapter Two (subsection 1.1.), the phenomenological orientation 
of Prague structuralism enabled its development of an open and non-linear notion of 
structure or system: the openness of the system consisted in the system’s acting as a 
mediation between self and world, while the non-linearity (I am using here a term 
that is not used by the Prague structuralists themselves) consisted in the simultaneity 
of potential modes (functions) that that mediation could take. The difference 
between the Prague and Parisian versions of structuralism in this respect can be 
traced back to the basic difference between phenomenological and Parisian 
structuralist conceptions of the sign – and this comes back to a difference between, 
on the one hand, a dyadic conception of semiosis as a Saussurean “speech circuit” 
between the sender and receiver of a message, and, on the other hand, a triadic 
                                                 
6 This influence is also mediated by the influence of Husserl on Karl Bühler, particular in terms of 
Husserl’s notion of language as a “sense-conferring act” (Bühler 1990 [1934], 10-13, 72-80): Bühler, 
was, in turn, an important influence on Mukařovský. Robert Innis, summarizing Bühler’s conception 
of language as a form of action, writes: “As dependent on acts, in the Husserlian sense, language 
refers us back to the constituting acts of consciousness as conditions of sense, for without these acts – 
as acts of meaning, of intending, of abstracting – the ‘dead’ material of the language sound or mark 
cannot be endowed with sense” (Innis 1982, 17).  
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conception that sees the sign as mediating the triangle of sender, receiver and 
referent. This, for example, is how Paul Ricoeur, in a 1969 lecture, distinguishes 
between the “differential value” of the lexical entry for a word, and its “meaning” as it 
emerges in a sentence: 
In the sentence we experience language not as an object, not as a closed 
system, but a mediation [. . .] We recapture here the essential function of 
language, which consists of saying something about something. In the 
sentence and through the sentence language escapes [transcends] itself 
towards what it says. It goes beyond itself and disappears and dissolves into 
its intentional referent. (Quoted in Magliola 1977, 82) 
As Robert Magliola argues, while Parisian structuralism excises both referent and 
subject from the closed system of signifier-signified, “for the phenomenologist, 
meaning (in and through language) arises from the action, or more precisely the 
interaction, between self and world” (Magliola 1977, 83). 
 This connection between semiotics and phenomenology, broached by the 
Prague structuralists, is one that runs through this thesis. At the beginning of 
Chapter One (subsection 1.1.), in the context of preparing the ground for my view of 
narrative as a form of intersubjective mediation, I invoke the concept of 
“internalization” developed in the 1920s and 1930s by the Russian psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky – that is, the idea that much mental functioning and consciousness consists 
in the playing out in the internal, intrasubjective domain of relations that had 
initially presented themselves in the external, intersubjective domain. To use the 
term employed by evolutionary psychologist Merlin Donald, humans have, as 
between biology and culture, “hybrid” minds (Donald 2001, 12): 
The main difference between apes and us is culture, or more specifically 
symbolic culture, which is largely outside, not inside, the brain box. Culture 
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distributes cognitive activity across many brains and dominates the minds of 
its members. (149) 
A continuing refrain in both Chapter One and Chapter Three is that changes in 
semiotic technology, such as the transition from oral to literate narrative (the 
“technologizing of the word”, in Walter Ong’s (1982) phrase), brings to awareness or 
brings to consciousness aspects of language and mind that had previously been latent 
(or, to use a term popular with the Prague structuralists, un-“actualized”).  
Thus in Chapter Three (subsections 2.1 and 2.2) I argue that the semiotic 
potentialities of print (and of the integration of print with photography (subsection 
3.2)) enable the actualization of cycles of subjectivity and objectivity analogous to the 
disclosure inherent in phenomenological experience – that is, the way that the 
intentionality of consciousness is always transcending, passing through and beyond, 
particular presentations of phenomena. The key potentiality of writing and print in 
this respect has its roots in the particular and paradoxical dynamic that it 
instantiates between interiority and exteriority. Walter Ong has argued that the 
spoken word has a particular and close relationship with interiority because it 
consists of sound, which has a unique capacity to make interiority manifest:  
Sound [. .] reveals the interior without the necessity of physical invasion. Thus 
we tap a wall to discover where it is hollow inside [. . .] To discover such things 
by sight, we should have to open what we examine, making the inside an 
outside, destroying its interiority as such. Sound reveals interiors because its 
nature is determined by interior relationships. The sound of a violin is 
determined by the interior structure of its strings, of its bridge, and of the 
wood in its soundboard, by the shape of the interior cavity in the body of the 
violin, and other interior conditions. (Ong 1967, 118) 
The spoken word “moves from interior to interior” (125), and “[i]n all human 
cultures the spoken word appears as the closest sensory equivalent of fully developed 
interior thought” (138): thus, by enveloping an audience in this interiority, the 
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spoken word, the voice, “has a kind of primacy in the formation of true communities 
of men, groups of individuals constituted by shared awarenesses” (124). In addition, 
“[t]he interiorizing force of the oral words relates in a special way to the sacral, to the 
ultimate concerns of existence [. . .] ‘The letter kills, the spirit [breath, on which rides 
the spoken word] gives life’ (2 Corinthians 3:6)” (Ong 1982, 74-5; parenthesis Ong’s).   
Writing and print, by contrast, are manifested by sight, which “situates the 
observer outside what he views, at a distance” (Ong 1982, 72). On the other hand, as 
Wolfgang Iser points out in The Act of Reading, a text is not an object in the sense 
that, say, a statue is an object – that is, something that we can take in at one view. 
There is a sense in which the reader is always travelling “inside” the text:  
We always stand outside the given object, whereas we are situated inside the 
literary text. The relation between text and reader is therefore quite different 
from that between object and observer: instead of a subject-object 
relationship, there is a moving viewpoint which travels along inside that which 
it has to apprehend. This mode of grasping an object is unique to literature. 
(Iser 1978, 108-9) 
A similar point is made by the phenomenological critic Georges Poulet: 
[T]he extraordinary fact in the case of a book is the falling away of the barriers 
between you and it. You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer either 
outside or inside [. . .] [W]hat I glimpse through the words are mental forms 
[that] do not seem to be of a nature other than my mind which thinks them. 
They are objects, but subjectified objects. (Poulet 1969, 55-6). 
A recurring theme in this thesis, as regards the phenomenology of reading, is this 
potentiality of written narrative to instantiate different forms of oscillation between 
outside and inside, exteriority and interiority, subject and object: in Chapter One, we 
see it in the form of the embedding of narratives (whereby the “outside” of one 
narrative, the context of its narration, forms the “inside” of another narrative), and in 
Chapter Three we see it in the cycles of objectivity and subjectivity that characterise 
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experientiality in modern fiction. But as Walter Ong notes of interiority and 
exteriority, these terms 
are not mathematical concepts and cannot be differentiated mathematically. 
They are existentially grounded concepts, based on experience of one’s own 
body, which is both inside me (I do not ask you to stop kicking my body but to 
stop kicking me) and outside me (I feel myself as in some sense inside my 
body). The body is a frontier between myself and everything else. What we 
mean by ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ can be conveyed only by reference to 
experience of bodiliness. (Ong 1982, 72-3) 
Thus in Chapter Three (subsection 2.2.) I invoke in particular the embodied 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty to describe the involutions of inside and outside, 
of subjectivity and objectivity, that characterise the “body” of the modern narrative 
fiction text. 
 
Scope of Historical and Literary Reference 
Although, as I have just indicated, I draw on recent theoretical and empirical 
work in the cognitive sciences and narrative theory, I am also concerned with re-
evaluating approaches from the past. Significant shifts in ideas are characteristically 
accompanied by reassessments of the past and challenges to established canons: 
often these shifts provoke, or are provoked by, the (re)discovery or reassessment of 
figures who may have been neglected or marginalized. The awakening of interest in 
the scientific investigation of consciousness since the 1990s, for example, has been 
accompanied by a refreshed appreciation of the writings of William James (see, for 
example, Edelman 1992, 6, 36-37; Damasio 1999, 38-39, 287-89). Or one could point 
to the example of Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934), the discovery of whose writings by 
psychologists in the West in the 1960s (see Chapter One subsection 1.1) has played a 
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significant part in developmental psychology’s moving beyond Piaget towards an 
appreciation of the social and cultural dimensions of cognition (Bruner 1986, 70-78). 
 Historical revisionism, similarly, is key to the vitality of humanities, as a 
counterweight to the tendency to build a field or discipline not on clearly articulated 
questions and problems, but on exegesis of, and extrapolation from, canonical 
schools and authors: the effect of this tendency is for the field to become defined, 
conservatively and tautologically, by the smooth progress and development of the 
tradition. In the case of narratology, this danger can be seen in the entrenchment of a 
well-worn path from Saussure and Propp to Parisian structuralism of the 1960s, and 
then on to 
[p]ostclassical approaches [. .] [which] encompass frameworks for narrative 
research that build on this classical tradition but supplement it with concepts 
and methods that were unavailable to story  analysts such as Barthes, Genette, 
Greimas and Todorov during the heyday of structuralism. (Herman 2007a, 12) 
I have attempted to avoid this trap by referring not just to theorists who are part of 
the tradition, but also to those who – either by reason of historical accident or 
intellectual incompatibility – have fallen outside it. There are two principal (and 
interrelated) examples of this in what follows: firstly, triadic  (or what I call 
“situated”) semiotics as an alternative to the Saussurean model that has underlain 
classical narratology; and secondly, the distinctive version of structuralism that 
emerged from the Prague Linguistic Circle in the 1930s, a version in which a 
phenomenological orientation enabled the development of a conception of structure 
more open and dynamic than that to be found in the later Parisian structuralism 
that, again, has underlain classical narratology. 
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In Chapter One Section 4 I argue for the importance for narratology of 
semiotic theories, roughly contemporaneous with Saussure, that differ radically from 
Saussure in their contextualism – that is, their insistence that language has to be 
understood in terms of a “referential triangle” that links communication to its 
referential context. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards’ The Meaning of Meaning (1923) 
takes issue with Saussure for “neglecting entirely the things for which signs stand” 
(Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923], 6): 
A sign for de Saussure is twofold, made up of a concept (signifié) and an 
acoustic image (signifiant), both psychical entities. Without the concept, he 
says, the acoustic image would not be a sign. The disadvantage of this account 
is [. .] that the process of interpretation is included by definition in the sign! 
(5) 
Karl Bühler, too, in his Theory of Language (1934), rejects this automatic association 
that Saussure sets up between the binary pair of “acoustic image” and “concept”, 
describing it as “this most disastrous of all material fallacies” which confuses 
conventional association with “the experience of meaning itself” (Bühler 1990 
[1934], 68; emphasis in the original). The latter, for Bühler, includes not just the 
social, conventional aspect on which Saussure focusses, but also the individual’s 
“meaning-conferring acts” (79): this concept, which Bühler draws from Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations, he understands as the “different acts of meaning in which 
the ‘object we mean’ is constituted” (256). And behind both Bühler and Ogden and 
Richards stands Charles Peirce, for whom the sign “stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity”, this something for which it stands being the 
“object” of the sign (Peirce 1955, 99).7  In Chapter One Section 4 I show how these 
                                                 
7 Peirce is not referred to by Bühler, but is an important influence on I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden 




contextualist, instrumental conceptions of language support the view of narrative as 
being based on an intersubjective, triadic mediation between sender, receiver and 
narrative object, emerging from the joint attentional situation, rather than on a 
dyadic “communication” between sender and receiver. 
 The second principal revisionist  strand in the thesis is the attention given to 
Prague structuralism of the 1930s and 1940s, and in particular to the work of Jan 
Mukařovský.8  By historical accident, through the dominance of the French version of 
structuralism, this theoretical tradition has remained largely invisible to narratology 
and its relevance for narrative theory neglected, for as Jurij Striedter, a leading 
historian of the Prague Linguistic Circle, has noted: “compared with the strong 
impact Russian Formalism and its transformations have had in France, Czech 
literary Structuralism did not play any significant role in the development of French 
Structuralism” (Streidter 1989, 156-57; c.f. Galan 1985, 1-2). In Chapter Two 
(subsection 1.1) I show how the Prague structuralists developed a distinctive 
conception of literature as made up of interlocking and interacting autonomous 
dynamic systems, a notion quite different from the rigid, spatialized notion of 
structure that we find in the Parisian version of structuralism.  
There is a direct link between the Prague School’s conception of dynamic 
systematicity and the triadic conceptions of semiosis outlined in Section 4 of Chapter 
One.9  For the latter, by conceiving of language as a tool or instrument used for 
particular purposes (according to particular intentionalities) in particular contexts, 
                                                 
8 The “Prague Linguistic Circle” was inaugurated in 1926. Its members would come to include, in 
addition to Mukařovský, Roman Jakobson, Felix Vodička and René Wellek. Foreign scholars who 
addressed the Circle during the 1930s included Husserl, Boris Tomashevsky and Emile Benveniste. 
For historical overviews, see Galan 1985 and Striedter 1989.  




paved the way both for language to be conceived simultaneously according to 
different functions through structures of embedding, and also for the functions of 
particular linguistic features to be seen as changing over time through 
recontextualization. Where Saussure envisaged a rigid demarcation between 
synchronic and diachronic aspects of language (and advocated a concentration by 
linguistics on the synchronic) the Prague structuralists envisaged “no 
insurmountable barrier between the synchronic and diachronic methods, as 
claimed by the Geneva School [i.e. Saussure]” (Prague Linguistic Circle 1982 [1929], 
6; emphasis in original). As I demonstrate in Chapter Two, the Prague School’s 
integration of the diachronic and synchronic (the linear and“non-linear)  presaged in 
interesting ways the dynamic systems theories that support contemporary enactive 
approaches to cognition (Thompson 2007, 11). 
 To conclude this introduction to some of the principal features of the thesis, I 
will now take the Prague School’s conception of the dynamic systematicity of literary 
history as a framework for setting out and justifying the historical dimension of the 
thesis and its deployment of particular literary examples. For although the intention 
of the thesis is to set out a theoretical framework rather than provide a historical 
account, there is a strong diachronic aspect to the framework.1 0  This diachronicity is 
implicit in the focus, established in Chapter One, on the constitutive significance of 
mediation for narrative: the changing form of mediation (writing, print, or the 
incorporation of images such as photographs) creates affordances for new forms of 
                                                 
10 This diachronic aspect is reflected loosely in the chronological progression of my  literary examples, 
from Boccaccio’s Decameron (1348-53) (Chapter One subsection 2.3) to W.G. Sebald’s Austerlitz 




joint attention, and hence for recontextualizations that generate new forms of 
functionality. This by no means implies a technological determinism, for these 
mediating systems only express themselves as vehicles for concrete values: there is a 
genuine interactivity at work here between the evolution of the mediating system 
and the evolution of the wider cultural systems of which the mediating system forms 
part. 
 Before showing how this interactive dynamic works itself out in the examples I 
take during the course of this thesis, it is necessary first to say a word about this 
concept of interactive systematicity. In his essay “On Structuralism” (1946), 
Mukařovský identifies the key  feature of structure as being motion: 
That which endures is only the identity of a structure in the course of time, 
whereas its internal composition – the correlation of its components – 
changes continuously [. . .] [T]he hierarchy – the mutual subordination and 
superordination of components (which is only the expression of the internal 
unity of a work) – is in a state of constant regrouping. (Mukařovský 1946, 4) 
Structure in the first instance refers to the individual work of art, but the character of 
structure as motion is only seen clearly when the individual work of art is placed in 
its proper historical, temporal context, where it refers both to what has been and 
what is to come: this means that “[e]very work of art, even the most ‘original’, [. .] 
becomes part of a continuous stream passing through time” (Mukařovský 1946, 4). 
This emphasis on literary evolution marks one of the most important initial 
divergences of Czech structuralism from Russian Formalism. The latter, with its 
focus on “devices” by which conventional perceptions are “de-automatized”, had 
emphasised the discontinuity of literary history, just as Saussurean linguistics tended 
towards a picture of language as a succession of synchronic states. In their collective 
“Theses” of 1929, the Prague Circle reject the separation of synchrony and diachrony, 
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pointing out that changes to a system are not necessarily arbitrarily imposed from 
without, but may reflect internal demands of the system itself (i.e. diachrony needs 
synchrony). Equally, however, 
neither can a synchronic description absolutely exclude the notion of 
evolution, for such a synchronic moment reflects the disappearing, present, 
and coming stages. Stylistic elements perceived as archaisms, as well as the 
distinction between productive and nonproductive forms, are evidence of 
diachronic phenomena which cannot be eliminated from synchronic 
linguistics. (Prague Linguistic Circle 1982 [1929], 6; emphasis in original) 
From this synchronic point of view, in other words, any individual work of art is a 
snapshot in which diachronicity, in the form of elements that look to the future and 
elements that look to the past, is an integral part of synchronicity. In Chapter Two I 
illustrate this paradoxical manifestation of the diachronic within synchronicity with 
the example of the photograph (subsection 3.1), and show how this extension of the 
Prague structuralists’ notion of systematicity can illuminate “imagistic” or 
“ekphrastic” forms of narrative such as the short story (subsection 3.2.). 
It is the tension between these various diachronic elements within the 
synchronic structure, according to Mukařovský, that creates the dynamism of the 
work of art. And it is for this reason that  
[t]hough every work of art is in itself structure, the artistic structure is not a 
matter of the single work. It persists in time, passing in its flux from work to 
work and changing constantly in this process. (Mukařovský 1941, 71) 
The dynamism of the individual work of art is thus due to the dynamism of the 
artistic system of which it is a snapshot (a particular literary genre, for example, or 
wider systems such as “the novel” or the “short story”). But in addition, these wider 
diachronic artistic systems that embrace the individual work cannot be treated in 
isolation from wider cultural and social systems: 
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In the history and theory of the arts [. .] not the artistic structure itself but its 
relations to other phenomena, especially psychological and social ones, are 
treated as structural. The scholar takes each of the developmental series as a 
structure. As a structure, it is linked to other series, themselves structures, 
which together form structures of a higher order. (Mukařovský 1941, 70) 
The picture that Mukařovský paints, therefore, is one of multiple interacting dynamic 
systems – or, to be more precise, of multiple dynamic systems that interact by virtue 
of being nested or embedded one in another.1 1  The relationship, in other words, is 
not one simply of external influences, but of wider systems actualizing proclivities 
and dynamics inherent in the embedded system: 
Every impulse originating in one series manifests itself in another as a fact of 
its immanent development. Thus, an impulse for change in art, even if it 
comes from the sphere of social action, can be instrumental only to the degree 
and in the direction necessitated by the previous stage in the development of 
art. (Mukařovský 1941, 70) 
External influence, in other words, expresses itself as immanent development. To use 
a phrase that will recur throughout this thesis, the effect of changes in the enclosing 
system may be to “bring to awareness” or “bring to consciousness” hitherto 
unactivated potentials of the encompassed system.  
 This theoretical perspective, gleaned from Prague structuralism, can be used 
to characterize the impact of mediational changes on the development of narrative, 
and simultaneously serves as a framework for enumerating the literary examples 
                                                 
11 The distinction made above between Russian Formalism and Czech structuralism on the question of 
evolution and sy stematicity should be qualified here, for towards the end of the short-lived Russian 
Formalist movement we find, in the writings of Juri Ty njanov, ideas which point forwards towards 
later developments by the Prague theorists. In his essay “On Literary Evolution” (1927), Ty njanov 
writes: “The correlation of each element of a literary work, as a sy stem, with others, and naturally, 
with the sy stem as a whole, I term the element’s constructional function [. . .] The element 
simultaneously correlates: on the one hand, with the series of similar elements in other works as  
sy stems and [. .] with other elements in its own sy stem” (quoted in Shukman and O’Toole  1977, 33). 
As Peter Steiner comments: “Ty njanov considered systemic not only the organization of each level but 
the interrelations among the levels as well. Thus, the minimal sy stem – the literary work – was a 
variable in the higher literary system, and in turn this sy stem was a variable in the ultimate cultural 
sy stem” (Steiner 1984, 114). 
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deployed in the course of the thesis. In Chapter One, I show firstly how in the 
predominantly oral context of the young child’s interaction with others, there is a 
tendency for narrative to be detached from immediate context and to become the 
object of varied forms of joint attention (subsections 1.3 and 1.4). Then (in 
subsections 2.2. and 2.3.) I show how, in the historical domain, the transition to the 
writing of narrative actualizes and makes explicit this impulse towards 
recontextualization that I have pointed to in the ontogenetic domain: in subsection 
2.2 this is done through a brief survey of critical and theoretical perspectives on 
medieval narrative, and in 2.3 through a focus on the complex structure of 
hierarchical, nonlinear (re)contextualization or “framing” that we find in Boccaccio’s 
Decameron. 
 “Print,” Walter Ong writes, “both reinforces and transforms the effects of 
writing on thought and expression”, accentuating “the shift from sound to visual 
space” (Ong 1982, 117): 
Print situates words in space more relentlessly that writing ever did. Writing 
moves words from the sound world to a world of visual space, but print locks 
words into position in this space. (121) 
Print erases vestiges of the utterance in the written manuscript: it creates a 
possibility for endless mechanical repetition and, through its wider dissemination 
and greater legibility, encourages solitary, silent reading (122). As I describe in 
Section 3 of Chapter One, these changes create possibilities for new and more 
elaborated forms of joint attention. My focus here is on Don Quixote, which among 
many other things is a narrative which explores at multiple levels the effects of print 
on those who read it. My argument is that, in Cervantes’ novel, the mediation of print 
plays a crucial role in the emergence of character as a central node to the dynamics 
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of narrative joint attention: it becomes (like a “character” in the sense of a letter for 
typesetting) a sign – something that we both “read” and “read with”. 
 As noted above, the first two sections of Chapter Two are given over to a 
theoretical discussion of dynamism and systematicity in narrative fiction, and to an 
exposition of the concepts of “contexture” and “series”. In Section 3 I illustrate these 
concepts with a discussion of the short story in the “imagistic”  form advocated and 
practised most famously by Edgar Allan Poe: here I focus for my principal example 
on H.P. Lovecraft’s “The Picture in the House” (1921). The development of the 
modern short story represents a special case, an intensification, of the relation 
between residual orality and print. On the one hand, one finds throughout the 
history of the modern short story, from Poe onwards, invocations of oral forms such 
as the anecdote, the dramatic monologue, the folk-tale etc.1 2  On the other hand, Poe’s 
well-known definition of the short story as capable of being read at one sitting 
(“requiring from a half-hour to one or two hours for its perusal”) emphasises the 
impression made on the solitary consumer of the text, while his emphasis on the 
“preestablished design”, on the “picture” that is “painted” by the writer, suggests a 
fundamentally visual rather than aural conception of the reader’s role (Poe 1994, 61). 
 In my reading of Lovecraft’s “The Picture in the House”, I show how the 
extreme temporal compression of the short story’s ekphrasis, its “speaking out” of 
the image, throws into relief the concurrence of series, much as is done when a 
photograph captures as a single instant the multiple temporalities (clouds passing 
                                                 
12 This orality is marked in Poe’s stories, which are characteristically cast in the form of a first-person 
personal anecdote (“The Fall of the House of Usher”, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue”, “The 
Purloined Letter” etc) or dramatic monologue (“The Tell-Tale Heart”). For a survey of the “oral” 




overhead, people walking down the street) that are concurrently unfolding around us 
in everyday experience: the modern short story represents a distinctly modern 
visual, ekphrastic mode of narrative that, drawing on the differentiation by function 
of experiential series, creates a dynamic structure in which temporal compression 
has squeezed the non-linearity into greater awareness. 
 Before moving on from this discussion of “contexture” – that is, the particular 
form of systematicity, such as narrative fiction, in which the aesthetic function is 
dominant – to an introduction to the historical context and literary examples in the 
explication of experientiality and disclosure, it would be useful to present a rough 
schematic summary of the stages we have gone through in the passage from joint 
attention to contexture, of how these stages are supported by developments in 
semiotic technology, and of how the final chapter of the thesis, on experientiality in 
narrative fiction, fits into this model: 
Joint Attention         
             →  Polyfunctionality 
Function  
Aesthetic function      →     Contexture    →  Orientation to whole of perceiver’s 
existence 
 Orality  → Writing → Print 
 Mediation   → Contexture → Disclosure 
The differentiation of function in the joint attentional situation is fundamental: it is 
based on language’s role in mediating to others differing forms of attention and 
intention towards the world. This differentiation of function leads to ever-greater 
flexibility in the use of language, and this polyfunctionality makes possible the 
development out of the aesthetic function (one of the functions that is differentiated 
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in the joint attentional situation) of the particular kind of language-system termed a 
“contexture”, in which the aesthetic function is dominant. The aesthetic function 
orients the sign to itself as a totality, and also, simultaneously, to the perceiver of the 
sign. Because the aesthetic sign has been to this extent decontextualized (it has 
created its own context – its contexture – by making of itself a whole), its orientation 
to the perceiver is less in regard to specific contexts than with regard, potentially at 
least, to the whole of the perceiver’s existence. This orientation to the whole of the 
perceiver’s existence in turn increases the affordances for polyfunctionality within 
the contexture: the wider the context in which the language is viewed, the greater the 
array of simultaneous functional values that can be assigned to the language. Finally, 
these transformations (which should be understood less as a causal progression or 
history than as representing levels of analysis)1 3  are supported by changes in the 
semiotic mediating technology, from the forms of decontextualization of narrative 
available in purely oral settings (see Chapter One subsection 1.4) to the more radical 
decontextualization of writing (Chapter One Section 2) and the still more radical 
decontextualization and visualization made possible by print (Chapter One Section 
3). 
 In Chapter Three I explore the effect on the experience of narrative – and in 
particular the experience of the experience in narrative – of this radical 
decontextualization and visualization made possible by print. In terms of the literary 
sources I call upon, there are three aspects to my presentation: (1) In subsection 1.2 I 
turn to children’s literature (where we find the visual and sensori-motor interaction 
                                                 
13 In Chapter One subsection 1 .1 I discuss the notion of genetic analysis, as put forward by Vygotsky. A 
key  point about genetic analysis is that it is cumulative rather than simply causal: any stage of 
development retains within itself the previous stages. It is in this sense that the stages outlined above 
represent levels of analysis more than links in a causal chain. 
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of the reader with the text-as-object foregrounded), and consider the presentation of 
consciousness in Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland. Alice in Wonderland is a book 
of “pictures and conversations”, and throughout Carroll’s narrative, as I illustrate, 
Alice’s endless dialogue with herself, her stream of consciousness, is articulated, with 
an elaborate use of punctuation and other graphic marks, as a picture. (2) In the 
following subsection, 1.3, and in subsection 2.1, I set out the arguments for regarding 
Free Indirect Discourse as a distinctly written form of discourse, and link this with 
its pivotal role in articulating the process of phenomenological disclosure through 
cycles of subjectivity and objectivity, expression and representation: these cycles, I 
argue, are characteristic of the experience both of and in modern narrative fiction. 3) 
Finally, in Section 3 I turn to the role of the image in modern narrative fiction’s 
“experientiality” – firstly (subsection 3.1) in the sense of the use of verbal imagery 
(that is, some form of metaphorical translation) to evoke “pre-reflective” 
consciousness, and secondly (subsection 3.2) in the actual use of photographic 
images in narratives by Georges Rodenbach and W.G. Sebald, where the photograph 
becomes not just a documentary verification or representation but a form of 
subjective expression. In both cases, I argue, the affordances offered by 
developments in semiotic technology play a crucial part. And both cases provide 
good examples of Mukařovský’s concept of interacting autonomous cultural systems. 
In the case of the use of verbal imagery for evoking pre-verbal experience, a familiar 
feature of poetic language (imagery) is given new meaning by being channelled 
through a new cyclical narrative dynamics operating between the “expression”n and 
“representation” of consciousness. In the case of the use of the photograph, 
technological changes enabling the close conjunction of photograph and text create 
affordances for fruitful interaction between the distinct semiotic systems of the text 
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and photograph. W.G. Sebald’s narratives serve as an eloquent reminder that 
narrative fiction, from a semiotic point of view, can never be confined purely to the 
level of linguistic “communication”: new forms of mediation (writing, print, the 
incorporation of photographs) substantially change what language is and is capable 
of. 
 The thesis, then, draws on a broad historical range of literary examples, from 
Boccaccio to W.G. Sebald. These examples have been chosen to illustrate both 
particular aspects of the overall theoretical model and also the dynamic, diachronic 
nature of the model itself. Thus the earliest examples (Boccaccio, Cervantes) are 
those which illustrate, in a literary context, the foundational nature of joint attention 
for narrative. In Chapter Two I turn to the post-Edgar Allan Poe short story, 
exemplified here by H.P. Lovecraft’s “The Picture in the House”, as a striking 
instance of the emergence from this joint attentional dynamic of complex forms of 
non-linear systematicity.  Here, particular characteristics arise out of the specific 
historical context of the encounter between, on the one hand, an imagistic 
conception of the short story as a form, and, on the other hand, a distinctively 
modern photographic consciousness. But as I indicate in the Conclusion, the model 
of a non-linear simultaneity of series that we find instantiated here in a particularly 
marked form is one that has traction over a much wider historical domain of literary 
narrative. In Chapter Three, on the other hand, I turn to a feature distinctive to 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century literary narrative: the foregrounding of 
experientiality. While the elevation of consciousness and perceptual experience to a 
central, structuring role in narrative discourse may in part have origins that lie 
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outside the literary system itself,1 4  the forms in which it is expressed – in particular, 
the emergence of a phenomenological series cumulatively integrating subjective and 
objective perspectives – are made possible by the dynamics of joint attention and 
non-linear systematicity outlined in the previous two chapters. The choice of 
particular examples is thus intended to illustrate the dual aspects of continuity and 
evolution inherent in the model itself.  
                                                 
14 On this wider context for the concern with consciousness in modernist narrative – a context that lies 
bey ond the scope of this thesis – see Judith Ry an 1991. 
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CHAPTER ONE. NARRATIVE MEDIATION 
In the Introduction to Narrative Discourse (1972), Gérard Genette distinguishes 
between three different “aspects of narrative reality”: 1) the story, which is “the 
signified or narrative content”, 2) the narrative, which is “the signifier, statement, 
discourse or narrative text itself”, and 3) the narrating, which is “the producing 
narrative action and, by extension, the whole of the real or fictional situation in 
which that action takes place” (Genette 1980 [1972], 27). The terms in which Genette 
casts the distinction between 1) and 2), between the “narrative” (the textual signifier) 
and the “story” (the conceptual signified) signals his debt to Saussure. In his Course 
in General Linguistics (1915), Saussure initially uses the terms “sound-image” and 
“concept” for signifier and signified: “[t]he linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a 
name, but a concept and a sound image” (Saussure 1959 [1915], 66). The relationship 
between the concept and the sound-image is purely “psychological”, since the sound-
image is “not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but  the psychological 
imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses”  (66). The 
association between any particular signifier and signified is arbitrary  not in the sense 
that it is a matter of individual choice, but in the sense that it is “unmotivated”, 
having “no natural connection with the signified” (69). In place of any natural (e.g. 
iconic) connection, there is the connection forged by social convention, embodied in 
the total linguistic system in which that particular association of concept and sound-
image is embedded. That total linguistic system, Saussure calls the langue.1 5   
These then, are the Saussurean terms by which Genette wishes the distinction 
between his first two aspects of narrative to be understood: the story is the signified, 
                                                 
15 For a fuller discussion of Saussure’s concept of langue, and of the differences between Saussure’s 
model of language and the approach taken in this chapter, see Section four, below.  
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and the narrative or narrative discourse the signifier. But his third aspect, the 
narrating, introduces a different element. This would seem to belong to what 
Saussure called parole (speech), as opposed to langue (language) – that is, a 
concrete speech-act performed in a specific context. Saussure was clear that langue 
and parole should be kept quite separate by semiology, with langue forming the 
main focus of attention and parole (the “executive side”) playing a subsidiary role 
(Saussure 1959 [1915], 66). But for Genette the two are linked as two prongs of a 
triad, with narrative or narrative discourse at its apex: “As narrative, [narrative 
discourse] lives by its relationship to the story that it recounts; as discourse, it lives 
by its relationship to the narrating that utters it” (Genette 1980 [1972], 29).1 6  
These distinctions form the basis of Genette’s separation of “Mood” and 
“Voice” as categories of analysis. Mood is “[n]arrative ‘representation,’ or, more 
exactly, narrative information” (162), while “Voice” refers to the “generating 
instance” or “enunciating” of that information (213): the analysis of “Mood” looks at 
how, for example, narrative “information” is filtered through “distance” (162-64) or 
“focalization” (189-98), while “Voice” directs the analyst towards such issues as the 
role of the “narrator” (255-59) and the relationship between different narrative 
“levels” where one “narrating instance” is embedded in another (227-37). The 
distinction between “Mood” and “Voice” is the distinction between  
                                                 
16 Far from giv ing narrating/parole a secondary role, in his book of second thoughts, Narrative 
Discourse Revisited, Genette displaces narrative from its primary role as “mediator” between the 
other two: it is now the narrating that is primary , with “the narrative act initiating (inventing) both 




the question who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative 
perspective? and the very different question who is the narrator? – or, more 
simply, the question who sees? and the question who speaks? (186) 
In his essay “Person, Level, Voice: A Rhetorical Reconsideration” (2010), Richard 
Walsh characterizes Genette’s distinction in terms of the difference between 
“communicative” and “rhetorical” models of narrative, and questions whether they 
are compatible in the way that Genette tries to make them. In the “communicative 
model” (Genette’s “Mood”), “the narrating instance is situated within the structure of 
narrative representation, as a literal communicative act (that is, as a discursive event 
that forms part of a chain of narrative transmission),” whereas the “rhetorical” model 
“invert[s] the hierarchy of that relationship between structure and act” such that 
“narrative representation is not conceived as a structure within which a 
communicative model of narrative acts is implied, but as an act itself, the 
performance of a real-world communicative gesture” (Walsh 2011, 35). 
 We have here, then, a paradoxical relationship whereby that which was 
“inside” the communicative act considered as “representation” (i.e. the narrating 
instance) can become, in the rhetorical act, the “outside” of a “represented” 
communicative act: 
In fiction, transmission is an element of the rhetoric of represented telling – 
that is, representing an intra-fictional narrative discourse as if you were 
transmitting an extant discourse. Acts of narrative representation, in other 
words, are themselves among the possible objects of narrative representation: 
one of the things a story may be about is the telling of a story. (Walsh 2011, 
36-37) 
This strange inter-relation of “inside” and “outside” in narrative fiction is a recurrent 
theme in this thesis: in this present chapter I pursue it with reference to “stories 
about the telling of stories” (taking Boccaccio’s Decameron as an example) and 
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character (referring especially to Don Quixote), while in Chapter Three it is discussed 
with reference to the narrative representation of consciousness and experience, and 
to the relationship between those narrative representations and phenomenological 
“disclosure”. An important part of my argument in both chapters is that the semiotic 
technology of visually representing language through writing and print plays a key 
role in engineering this inversion whereby the communication of information 
becomes the inside of an act of representation. 
 Walsh’s approach to this paradox is through the recursive possibilities of 
Plato’s distinction between diegesis and mimesis, which can be seen as “two 
hierarchical modes of fictive representation” (41). “Fictive” refers here to the 
“rhetorical gesture of fictionality” that constitutes the fictional narrative and that, 
ultimately, consists in an act of representation (41). This “rhetorical gesture”, though 
necessarily made up of words, is semiotic rather than merely linguistic (fictions can 
take on many different forms of mediation): “as rhetoric it is necessarily 
communicative; as a gesture it is semiotic, but not intrinsically linguistic” (45). In 
this chapter I pursue the second of these two avenues of investigation opened up by 
Walsh: towards the semiotic, trans-linguistic basis of narrative fiction. As a gesture, 
narrative is not confined by, to put it in Saussurean terms, the “codes” of langue, but 
belongs, as Walsh puts it, to the “real world”: it points beyond language itself. 
Contrary to Saussure, language is motivated by contexts that transcend the language. 
In this chapter I present an account of narrative signification – Walsh’s “gesture of 
fictionality” – rooted in the idea that context is not an add-on extra to language: 
language, I argue, is intrinsically contextual in a way that has important implications 
40 
 
for the ways writers produce and readers understand and respond to fictional 
narrative.1 7  
For Genette, as we have seen, the questions “who speaks?” and “who sees?” 
are distinct: language and vision are separable. Yet from a semiotic point of view – 
regarding language, that is, as a kind of sign – the separation may not be that 
sustainable. Karl Bühler (to whose contextualist or “situated” semiotics I will return 
below, in Section five of this chapter) points out in his Theory of Language (1934) 
that in the etymology of “the usual words for signs [,] [. .] words such as Zeichen 
(sign), σήμα (sign), δείξις (pointing), signum, seign[,] [. .] two factors that are 
originally registered are ‘brightness, visibility’ or ‘to make bright and visible’ on the 
one hand and ‘to make evident, to draw attention to’ on the other”: Indo-European 
words for “sign” characteristically refer to “a showing (or a revealing) of things to the 
viewer, or the other way round, leading the viewer (the viewing gaze) to the things” 
(Bühler 1990 [1934], 44). These etymologies suggest that language and perception 
may have a closer, intrinsic connection than Genette supposes. Language, according 
to this wider semiotic view, is not a code, but a form of mediation: something 
through which things are revealed, or by means of which (as an instrument or tool) 
people are guided to look at them. It is this view of language as a form of mediation 
that informs the approach to narrative fiction taken throughout this thesis.  
“Mediation”, I argue, is both intrinsic to narrative and has deeply informed 
the way that it has developed in the written and printed forms of narrative fiction. In 
subsection 1.1 I introduce the concept of mediation as it is presented by Russian 
                                                 
17 The contextual account of signification in this chapter leads, in Section 4 and in Chapter Two, to an 
instrumental or functional v iew of language. In Chapter Two, on the basis of this functional 




psychologist Lev Vygotsky: Vygotsky’s view of language as a mediating tool will 
become important for the functional view of language that I develop in Section 4 of 
this chapter and in Chapter Two. I also introduce two further ideas from Vygotsky 
that inform, more immediately, the discussion of “joint attention” that is to follow: 
the concepts of genetic analysis and internalization. The concept of joint (or shared) 
attention has acquired great importance in developmental and evolutionary 
psychology, referring to the kind of intersubjective communication that takes place, 
for example, between infant and carer as they jointly interact with objects (Scaife and 
Bruner 1975; Bruner 1983; Moore and Dunham 1995; Tomasell0 1999, 2008; Eilan 
et al 2005). In recent years, for example in the work of Vera Tobin, Todd Oakley and 
David Herman, researchers have begun to recognize the significance of this 
interactional dynamic for literary narrative.1 8  In subsection 1.2 I outline how the joint 
attentional triad of infant, carer and object has been shown to be crucial for the 
acquisition of language (Scaife and Bruner 1975; Bruner 1983; Moore and Dunham 
1995).  In reviewing this literature, and, in subsection 1.3, the literature on the use of 
narrative by young children, I will argue that the narratives of very young children 
have a peculiarly intimate relationship with the dynamics of joint attention. In the 
first place they bring this dynamic to a new level of awareness by making it explicit 
                                                 
18 Herman’s (2013) focus is on how joint attention grounds the intentionality of narrative, such that 
stories become psychological tools for organizing experience into “intentional systems” (a term that he 
adopts from philosopher Daniel Dennett). There are significant overlaps between Herman’s approach 
and that taken in this thesis, notably in his instrumentalist v iew of narrative (drawing on the work of 
Lev  Vy gotsky) as a psy chological tool (Herman 2013, 228-30): in this context, Herman draws 
attention, as is done in this chapter, to the important role played by contextualized, embedded 
narrative (263-81). Vera Tobin connects joint attention to the notion of “conceptual blending” that has 
emerged from cognitive linguistics, examining how modernist texts disrupt such blends (Tobin 2008) 
and how printed texts operate as objects of joint attention (Tobin 2014): there is a significant 
congruence between the model of narrative communication offered in this chapter and Tobin’s 
argument that “readers of published texts function in many  way s more like overhearers than 
addressees” (Tobin 2014, 179). Tobin and Todd Oakley  have extended the joint attentional approach 
to a consideration of the manipulation of perspective in film narrative (Oakley and Tobin 2012). Also 
pursuing a broadly joint attentional perspective, John Sutton and Evelyn Tribble have expl ored the 
role of “[e]mbodied interaction and mutual alignment” between characters in Lloy d Jones’ novel The 
Book of Fame (Sutton and Tribble 2014, 146).  
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through language. And secondly, as I explore in subsection 1.4, these narratives 
become “symbolic objects” through themselves being re-contextualized and hence 
subjected to further quasi-recursive acts of joint attention. It is in this way, I argue, 
that the constitution of the narrative representation should be understood: as a 
process of mediation between parties in which the mediation takes the form of a 
sharing of attention on an object (real or conceptual). 
In Section Two I explore how, through writing and print, the affordances for 
acts of joint attention, inherent in narrative from its oral origins, are extended and 
deepened through the narrative’s further decoupling from the oral situation, and 
through its spatialization, in the form of text: through these processes inherent in 
textualization, narrative becomes an object for joint attention in a sense beyond that 
explored in subsection 1.4. In subsection 2.1 I found this approach in the ideas of 
media theorists such as Walter Ong and David Olson concerning the impact of 
literacy on cognition and consciousness: my discussion of this impact begins, in 
subsection 2.2, with a brief overview of the textual “framing” of narrative (that is, the 
writing in of context) in medieval literature. Then, in subsection 2.3, I illustrate 
these affordances for joint attention offered by writing through readings from a 
celebrated example of Medieval “frame narrative”, Boccaccio’s Decameron (1349-
53). This analysis of Decameron aims to evoke how, by means of writing, mediation 
through joint attention becomes a process that does not merely frame the narrative, 
but is folded into it in such a way that it motivates the action itself.  
In Section 3 I extend the discussion of joint attention to the question of 
character: here, my principal text is Cervantes’ Don Quixote. Following an 
introduction, in subsection 3.1, to the joint attentional textual framing of Don 
Quixote – framing, that is, as a book that is compiled from different sources and  
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printed – in subsection 3.2 I describe how, through this deeply ambiguous joint 
attentional prism, Cervantes builds a complex and dynamic perspectival structure 
based on different and interacting acts of joint attention. It is out of this dynamic 
joint attentional structure, I argue, that fictional character emerges as what one 
might call (as with the textual framing of the whole narrative) a semiotic prism – 
something that we both “see” (a conceptual “object” to which attributes can be given) 
and at the same time something that we see through or with. These considerations 
lead, in subsection 3.3, to a discussion of the mediation and motivation of character-
representations in narrative fiction. René Girard (1965) and Rick Altman (2008) 
have highlighted the importance for the development of the novel of what Girard 
calls “mediated desire” – that is, motivations that are motivated by (mediated 
through) the motivations of others: representation in this perspectivalist context is 
never simply a dyadic relation of subject and object, but is, rather, an intersubjective 
mediation. This perspective from the history and theory of the novel leads, firstly, to 
a critique of the objectivist or representationalist assumptions behind some recent 
narratological accounts of fictional minds, and, secondly, to a link between the 
perspective suggested by Girard and Altman, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, the concept of joint attention, expanded here to embrace the notion of joint 
intentionality: the link between mediation and desire embodied in the notion of 
character involves a bringing-to-awareness of the substrate of shared intentionality 
inherent in all human communication. This emphasis on the importance of the 
motivation inherent in mediation – on the enactive quality of representations – is 
ultimately what differentiates the approach taken here from purely representational 
cognitive accounts of fictional narrative.  
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In the final section of the chapter, I highlight two historical formulations of 
the semiotics of language that are congruent with the triadic, mediating dynamic of 
joint attention: in the theories of C.K Ogden and I.A. Richards (1946 [1923]) and Karl 
Bühler (1990 [1934]) we find a contextualist and instrumental approach to language 
that diverges fundamentally from the dyadic “speech-circuit” model of Saussure that 
has informed structuralist narratology. In both The Meaning of Meaning and 
Bühler’s Theory of Language, this triadic view of language as a form of mediation 
and instrumentality leads to a conception of the polyfunctionality of language. This 
polyfunctionality will become important for my argument for a non-linear dimension 
to narrative in Chapter Two. 
 
1. Joint Attention and Narrative 
1.1 A Vygotskian Approach 
I begin my exploration of joint attention and its importance for narrative by making 
explicit the concept’s indebtedness to the sociocultural approach to mind developed 
in the 1920s and 1930s by Lev Vygotsky: the discovery in the 1960s by psychologists 
in the West of the writings of Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) has played a significant part 
in shifting psychology towards an appreciation of the social and cultural dimensions 
of cognition (Bruner 1986, 70-78). As has been highlighted by James Wertsch, three 
basic principles underlie Vygotsky’s approach to mental life (1991, 19-43): 
1) Genetic Analysis. This is the principle that “it is possible to understand 
many aspects of mental functioning only if one understands their origin and the 
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transitions they have undergone” (Wertsch 1991, 19). As Vygotsky writes in Mind in 
Society: 
 To encompass in research the process of a given thing’s development in all its 
 phases and changes – from birth to death – fundamentally means to discover 
 its nature, its essence, for “it is only in movement that a body shows what it 
 is.” Thus, the historical study of behavior is not an auxiliary aspect of 
 theoretical study, but rather forms its very base. (Wertsch 1991, 20 quoting 
 Vygotsky 1978, 65) 
Any mental phenomenon is situated in the context of a developmental process. Or 
rather, mental phenomena are situated within developmental processes, for a key 
part of Vygotsky’s genetic analysis is that developmental processes occur 
simultaneously at different levels, across different time frames: these levels 
constitute genetic domains (Wertsch 1991, 20-5). Vygotsky’s own empirical research 
was concentrated on ontogenetic development, but equally important for genetic 
analysis are the domains of phylogenesis, sociocultural history and “microgenesis” 
(the unfolding or “development” of individual mental processes over very short time 
frames). In the past twenty years, this concept of viewing processes as taking place 
simultaneously across different time frames has emerged as a key feature of the 
dynamic or complex systems approach to cognition. The dynamic dimension of 
narrative, and its relation to systematic complexity, will be explored in Chapter Two. 
2) The social origin of mental processes. This is the principle that mental 
processes are founded not simply on capacities of the individual, but are the result of 
processes of internalization whereby interactions with others are absorbed to form 
the basis of mental processes in the individual: “Each function in the child’s cultural 
development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual 
level: first, between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child 
(intrapsychological)” (Vygotsky 1978, 57). Vygotsky’s conception of internalization 
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does not envisage a simple transference of social speech, nor a simple isomorphism 
between external social processes and internal psychological processes (Wertsch and 
Stone 1985, 166). It involves, rather, a process of transformation that enables 
relations that had been played out externally with reference to another to be turned 
inward – to be played out now with reference to the self. It is in this way that 
“intermental” functions (involving interactions with others) become “intramental” 
mental functions (of the individual).1 9  In developing the theory that individual 
mental functioning represents an “aggregate of internalized social relations”, 
Vygotsky was influenced by Marx (Wertsch 1991 25-6), and there are also clear 
parallels with the theory of the “dialogic” nature of thought and discourse being 
developed simultaneously in Russia by Mikhail Bakhtin (Wertsch and Stone 1985; 
Wertsch 1991). 
 A highly significant instance of this process of internalization, for Vygotsky, is 
that stage in child development which Piaget termed “egocentric speech” – that is, 
the tendency of children between about three and seven years of age to talk to 
themselves.  Piaget, who had been the first to recognize the significance of the 
phenomenon, defined egocentric speech in The Language and Thought of the Child, 
as language which is “for oneself, which is not intended for others” (quoted in 
Wertsch and Stone, 172): egocentric speech, in Piaget’s conception, was an external, 
physiological manifestation of the young child’s asocial, egocentric thought, and thus 
a phenomenon that was destined to atrophy with the child’s increased socialization. 
                                                 
19 Henceforth I follow Wertsch in using “intermental” and “intramental” – rather than 
“interpsychological” and “intrapsychological” (as in Vy gotsky 1978), or  “interpsychic” and 
“intrapsychic” (as in Vy gotsky 1986) as translations for interpsikhicheskii and intrapsikhicheskii 
(Wertsch 1991, 26). 
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For Vygotsky, by contrast, the movement was in the opposite direction, from 
socialization to individualization: 
In our conception, egocentric speech is a phenomenon of the transition from 
interpsychic to intrapsychic functioning, i.e., from the social, collective activity 
of the child to his more individualized activity [. . .] (Vygotsky 1986, 228) 
A number of observations and experiments supported this claim. He found, for 
example, that egocentric speech occurs characteristically in the presence of others, 
rather than when the child is alone, and that placing the child with a group of deaf-
and-dumb children or children who spoke a different language also reduced the 
propensity to egocentric speech: egocentric speech had a clear social dimension 
(Vygotsky 1986, 231-3). He also examined the linguistic properties of children’s 
egocentric speech and compared them to the properties of “inner speech”, finding in 
both a tendency towards a specific form of abbreviation: that of “omitting the subject 
of a sentence and all words connected with it, while preserving the predicate”. This 
“tendency towards predication”, Vygotsky argued, was a “basic form of syntax of 
inner speech” that could be seen in embryo in the child’s egocentric speech (Vygotsky 
1986, 236). Through making connections between observations such as these, 
Vygotsky traced the trajectory whereby the social language of the child is subject to a 
process of individualization, becoming first the egocentric speech of the child before 
going fully “underground”, morphing into that inner speech by which mechanisms of 
control and regulation that had been played out on the social plane, with reference to 
others, are now played out internally, with reference to the self.  
3) The centrality of mediation to human mental functions. Another 
observation concerning the egocentric speech of children to which Vygotsky 
attributed significance was children’s propensity to use it, in particular, when solving 
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problems (Vygotsky 1986, 30; Vygotsky 1978, 25-6). In the paper “Tool and Symbol 
in Children’s Development”, Vygotsky presented evidence that, contrary to the 
influential research of Wolfgang Köhler, which had emphasized parallels between the 
practical, technical intelligence of apes and young children, language plays a key part 
in the practical intelligence of young children, giving it a quite different character  
from that of apes (Vygotsky 1978, 19-30): 
Children, with the aid of speech, create greater possibilities than apes can 
accomplish through action. One important manifestation of this greater 
flexibility is that the child is able to ignore the direct line between actor and 
goal. Instead, he engages in a number of preliminary acts, using what we 
speak of as instrumental, or mediated (indirect), methods. In the process of 
solving the task the child is able to include stimuli that do not lie within the 
immediate visual field. (Vygotsky 1978, 26)   
Thus “symbolic activity”, for Vygotsky, had “a specific organizing function that 
penetrates the process of tool use and produces fundamentally new forms of 
behavior” (Vygotsky 1978, 24). Symbolic activity had this capability for restructuring 
perception and cognition because of its reversibility, whereby the same sign can have 
meaning for both parties in a communication. In “Consciousness as a Problem in the 
Psychology of Behavior” Vygotsky highlighted the significance of the fact that a word 
can be both stimulus and response, writing that  “[a] heard word is the stimulus, and 
a word pronounced is a reflex producing the same stimulus”: the internalization of 
symbols in the form of language - thinking through language - enables thought to 
turn back on itself, to “possess [experiences] in object form (stimulus) for other 
experiences” (quoted in Lee 1985, 76. C.f, Gillespie 2007, 683). In this way language 
becomes a tool of thought.2 0  
                                                 
20 Vy gotsky’s formulation of the universality of a close interpenetration of language and thought in 
development is open to the charge of cultural bias. Wertsch cites the example of research carried out 




1.2 Joint Attention: Perspective and Dynamics 
Joint Attention is an intersubjective mental process involving interaction both with 
another mind and with an object (which itself may be physical, or itself mental and 
symbolic). First identified and described in the context of developmental psychology 
(Scaife and Bruner 1975; Bruner 1983; Moore and Dunham 1995),2 1  it has also been 
explored in an evolutionary context (Tomasell0 1999) and in contexts of adult 
interaction (Eilan et al 2005). The basic developmental phenomenon of joint 
attention, here described by Michael Tomasello, has been widely observed: 
 Six-month-old infants interact dyadically with objects, grasping and 
 manipulating them, and they interact dyadically with other people, expressing 
 emotions back and forth in a turn-taking sequence [. . .] But at around nine to 
 twelve months of age a new set of behaviors begins to emerge that are not 
 dyadic, like these earlier behaviors, but are triadic in the sense that they 
 involve a coordination of their interactions with objects and people, resulting 
 in a referential triangle of child, adult, and the object or event to which they 
 share attention. (Tomasello 1999, 62) 
As an early indicator of the onset of this “Nine Month Revolution”, the child will, 
during joint attentional episodes, alternate its gaze from the object to the 
parent/carer’s eyes, monitoring the attention that the parent/carer is giving to the 
object (Tomasello 1995, 110-11; Baldwin 1995, 134). Such interactions involve, 
crucially, a “tuning in” to the intentionality of the adult, a developing understanding 
                                                 
visual memory tasks was compared with that of European “white” Australian children. The aboriginal 
children consistently outperformed the European children on these tasks, with the European children 
apparently hampered by reliance on verbal mediation such as rehearsing lists of verbal labels 
(Wertsch 1991, 31). Such examples do not invalidate Vygotsky’s characterization of the fundamental 
processes involved, but merely caution against and a hasty  and universal application of them.  
21 As we shall see, the concept of joint attention is congruent with Vygotsky’s ideas concerning the 
socio-cultural origins of cognition. An early formulation of the concept of joint attention was put 
forward by  Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan (1963), who use the phrase “primordial sharing 
situation” for “early forms of interaction which have the character of ‘sharing’ experiences with the 
other rather than of ‘communicating’ messages to the Other” (Werner and Kaplan 1963, 42).  
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that in contexts of joint attention, intentionality is directed not just to the object, but 
to the other’s intentionality to the object.  (As Vygotsky writes: “The path from object 
to child and from child to object passes through another person” (Vygotsky 1978, 
30).) It is at this age, and in the context of such joint attentional episodes, that 
children start using “proto-imperatives” (pointing) and “proto-declaratives” 
(showing) which seek to change the other’s intention towards the object to one of 
attention to it, or towards a particular aspect of it (Tomasello 1995, 110-11; Tomasello 
1999, 62). 
  Joint attention crystalizes in the form of the use of signs – facial expressions, 
gestures, sounds, and language. Two aspects of signs, as they emerge from the joint 
attentional situation, are of particular importance: their perspectival quality and 
dynamic context: 
1) The perspectival quality of signs  
Joint attention establishes the basis for reference, the initial “labelling” that is the 
basis for later language development (Bruner 1983, 67-88).  As Werner and Kaplan 
write in the early version of a theory of joint attention: 
[W]ithin [the] primordial sharing situation there arises reference in its initial, 
nonrepresentational form [. . .] [T]he act of reference emerges not as an 
individual act, but as a social one: by exchanging things with the Other, by 
touching things and looking at them with the Other. (Werner and Kaplan 
1963, 42-3) 
At this level, words “point” to things, but the pointing is done not with reference to 
the object, but with reference to another person: 
When children hear new language addressed to them [. . .] they must 
 determine not the adult’s intention to the object, as many theories of reference 
 assume, but rather the adult’s intention with respect to their attention. 
 Reference is not directed to an object but to a person. (Tomasello 1995, 115) 
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“The problem of how reference develops,” as Bruner writes, “can [. .] be restated as 
the problem of how people manage and direct each other’s attention by linguistic 
means” (Bruner 1983, 68).2 2  
Language thus emerges out of a pre-linguistic “referential intersubjectivity” 
(Bruner 1983, 122), based on an understanding that the adult has a form of attention 
towards the object that is distinct from the child’s, and that the purpose of a 
particular behaviour (the use of a gesture such as pointing, for example, or the 
uttering of a word) is to communicate that form of attention to the child, with the 
intention of changing the child’s form of attention to the object. The use of these 
signs or symbols has that quality of reversibility whose importance Vygotsky had 
highlighted: 
 To acquire the conventional use of a linguistic symbol, the child must be able 
 to determine the adult’s communicative intentions (the adult’s intention 
 towards her attention), and then engage in a process of role reversal imitation 
 in which she uses the new symbol toward the adult in the same way and for 
 the same communicative purpose that the adult used it toward her. 
 (Tomasello 1999, 116) 
Gestures such as pointing and showing share with language this quality of 
intersubjectivity. Where language is different, however, is in its increased 
perspectival quality. Linguistic symbols do not merely refer to an object, but imply, 
with increasing specificity and sophistication, perspectives or construals of the 
object: “The perspectival nature of linguistic symbols multiplies indefinitely the 
specificity with which they may be used to manipulate the attention of others” 
(Tomasello 1999, 107).  
                                                 
22 “The essence of sign use consists in man’s affecting behaviour thr ough signs” (Vygotsky 1978, 54).   
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The theory of “cognitive grammar” developed by Ronald Langacker, as 
Tomasello points out, bears out this perspectival view of language. According to 
Langacker, grammatical constructions are “imagic in character”: they always imply a 
construal of the situation in that “[w]hen we use a particular construction [. .] we 
thereby select a particular image to structure the conceived situation for 
communicative purposes” (Langacker 1991, 12). The reading of sequences of 
sentences such as the following highlights the effect on construal of grammatical 
construction: 
 Joe broke the window. 
 The window was broken by Joe. 
 It was Joe who broke the window. 
 It was the window that Joe broke. etc 
Use of different grammatical constructions such as actives and passives imply 
different configurations of “figure” and “ground” (or “trajector” and “landmark”, as 
Langacker revises gestalt terminology): syntactical structures have a symbolic 
meaning independent of their content.2 3   
 For Vygotsky, too, the use of language is deeply intertwined with “construal”, 
understood as a particular structuring of the perceptual field. The simple act of 
reference, of “labelling”, in itself produces such a fundamental restructuring:  
 [L]abelling is the primary function of speech used by young children. 
Labelling enables the child to choose a specific object, to single it out from the 
entire situation he is perceiving. Simultaneously, however, the child 
embellishes his first words with very expressive gestures, which compensate 
for his difficulties in communicating meaningfully through language. By 
means of words children single out separate elements, thereby overcoming the 
natural structure of the sensory field and forming new (artificially introduced 
and dynamic) structural centers. The child begins to perceive the world not 
                                                 
23 Langacker’s concept of “construal” - and in particular its dy namic, constructivist character - will be 
explored further in Chapter Two (subsection 2.2) in relation to the concept of narrative “series”.  
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only through his eyes but also through his speech. As a result, the immediacy 
of “natural” perception is supplanted by a complex mediated process; as such, 
speech becomes an essential part of the child’s cognitive development. 
(Vygotsky 1978, 32)  
As Vygotsky pointed out, this view accorded with Wolfgang Köhler’s finding that, in 
performing practical tasks, the perceptual field of apes was more predetermined, and 
less liable to voluntary alteration, than was the case with humans (31). The myriad 
possibilities that language affords for variation in perspective-taking (variation along 
language’s “paradigmatic” axis, for example) enable the developing child to abstract 
from the given perceptual situation in a way which is unavailable for the ape 
(Tomasello 1999, 120-1):   
[A]s the child internalizes a linguistic symbol - as she learns the human 
 perspectives embodied in a linguistic symbol - she cognitively represents not 
 just the perceptual or motoric aspects of a situation but also one way, among 
 other ways that she is aware, that the current situation may be attentionally 
 construed by  ‘us’, the users of that symbol. (Tomasello 1999, 126) 
The developmental process of “acquiring” language is thus not a matter of learning 
“codes”, but of internalizing, in a new, semiotic form, that capacity for variation of 
perspective and construal afforded by the joint attentional situation (Tomasello 1999, 
125-26). 
2) The Dynamic Context of Linguistic Signs 
Language is acquired in the context of coordinated sequences of actions by 
child and carer. Jerome Bruner (1983) has pointed to the importance of standardized 
reciprocal exchanges between infant and carer: these “formats” may take the form, 
initially, of games of “peekaboo” or of handing objects back and forth, accompanied 
by words and vocalizations that underline the pattern and rhythm of the exchange. 
Crucially, once the format is established, the variable elements that constitute the 
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format can become the object of play. Roles can be swapped, or objects, or disruptive 
surprises can be created by withholding an object on the point of handing it over. 
“While the overall game became routinized,” as Bruner summarizes his observations 
of these infant-carer exchanges, “the constituents that made it up were forever being 
varied: utterances, prosody, pause length, whatever” (Bruner 1983, 51). In games of 
passing and hiding objects, we see the basic face-to-face dyadic relation 
supplemented and partially subsumed by “a rich triadic person-person-object style of 
play” (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978, 211). Such play involves, crucially, a tuning in to 
the intentionality of the adult; the infantile “joke”, for example, involves a “sharing of 
pattern and coincidence in intentionality, i.e. the formation of a climax or paradox in 
mutual intentionality” (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978, 189). As the child develops and 
is integrated more fully into the physical and social world around it, these formats 
will take more varied and practical forms – meal-time formats, for example, or 
greeting or farewell formats. The particular construals of the perceptual situation 
take place in a dynamic context of unfolding interactive, intentional sequences, in 
what Tomasello calls “the flow of social interaction” (Tomasello 1999, 112): they 
emerge as part of what Katherine Nelson terms “event representations” of sequences 
of actions directed at particular goals (Nelson 1996, 16-17). 
To sum up, the process of symbol-formation, as it emerges, initially, in the 
context of joint attention between young children and carers, has two principal 
aspects – a perspectival aspect, whereby the symbol is used to direct attention to a 
particular construal of the perceptual situation, and a dynamic context, an 
intentionality whereby language is always embedded in a flow, in a sequence of 
(inter)actions (and words) directed towards a goal. Both aspects are inherent in the 
pre-linguistic joint attentional situation, but are made increasingly explicit, are 
55 
 
brought more strongly to awareness, to consciousness, by the progressively more 
sophisticated capacities for differentiation and specification contained in signs such 
as gesture and, above all, language. 
1.3 Joint Attention and the Beginnings of Narrative 
What role, then, does narrative play in this process whereby language emerges 
from the dynamic, perspectival and triadic context of the joint attentional situation? 
The answer will depend in part, of course, on one’s definition of narrative. If 
narrative is defined as a story, in the sense of a representation of a sequence of 
events with an internal structure (in Aristotelian terms, with a beginning, a middle 
and an end), then children cannot be said to have attained narrative “competence” 
till, typically, between five and seven years of age (Engel 1999, 158-59). But this is a 
highly restrictive view of narrativity in children. As Judy Dunn points out, children 
are avid consumers of narrative long before that: “The power of narrative to hold 
children’s interest is evident from early in the second year. By two years old, as many 
parents know, children are frequently excited and moved by stories” (Dunn 1988, 
141). They also produce “narrative”. Susan Engel (1999) gives the following (from a 
transcribed dialogue between two four-year-olds) as an example of the kind of 
discourse that is left out of purely plot-based definitions of narrative: 
 Wasn’t that funny, Harry, yesterday when Lizzie slipped in the mud? 
 Hahahahaha. She had mud all over her pants and she looked like she pooped 
 in her pants. Hahahaha. And she really looked like a poopy head. Hahahaha. 
 And she looked like a poop on the face. She looked like a shcmoop on the face. 
 Hahahaha. (Engel 1999, 72) 
As Engel observes, although this may not have any clear narrative “structure” (and 
quickly digresses into word-play), “[i]t nonetheless conveys an experience (albeit 
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elliptically described) occurring in space and time, and it suggests the author’s view 
of the event, a meaning to the story. It has a narrative voice” (Engel 1999, 72).  
Indeed one could go further and assimilate this exchange between four-year-
olds to Labov’s structure of conversational narrative. The opening sentence (“Wasn’t 
that funny, Harry, yesterday when Lizzie slipped in the mud?”) provides, in Labov’s 
terms, both an “orientation” and “evaluation”: the speaker places the narrative in a 
space and time different from that of the discourse (“yesterday when Lizzie slipped in 
the mud”) and indicates with regard to the thing being framed (“Wasn’t that funny”) 
what aspect is to be attended to jointly by the speaker and Harry (“Wasn’t that 
funny”). (This latter form of frame – the “evaluation”, the point of the story, its 
meaning – continues through the narrative in the form of the interjections of 
laughter.) These “framings”, by tense and by orienting and evaluative language, make 
of the narrative an object that is removed from the immediate situation and can 
figuratively be “held up” for inspection from a particular point of view (in this case its 
“funniness”). 
 Vivid and detailed evidence of both the narrative ability of an even younger 
child – and of the child’s internalization of narrative (its transformation into a mode 
of thought) – is provided by a research project that was conducted in the 1980s, 
when a group of developmental psychologists, including Bruner, studied tapes and 
transcriptions of the bed-time and nap-time monologues of a little girl, Emily. (These 
tapes had been made over a fifteen-month period from the ages of 21 months 7 days 
to 36 months 9 days, and the results of the research were published in the volume 
Narratives from the Crib (Nelson 1989).) Emily’s monologues, spoken after her 
mother or father had left the room, are clear examples of what Piaget called 
“egocentric speech”. The recordings also included the before-lights-out dialogues 
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with the adult, but there was a marked difference between Emily’s monologues and 
these dialogues: “[Emily’s] dialogic and monologic utterances,” as Carol Feldman 
observes, “differ vastly in the richness of their pragmatic and narrative marking [. . .] 
[O]nce the lights are out and her parents leave the room, Emily reveals a stunning 
mastery of language forms we would never have suspected from her dialogic speech” 
(Feldman 1989, 100). 
 An important feature of this unexpected “mastery of language forms” was the 
use of narrative: “sequential narrative accounts”, as Katherine Nelson, observes, had 
a “central role in Emily’s monologues” (Nelson 1989b, 42). Children’s first encounter 
with narrative characteristically takes the form of carers’ verbal commentary on, or 
retrospective summary of, routine events and sequences such as getting dressed, 
meal-times, travelling outside the home, bed-time etc. These “scripts” tutor the child 
both in how to negotiate the physical and social world and in the meaning of 
language. “[R]aw experiential material,” as Engel writes, “is mediated from the start 
by parents’ use of storylike language to translate the world for their children” (Engel 
1999, 33). This type of narrative features strongly in Emily’s monologues, beginning 
with mastery of basic sequencing with connectives such as “when” and “then”. But 
early on we also find these routine scripts being transcended in striking ways. This is 
Emily at 22 months, moving swiftly both from just such an iterative script (“when 
Daddy [. .] then Daddy”) to a projection into the future (“next year”): 
 when Daddy come then Daddy get Emmy 
 then Daddy wake Emmy up 
 then, then . . . then Carl come play  
 Emmy not right now 
 Emmy sleep, Emmy sleep(ing) . . . 
 next year, next year Carl come 
 and the baby come. (Bruner and Lucariello 1989, 84) 
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The movement here is one not just from the iterative present to the future, but from 
the routine and habitual to the singular and affectively salient (the anticipated birth 
of a younger sibling). 
In their contribution to Narratives from the Crib, Jerome Bruner and 
Lucariello show how, during the course of Emily’s third year, her narratives develop 
along four “dimensions” of narrativity. Sequencing begins with the use of simple 
connectives (and/then), and develops both through the use of more complex 
connectives (when/before/after) and, most notably, through causal connectives 
(because/so). Canonicality – the degree to which an action or event is registered as 
usual/appropriate or unusual/inappropriate – develops from markers of simple 
frequency (e.g. the unusual marked by “one time”) to markers of necessity (things 
have “gotta” be a certain way) or appropriateness (things are “supposed to be” a 
certain way). The “breaching” of canonicality characteristically takes the form of the 
thwarting of a goal. Perspective, the expression of a stance towards what is being 
represented in the narrative, is conveyed through a variety of linguistic means, such 
as by time-frames (e.g. past tense), by markers of uncertainty (maybe) or affectivity 
(“Danny wasn’t frightened when the clown came down”), by epistemic markers (“I 
don’t know”), or by “metacommentary” which differentiates between the standpoint 
of the narrator and that of protagonists in the narrative. During Emily’s third year 
there are particularly sharp increases in the frequency of markers of affectivity, 
epistemics and time perspective (Bruner and Luciariello 1989, 80-94). Lastly, Bruner 
and Luciariello posit a dimension of intentionality, whereby the relation between 
actions and originary intentions is marked: this aspect of narrativity is slow to 
manifest itself in development, and instances of it are rare in Emily’s monologues 
(Bruner and Luciariello 1989, 82, 88).  
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 Developmental psychologists have differed in their definitions of “narrative” 
or “narrativity” (Nelson 1996, 185-89), but these differences are ones of emphasis 
rather than differences as to the fundamental components of narrative. Some 
approaches emphasize the linear structure of narrative, its “story grammar”, while 
others emphasize its experiential or perspectival quality. As Susan Engel points out, 
these differences in emphasis generate somewhat different versions of the 
developmental history of narrative, since, as we have seen, children’s use of the 
experiential markers of narrativity develop earlier than their ability to construct a 
“story” (Engel 1999, 70-1). But for all the differences of emphasis, there is a 
consensus that narrativity has two principal aspects: the linear sequencing of events 
and some perspective on or construal of those events. For Katherine Nelson, 
“narrative structure has two essential dimensions: temporality (its syntax), theme or 
meaning (its semantics)” (Nelson 1996, 189). Bruner has formulated the distinction 
in terms of two simultaneous “landscapes” of narrative - a “landscape of action” and 
a “landscape of consciousness” (Bruner 1986, 14). It is this dual character that, for 
Bruner, makes narrative a distinctive mode of knowing the world, one that both plays 
a vital role in the child’s cognitive and emotional development and is quite distinct 
from the paradigmatic mode characteristic of propositions and logical relations. 
Narrative does not make propositions about objects, but explores “the vicissitudes of 
human intentions” (16). 
 There is, then, an isomorphism between narrative, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the process of sign-formation in the joint attentional situation: both 
manifest perspectival and dynamic aspects.  But in narrative, the perspectival 
variation and enactive sequencing inherent in symbolization are brought to 
awareness in a new way, through being made subject to further differentiations and 
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through reintegration within new dynamic frameworks. Thus narrative recapitulates, 
at a higher level, the process of symbol-formation in the joint attentional situation: it 
rehearses, one might say, the genesis of meaning. 
1.4 Narrative as an Object of Joint Attention 
Narratives offer affordances for re-contextualization, for becoming an object 
that can itself be subjected to different kinds of (joint) attention. As Rukmini Bhaya 
Nair writes, narrative is “a dynamic structure that converts ‘talk’ into ‘text’. Its 
function is to make some parts of a communicative loop or chain [. .] both detachable 
and iterable” (Nair 2003, 5). Susan Engel has drawn attention to the way the adult’s 
narrativization of the child’s experience creates a symbolic object for the joint 
attention of adult and child: 
 When the parent [. .] describes experience, she is creating an object of 
 contemplation and inviting her child to share in this contemplation. As the 
 mother describes an excursion she and the child have recently made together, 
 she is painting a verbal canvas. Having finished, she stands back and invites 
 her child to consider it with her. Now they not only have the verbal painting 
 (the story), but they can look again and again at it, comment on it, even 
 change it in the light of new understanding. (Engel 1999, 118-9) 
As Katherine Nelson has pointed out, listening to tapes of Emily’s monologues rather 
than merely reading transcripts reveals how, even alone in her bed, she creates a 
paralinguistic “framing” for her narratives that recapitulates and internalises this 
social iterability: 
 It is notable that a highly salient characteristic of Emily’s first crib 
 monologues at 21 months was her use of an appropriated ‘story voice’ to mark 
 her nascent narratives, with raised pitch and extended contours, easily 
 differentiated from the ‘play voice’ that she used in discourse with and around 
 her toys. (Nelson 1996, 193) 
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These observations, she concludes, are evidence that “prosody and other 
metalinguistic markers set narrative off from other types of discourse for the child” 
(Nelson 1996, 193).   
Sometimes marking them with these paralinguistic framings, Emily returns to 
particular stories repeatedly, over periods of weeks, as though rehearsing them in her 
mind. In what Carole Feldman calls “problem-solving” narratives (Feldman 1989), 
she uses narrative as a way of turning thought back on itself, generating internal 
micro-narratives (as introduced by the phrase “If they don’t come” in the example 
below) out of the “maybes” and “I don’t knows” that she experiences as she 
negotiates the world around her: 
 Today, it’s beau-, it’s night time it’s dark out. [sings] It’s a beautiful day. 
 Tomorrow it’s going to be . . . day. Tanta day.2 4  Tanta day. All the kids come 
 just home. Carl, Carl, Carl, Danny, Lance . . . Janet. I don’t (know) about 
 Lance or Jack. I know Janet and Carl (kids). Carl and Danny. Danny and Carl 
 and Janet come. I don’t (know) about Lance . . . and um . . . Jackie. If they 
 don’t come Lance and Jackie maybe they, maybe their mommy and daddy 
 won’t work. [etc] (Feldman 1989, 117) 
The perspectival “framings” afforded by epistemic markers (“maybe, “I don’t know”) 
and temporal shifts (“Tomorrow it’s going to be”) create a distancing effect, allowing 
the narrative to become an object susceptible to repetition and variation.2 5  For 
Bruner and Luciariello, Emily’s increasing sophistication in differentiating a variety 
of perspectives, both on and within the narrative, demonstrates the important role 
that narrative plays in emotional development: narrative serves a crucial “cooling” 
function for Emily in that it distances her thought and language from immediate 
                                                 
24 “Tanta day ” refers to a day  when Emily  is looked after by her grandmother (“Tanta”). 
25 According to the developmental, “genetic” approach offered here, there is no such thing as “pure” 
repetition since developmental time is irreversible and any repetition is re -contextualized in the light of 
fresh understandings. On the importance of the notion of “irreversible time” for an approach to 
psy chology that emphasises the active role of semiosis, see Rosa 2007, 217 -8 and Abbey 2007 , 362-3.  
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affect and action. Through contemplating it as a narrative object that can be placed in 
different lights, Emily “cools” the potentially troubling relation between events in the 
world around her and what she feels or knows about them (Bruner and Luciariello 
1989, 76). 
 As children grow older, they encounter and use narratives in wider varieties of 
context. In The Beginnings of Social Understanding (1988), Judy Dunn examined 
how pre-school children’s modes of understanding others are shaped by “the 
affective tension in the relationships between siblings and between parent and 
child”: in the second and third years, language develops in the hothouse of family 
life, with its “continuing discussion and attribution of blame and responsibility” 
(Dunn 1988, 181, 179). In these circumstances, as Jerome Bruner has elaborated on 
Dunn’s observations, “[n]arrative accounts [. .] are no longer neutral. They have 
rhetorical aims or illocutionary intentions that are not merely expository but rather 
partisan, designed to put the case [. .] in behalf of a particular interpretation” 
(Bruner 1990, 85). Older children, exposed to wider social worlds beyond the family, 
may discriminate between genres of narrative appropriate to different contexts. 
Narratives between peers, for example, may differ from those with different 
categories of adult, and these may differ again from narratives produced as an 
accompaniment to symbolic play with toys. Narrative “competence”, in sum, cannot 
be abstracted from the situation in which it is elicited: 
 [A] child may convey deep personal feelings about himself in a conversation 
 with a parent about a past experience and yet not be able deliberately to create 
 a story about those feelings to share with others. (Engel 1999, 20) 
Narratives are produced and experienced within “contexts of use” (Sutton-Smith 
1986, 67-68); inherent to them is a recursive contextualism: 
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 [A]ny single narrative is contingent on a wider set of narratives (a narrative 
 context in which it is embedded) [. . .] To look at [. .] a narrative outside of a 
 wider narrative context, or a narrative context outside the social traditions, 
 history, and practice of a group of people is both misleading and pointless. 
 (Gee 1991, 3) 
This is the problem for psychologists taking the experimental path to investigate 
children’s narrative: in the laboratory, the only motivation to narrativize is the 
request of the experimenter, whereas in everyday life the contextual motivation not 
only gets a story going but shapes its content (Hudson and Shapiro 1991, 123). 
 The shaping of narrative by its contextual motivation can be seen clearly in the 
way that socio-cultural expectations of what constitutes a “good story” are grounded 
in conceptions of the social function of narrative - what stories are for. Shirley Brice 
Heath’s classic study of language use in neighbouring black and white communities 
in the American south illustrates the point vividly (Heath 1983). In the first place it 
should be noted that what has been said above about narrative’s iterability through 
paralinguistic ritualization is borne out by Heath’s observation of how, in both 
communities (though in different ways), children experienced narratives as framed 
in particular ways. In the black community of Trackton, storytelling took place out on 
the street and was open to any child who could hold an audience through such 
techniques as emotional evaluation of the story, alliterative language play, gestures, 
sound effects and voices: 
 All these methods of calling attention to the story and its telling distinguish 
 the speech event as a story, an occasion for audience and story -teller to 
 interact pleasantly, and not simply to hear an ordinary recounting of events or 
 actions. (Heath 1983, 171-2) 
In the white (and strongly religious) community of Roadville stories were also 
framed, but in quite a different way: license to tell stories was strictly regulated by 
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social hierarchy, and children were not expected to tell stories in front of adults 
unless specifically requested to (Heath 1983, 149-58). Within these frames, the 
narratives themselves were shaped by perceptions as to the purpose of story -telling. 
In Roadville, where the influence of Biblical parables was strong, the stories 
characteristically took the form of narratives of mishaps (often told “against” the 
speaker him-/herself) leading to a moral or message at the end that pointed to the 
possibilities for future improvement.2 6  Only “factual” stories were tolerated, 
exaggeration was frowned on, and narratives were shaped by the expectation that the 
purpose was “to reaffirm group membership and behavioral norms” (Heath 1983, 
184). In Tracton, by contrast, the purpose of stories was seen as being to entertain 
and “to intensify social interactions” (Heath 1983, 166). Stories characteristically 
“assert[ed] individual strengths and powers” and “use[d] reality only as the germ of a 
highly creative fictionalized account” (Heath 1983, 184).2 7   
 Narrative, then, is inherently contextual, its contextual character inscribed 
deep into its internal, textual qualities. Social values and norms are internalized as 
types or genres of story. (With these generic structures then offering affordances for 
repetition (and hence variation).) And the differentiation of internal perspectives – 
for example the projected subjectivity of a protagonist (which may be an 
autobiographical self) – draws the listener in, co-opting him/her as the interpreter of 
represented subject-object relations. Here, narrative recapitulates in myriad different 
ways the symbol-forming, meaning-making dynamic of the joint attentional scene. In 
the joint attentional situation, “[t]he path from object to child and from child to 
                                                 
26 Heath cites an example of a woman’s  anecdote about how she ruined some baking by gossiping on 
the telephone, which concludes: “Guess I’ll learn to keep my mind on my  own business and off other 
folks’.” (Heath 1983, 151-2) 
27 On cross-cultural comparison of sty les of oral narrative see Gee 1991, 8-17; Hicks 1991, 58-59. 
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object passes through another person” (Vygotsky 1978, 30), while in narrative the 
path from object to listener passes through the narrative’s projected subjectivities, its 
perspectives and embedded construals.  
 
 
2. Writing and the Narrative Object  
 In Section One we saw how narrative, generated originally by the joint 
attentional situation, itself becomes an object of joint attention through 
decontextualization and recontextualization. In this section I consider the difference 
that writing makes to these processes. In order to do so, for reasons I give in 
subsection 2.1, I shift from the ontogenetic domain that formed the focus of Section 
One to the domain of socio-cultural history: this is where literature enters my 
argument. In subsection 2.1 I highlight how theorists of literacy such as David Olson 
have pointed to the need to recover the context of oral language – its “illocutionary 
force” – as a key driver of the development of written language (and hence of literate 
consciousness). In subsection 2.2 I adopt this perspective in reviewing some 
observations on the nature of medieval narrative. Already, in subsection 1.4 above, 
we have seen that oral narrative is, paradoxically, both profoundly and inherently 
contextual, in the sense of bearing traces of its context deep in its texture, and at the 
same time open to decontextualization and recontextualization through repetition.  
Here, in subsection 2.2, we see, in the characteristic forms of medieval narrative, the 
interaction of this dynamic with the dynamic identified in subsection 2.1 towards an 
incorporation, a writing-in, of context. In subsection 2.3 I show how Boccaccio’s 
Decameron exemplifies the complex architecture of joint attentional perspectives 
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that can be generated by this drive towards the in-folding of contexts. One feature of 
this process is the paradox involved in telling a story about telling a story, involving 
as it does a strange recursive topology whereby the external becomes internal and 
vice versa: the affordance that written narrative offers for this dynamic topology will 
become important in Chapter Three. 
 
2.1 The Impact of Writing 
One of Vygotsky’s immediate concerns in psychological research – in line with 
the importance he ascribed to mediation in mental processes – was with the effects 
of literacy on cognition and consciousness. This issue was a real and pressing 
practical one in the context of post-Revolutionary Russia, with its vast illiterate 
peasant population.2 8  But the lines are harder to draw in most modern societies, 
where oral and written discourses are mutually implicated at many levels. As David 
Olson has argued, in a literate culture, “literate thought” is a part of oral 
communication (Olson 1994, 281).2 9  The development of young children’s speech 
draws on episodes of joint attention with carers to simple texts such as single-word 
board books or picture-books. Later in development, speech absorbs language from 
television or cinema, which involves written scripts and treatments. Adult speech, in 
particular settings, takes up elements from a variety of written genres and styles of 
discourse (journalistic, bureaucratic, political/ideological). And, of course, the 
influence runs in the other direction too, as what Bakhtin called the “primary” or 
                                                 
28 For a summary  of the research into the impact of literacy on cognition conducted by Vygotsky’s 
pupil Alexander Luria, see Ong 1982, 49-57. 
29 See Chapter Three subsection 2.1 for further discussion of “literate thought”. 
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“simple” speech genres of oral discourse are re-contextualized into the “secondary” 
or “complex” speech genres of written discourse (Bakhtin 1986, 61-3).  
 Given this deep mutual implication of speech and writing in modern 
literate societies, it is necessary – in order to unpick the particular contribution that 
the cognitive technology of writing makes to narrative – to turn from the 
developmental to the historical domain. Anthropologists (Goody 1968, 1987; Olson 
1994) and evolutionary psychologists (Donald 1991, 2001) have been prominent 
proponents of the view, generalized by media theorists from the 1960s (McLuhan 
1962, Ong 1982), that internalizations of different forms of mediation such as oral or 
written language restructure cognition and consciousness in different ways.3 0  Olson 
(1994), for example, draws on the studies of Roy Harris (1986) and Albertine Gaur 
(1987) to argue that the origins of writing do not lie merely in the representation of 
speech: writing systems were created “not to represent speech, but to communicate 
information. The relation to speech is at best indirect” (Olson 1994, 67).3 1  The 
adaptation of independently-evolved systems of graphic representation to the 
representation of language (an adaptation that can be seen, for example, in 
transitional forms such as hieroglyphics, with their mixture of logographic and 
phonographic signs (79-80)) resulted in language itself being seen, being brought to 
consciousness, in a new way: 
 [W]riting systems provide the concepts and categories for thinking about the 
 structure of spoken language rather than the reverse. Awareness of linguistic 
                                                 
30 For a critique of this tradition see Harris 1989, and, for a reply to this critique, Menary 2007. 
31 Olson’s v iew contrasts with the orthodoxy that held in linguistics  for much of the twentieth century. 
According to this orthodoxy, “[w]riting is not language, but merely a way  of recording language by 
means of v isible marks” (Leonard Bloomfield quoted in Cry stal 1997, 180). This v iew of writing as 
merely derivative of and dependent on speech was shared by Saussure, for whom writing was the 




 structure is a product of a writing system not a precondition for its 
 development. (68) 
Thus, for example, the concept of generative syntax can be traced back to 
Mesopotamian counting systems – to the crucial shift from a system that represents 
three sheep with three tokens to a system that represents them with two tokens, one 
denoting sheep and the other denoting the number (72). The encounter between 
writing and language  
 allowed language to be seen as composed of words related by means of a 
 syntax. Writing thereby provides the model for the production of speech (in 
 reading) and for the introspective awareness of speech as composed of 
 grammatical constituents, namely, words. (77; emphasis in the original) 
It is writing, Oslon claims, that “is largely responsible for bringing language into 
consciousness” (xviii). 
 There is one important element of oral language that, according to Olson, is 
not easily accommodated in written form: this is its illocutionary force (89). Writing 
removes language from an immediate context that might help determine whether, 
for example, a given sequence of words is intended as a promise or a threat. As 
Wolfgang Iser observes in The Act of Reading: 
 The parting of the ways between literary and ordinary speech is to be observed 
 in the matter of situational context. The fictional utterance seems to be made 
 without reference to any real situation, whereas the speech act presupposes a 
 situation whose precise definition is essential to the success of that act. (Iser 
 1978, 63) 
Where illocutionary force can be expressed in the oral representation through voice 
and gesture, its written representation requires the development of new vocabularies 
and concepts (“he insisted”) (Olson 1994, 107-8). Olson notes, as an example of the 
effect on a language of widening and deepening literacy, the massive borrowings that 
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occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth  centuries from Latin into English, a 
conspicuous part of which consisted of “speech act and mental state verbs”  – words 
such as “assert” (1604), “concede” (1632), “contradict” (1570), “criticize” (1649), 
“explain” (1513), “infer” (1526), “predict” (1546) and “suggest” (1526) (108).3 2  
The recovery of words’ illocutionary force becomes “a fundamental problem in 
reading”, according to Olson, “and specifying it a central problem in writing” (93) – 
hence the development of hermeneutics and rhetoric as arts/sciences of the written. 
Writing’s overcoming of this deficiency compared with spoken language involves its 
bringing-into-consciousness a previously latent aspect of language. And this 
bringing-to-consciousness has far-reaching consequences: 
The history of literacy [. .] is the struggle to recover what was lost in simple 
transcription. The solution is to turn non-lexical properties of speech such as 
stress and intonation into lexical ones; one announces that the proposition 
expressed is to be taken as an assumption or an inference and whether it is to 
be taken metaphorically or literally. But in making these structures explicit, 
that is representing them as concepts and marking them in a public  language, 
those structures themselves become objects of reflection. That is what makes 
possible what we may think of as literate thought and literate discourse. (111)  
Drawing on the theories of Eric Havelock (1982) and Bruno Snell (1960) on the 
“literate revolution” in fourth-century B.C. ancient Greece, Olson traces the concepts 
of modern western epistemology back to this textual revolution whereby the word 
becomes a thing, a conceptual object that can be reflected on at different times and 
from different points of view. 
 
                                                 




2.2 The Realization of Narrative Context  
 This imperative towards making context explicit can be seen in written 
narrative in the birth of the “narrator” as an explicit, thematized figure. The narrator 
in written narrative is on the surface a sign of continuity with oral traditions, but it is 
also – in its very markedness, its becoming-explicit – a sign of the important 
transformation demanded by the passage from the immediacy of speech to the 
decontextualized language of writing: 
With the development of self-conscious tellers in non-traditional, written 
narratives [. . .] [t]he disparity between the narrator’s view of the characters 
and their views of themselves and each other, which is a constant in fiction, is 
augmented by a disparity between the narrator’s view of the story and the 
audience’s view of it. In any written narrative [. .] there will be at least a 
potential, and usually an actual, ironic disparity between the knowledge and 
values of the author and those of his narrator. The traditional oral narrative 
consists rhetorically of a teller, his story, and an implied audience. The non-
traditional, written narrative consists rhetorically of the imitation, or 
representation, of a teller, his story, and an implied audience. (Scholes et al 
2006 [1966], 52-3) 
In Medieval literature, the most obvious case of such thematization of the narrator 
and narrating is the tale- or novella-collection, in which stories are brought together 
by being represented as told by different characters occupying a framing situation or 
narrative: Boccaccio’s Decameron (mid-C14th), Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (late 
C14th), John Gower’s Confessio Amantis (late C14th) and Christine de Pizan’s The 
Book of the City of the Ladies (early C15th) are among the most well-known 
examples. Robert J. Clements and Joseph Gibaldi list fifty-five “principal novella 
collections” from Italy, France, England and Spain ranging in date from the mid-
fourteenth to mid-seventeenth century (Clements and Gibaldi 1977, 229-31). Both 
Katherine Gittes and Clements and Gibaldi have described the influence of Arabic 
examples in the appearance of the frame narrative in medieval European literature 
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(Clements and Gibaldi 1977, 37-40; Gittes 1991, 21-67): the most famous of these 
narrative framings is Scheherazade’s delaying of her execution by the sadistic Shariar 
in the late C13th Thousand and One Nights, but we find this model in other Eastern 
texts that were disseminated in Europe such as the Seven Viziers or Sindibad-nama 
(Clements and Gibaldi 1977, 38).3 3  
These framed collections of narratives involve a significant paradox. As Viktor 
Shklovsky points out in his Theory of Prose, while they ostensibly celebrate the 
power and scope of orality, they are conceived, and only possible, as text. Devices 
such as that whereby Scheherazade delays her execution – or similar delaying 
framing situations in The Seven Viziers and the Mongol story collection of Buddhist 
origin, the Ardzhi Barzhi – “are confined,” Shklovsky observes, “to the domain of 
written literature.” (Shklovsky 1991 [1929], 66).3 4  Clements and Gibaldi similarly 
highlight the “two faces” of the structure set up by a “cornice” or “framing-narrative” 
in Medieval novella-collections: “the tales framed by the various novelistic cornices 
employed from Boccaccio down through Giraldi and Marguerite de Navarre to Basile 
                                                 
33 According to Gittes, the “frame narrative” represented a distinctively Arabic contribution that was 
added to a literary tradition that Arabic culture had inherited from the Indian sub -continent, 
represented by  large collections of tales such as the Panchatantra (C5th BC) (Gittes 1991, 9-19); c.f. 
Clements and Gibaldi 1977, 37-40). In the European appropriation of this tradition, most famously in 
Boccaccio and Chaucer, we find, firstly , an elaboration of the framing narrative and its 
characterization of the internal narrators and listeners, and, secondly, correspondences and 
resonances (both between individual tales and between individual tales and the framing narrative) 
that serve to impart forms of architectural unity to the whole. Gittes analyses this transition from 
Arabic to European forms of the frame tale in terms of a tension between Arabic notions of open-
endedness and limitlessness, embodied in Arabic mathematics and architecture, and European 
(ultimately Greek) notions of sy mmetry, geometry and closure (Gittes 1991, 21 -55).  
34 Although in his Theory of Prose Shklovsky points to this broad historical significance of the framing 
story , in terms of the relation between orality and textuality, in his own study  of The Decameron he 
play s down the significance of the cornice  and “sees no artistic unity in what he  calls ‘the separate 
parts of the Decameron’” (Potter 1982, 68 quoting Viktor Shklovsky, Lettura del Decameron: Dal 




and María de Zayas are simultaneously printed on paper for one to read as well as 
fictively recited by a storyteller” (Clements and Gibaldi 1977, 5-6).3 5  
 The making-explicit of context that we find in the framed tale-collection 
(where the tales are represented as told on a particular occasion for a particular 
purpose) is only one way in which narrative is held up at a distance, is framed, in 
medieval literature. In his survey of medieval narrative, Tony Davenport lists the 
following principal types of “narrative voice”: 
 the authoritative controlling voice of the preacher who becomes an omniscient 
 narrator; less obtrusive versions of the tale-teller interpreting an acquired tale 
 and sharing its interest with the audience, where the narrating voice may 
 almost disappear but for the occasional ‘as the book says’ or ‘as I in town 
 herde’; the autobiographical first-person narrator of dreams and supernatural 
 experiences; the fictional storytellers who present narrative in a voice 
 assumed by the poet in a kind of ventriloquism. (Davenport 2004, 53-4) 
In all these cases the contextual situation of narrative is made explicit and 
foregrounded. In the first case, the preacher holds up his narrative as an exemplum, 
an illustration embedded in an extradiegetic discourse such as a sermon (Davenport 
2004, 55-67). The second of Davenport’s categories captures an aspect of medieval 
narrative antithetical to modern conceptions of creativity: the perception of narrative 
not in terms of what we would think of today as “invention”, but in terms of the 
interpretation of existing texts. Medieval narrative “is nearly always based on 
‘borrowed’ plot material” (Davenport 2004, 210). Eugène Vinaver, among others, has 
highlighted this interpretative dimension of the great Arthurian romance cycles of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In expanding the Arthurian canon, authors such 
as Chrétien de Troyes drew on a “vast store of exotic traditions, written and oral”: the 
                                                 
35 Another layer to the complex relationship between orality and literacy in medieval literature is 
constituted by the fact that at this time silent reading was still a rarity : characteristically, texts would 
be read out loud, either to oneself or to others (Coleman 1996). 
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skill of the poet lay not in making things up, but in bringing out the meaning of what 
was already there (Vinaver 1971, 16-17).3 6   According to Clements and Gibaldi, the 
medieval novella collections were informed by “the rhetorical view that inventio 
(from invenire, to come upon) entails the ‘discovery’ and subsequent ingenious 
reworking of already existent materials” (Clements and Gibaldi 1977, 13).3 7  We even 
find the same “double level of discourse” (Davenport  2004, 44), the same 
presentation and interpretation of a narrative through a narrative, in Davenport’s 
penultimate category — the first-person dream narrative – for these too are “framed 
narratives which offer the reader two related but separate states of understanding, 
the waking consciousness of a first-person narrator figure, often given an apparently 
autobiographical identity, and the reporting of a dreamer figure” (Davenport 2004, 
53-4).3 8   
In all these cases stories are not simply “communicated”: they  are held up, 
they are presented as objects for interpretation by author and audience – in other 
words, by a joint, intersubjective attention. That joint attention of author and reader 
is directed not just at the story itself, but also at the manner of its telling, or the 
possibilities for its interpretation. Evelyn Vitz, in a critique of the applicability of 
structuralist, “classical” narratology to medieval narrative, has argued that in the 
                                                 
36 As the author of the Livre des Rois writes: “The story is chaff, the meaning wheat; the meaning is 
the fruit, the story the branch” (quoted in Vinaver 1971, 17).  
37 Pier Massimo Forni writes that for Boccaccio, inventio “has to do with the provenance and 
production of texts. Where does the author find the novella? How? How does he retrieve it from the 
storehouse of written or oral traditions?” (Forni 1996, 3)  
38 Citing Genette’s analy sis of “narrative levels” in Narrative Discourse , Davenport points out how the 
medieval dream narrative complicates and problematizes the distinction between an “extradiegetic” 
and “intradiegetic” narrator: there is, he writes, a “doubleness” about these narrators that places them 
both within and outside the dream (Davenport 2004, 44). 
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latter, narrative elements cannot be treated in isolation from “the broader rhetorical 
discours of a text”: 
This bracketing-off procedure is especially impoverishing with respect to 
 medieval literature, where why the story is being told - for what purpose, to 
 what audience - is often [. .] crucial [. . .] (Vitz 1989, 8) 
Medieval narrative can thus be said to have a characteristically situated quality. In 
the transition from orality to writing, illocutionary force is made explicit, and the acts 
of narration and interpretation made manifest. As Davenport writes of the 
Canterbury Tales: 
Chaucer [. .] turns his pilgrims into critics as well as narrators and it is 
through the dynamics of the process of narrating and recording audience 
response that Chaucer creates his complex layers of narrative illusion. 
(Davenport 2004, 250) 
This making-explicit of illocutionary force, this folding-in of context into text, creates 
new opportunities for the exercise of the basic narrative dynamic of joint attention. 
The transition to the writing of text – and the consequent manifestation of context 
within the text – multiplies indefinitely the possibilities for recursive re-
contextualization, opening up new fields of expression for the generative power of 
that dynamic.  
2.3 Joint Attentional Structures in Boccaccio’s Decameron 
 Boccaccio’s Decameron (1349-53) exemplifies this process, returning as it 
does, again and again, to the paradoxes whereby a story can find “within” itself the 
“outside” of another story (and so on), or can be repeated (recontextualized) so that 
its “outside” becomes the “inside” of a different story, a different context (and so on). 
At the centre of the text’s various “levels” – the hinge around which they revolve – is 
an idealised vision of joint attention: the figure of the ten young women and men 
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seated in a circle and each telling a story, every day for ten days. But this idealised 
vision of communal contemplation and entertainment is itself framed by the story of 
the young people’s escape from plague-stricken Florence: this is a narrative which, in 
contrast to the idealization that it encloses, is characterised by a grittily documentary 
description of disease and social breakdown.3 9   And this narrative is in turn framed 
by prefatory material in which Boccaccio, the author, addresses his readership 
concerning the nested narratives he is about to recount.4 0  
 This nesting of levels of joint attention is a process that reaches down from the 
framing Cornice into the substance of the tales themselves: more than simply a 
formal pattern, it becomes a generative principle of narrative. Many of the stories in 
the Decameron are stories about stories – stories in which the pivot-point of the 
narrative is the telling of a story, the speaking of a particular phrase, even the 
uttering of a single word. In such cases, the re-telling of a story in a different context 
is more than just a re-framing: the relation with context becomes an interactive one, 
whereby the re-telling itself changes the nature of the context, encompassing and 
altering that which had previously framed it.4 1  Such stories make up the entirety of 
the First Day, and the theme is made explicit on the Sixth Day, when the young 
                                                 
39 In interpretative terms, Boccaccio scholars have read the transition from plague to storytelling 
world in different way s: Joy Hambuechen Potter, drawing on anthropology, sees it as a “liminal” rite 
of passage, a social ritual of cleansing and renewal (Potter 1982, 11-40); Thomas Stillinger reads it in 
terms of a transition and complex interplay between metonymy and metaphor, “a double perspective 
[. .] which seals the Decameron as a paradoxical object, both a mathematically complete totality and a 
space of boundless play” (Stillinger 2004, 50);  Richard Kuhns has drawn a connection between 
Boccaccio’s design for the Decameron and the contemporary artistic form of the fresco (Kuhns 2005, 
29-52). 
40 Including the various forms of prefatory and interpolated “authorial” material, Joy Hambuechen 
Potter has identified five distinct levels of formal “framing” making up the cornice of the Decameron 
(Potter 1982, 120-51). 
41 “[I]n the Decameron not only is action often a product of speech, but speech can be the only action 
of narrative interest. More precisely: ‘comedic rhetoric, technique of discourse, the articulation of a 
dialogue, may mark the turning point of a plot or define the nature of a plot or define the nature of a 
character; but they also constitute at times the essential structural nucleus of a story .’” (Forni 1996, 
89; quoting Mario Baratto, Realtà e stile nel Decameron) 
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people are instructed by their “Queen” for the day to tell stories concerning “those 
who, on being provoked by some verbal pleasantry, have returned like for like, or 
who, by a prompt retort or shrewd manoeuvre, have avoided danger, discomfiture or 
ridicule” (Boccaccio 1972 [1353], 481). In the third story of the first day (I3), a rich 
Jewish moneylender, pressed by  the Sultan of Egypt to say “which of the three laws, 
whether the Jewish, the Saracen, or the Christian, you deem to be truly authentic”, 
gets out of the tricky situation by telling the Sultan the story of a man who distributes 
as a bequest to his three sons and their heirs a valuable ring and two identical 
duplicates, and hence ensures that it will never be known who was the favoured one. 
The telling of the story effectively re-contextualizes the original question. We find the 
same pattern of narrative re-contextualization as a means of turning the tables on 
those in a position of power in I7, where a petitioner opens a Duke’s purse by telling 
him the story of how a wealthy abbot, in a moment of revelation, repents of his 
miserliness.4 2  And in III3 the re-contextualization of narrative is given ridiculous 
physical form in the person of a friar who acts as an unwitting go-between, a vehicle, 
for an adulterous liaison, relaying narratives of pretended protestation that are 
received (and intended to be received by the original sender) as narratives of 
invitation.4 3  
  The celebrated first tale in the collection – the tale of the false saint, 
Ciappelletto – illustrates both this thematic concern with the re-contextualization of 
utterances, and the way in which the Decameron’s layers of textual framing, rather 
                                                 
42“Day  I may  be seen as a sustained lesson in the power of wit to reform delinquent authorities who 
would not tolerate direct criticism from their subordinates.” (Marcus 1979, 27) 
43 Pier Massimo Forni has drawn attention to the way in which the humour of many of Boccaccio’s 
tales arises from such processes of realization, whereby abstract ideas or metaphors are actualized 
(and thus rendered ridiculous) by  being translated into physical terms (Forni 1996, 57 -88). 
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than being merely an ornament, interact to ironic and ambiguous effect with 
perspectives embedded deep in the narrative itself. The “rubric” (the short authorial, 
textual intervention that heads each of the tales) gives a bald summary of the plot: 
 Ser Cepperello deceives a holy friar with a false confession, then he dies; and 
 although in life he was a most wicked man, in death he is reputed to be a 
 Saint, and is called Saint Ciappelletto. (Boccaccio 1972 [1353] 68) 
With the beginning of the narration proper, this authorial framing is superseded by 
the frame constituted by the shared knowledge and perspective of the narrator and 
his audience (the young people seated in the circle). Pier Massimo Forni has analysed 
how the introductions with which each storyteller begins his/her tale 
characteristically contain a tension between rhetorical elements which “situate the 
content of the stories within a context of normalcy” and elements which signal what 
is unexpected, new (nuovo, from which novella is derived) (Forni 1996, 44).  
In the case of this opening tale, the narrator, Panfilo, begins by telling of a 
wealthy merchant, Musciatto Franzesi, who, finding himself overwhelmed by 
commitments, appoints a notary called Ciappelletto to act as his agent on some 
business he has in Burgundy. As Forni observes, Panfilo’s presentation of the initial 
situation “discreetly underlies the normality of the occurrence” from the shared 
perspective of narrator and audience (Forni 1996, 44): 
 But finding that his affairs, as is usually the case with merchants, were 
 entangled here, there, and everywhere [. . .] (Boccaccio, 1972 [1353], 69 
 (emphasis added)) 
As against this, there are rhetorical elements that foreground what is remarkable 
about what is to be told – and that also, in doing so, establish a construal, a possible 
interpretation, of the narrative material that is to follow. In the case of this first tale, 
this opening orientation towards the material is particularly extended. Panfilo tells 
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his audience that he is going to tell them “of one of His marvellous works”, and then 
attempts, in knotted, tortuous language, to show that the story he is about to tell – 
the story of a thoroughly evil man who comes to be mistakenly venerated as a saint – 
in fact (and contrary to first appearances) supports a belief in Divine Providence. 
There is, thus, both a context of normalcy, of a world in which merchants are known 
to behave in certain ways, and (to use Labov’s term) an orientation to something new 
– an orientation which involves, in turn, a directing of attention towards an aspect, a 
construal, of the material. 
Panfilo tells how Ciappelletto – a murderer, blasphemer, rapist, robber, 
glutton and drunkard (in fact “perhaps the worst man ever born”  (Boccaccio 1972 
[1353] 71)) – is sent to Burgundy by the merchant and lodges in the house of two 
Florentine brothers who know of his reputation. Soon after arriving at the brothers’ 
house he falls ill, and, overhearing the two brothers discuss their fears that his death 
will bring disgrace on their house (either because he would die unconfessed, or 
because he would confess and thereby reveal their guest’s true nature), announces to 
them that they have no need to worry: they should go ahead and send for a friar, and 
he will “set yours affairs and my own neatly in order” (Boccaccio 1972 [1353] 73). The 
friar – a pious and respected priest – arrives to take the confession, and the brothers, 
not trusting Ciappelletto to keep his word, hide behind a partition to listen. 
According to custom, the friar asks the man a series of questions: Has he ever 
committed the sin of lust? Of gluttony? Of avarice? Has he ever lost his temper? Has 
he borne false witness? The dying man is diffident and modest in his replies. He is 
reluctant to answer the first question, lest he “sin by vainglory”, but eventually 
admits that he is “a virgin as pure as on the day I came forth from my mother’s 
womb”. The pattern is repeated with the other questions: against the resistance of 
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the dying man’s modesty and the exacting moral standards he applies to himself, the 
friar draws out a story of the man’s life - a story of a blameless life in which the sins 
are so trivial that they merely serve to highlight the virtue that surrounds them. The 
climax of the scene comes when the dying man bursts into tears, eventually 
admitting that once, when he was a little boy, he cursed his mother (Boccaccio 1972 
[1353] 73-8). At the man’s funeral, the friar tells the congregation Ciappelletto’s story 
“with a torrent of words that the people of the town believed implicitly.” When the 
service is over the people throng round the body, tearing clothes from it: “and those 
who succeeded in grabbing so much as a tiny fragment felt they were in paradise 
itself.” The story of the dead man’s virtue is passed on and repeated: 
 The fame of his saintliness, and of the veneration in which he was held, grew 
 to such proportions that there was hardly anyone who did not pray for his 
 assistance in time of trouble, and they called him, and call him still, Saint 
 Ciappelletto. Moreover it is claimed that through him God has wrought many 
 miracles, and that He continues to work them on behalf of whoever 
 commends himself devoutly to this particular saint. (Boccaccio 1972 [1353] 
 81) 
Through re-contextualization, Ciappelletto’s false confession is amplified, its 
reverberations rippling out even to the here-and-now of the narrator Panfilo and his 
audience (“and they called him, and call him still, Saint Ciappelletto”). 
 Franco Fido, following the observations of Mario Baratto, has pointed to the 
comic effect in the story of “speeches that grow in concentric circles around the bed 
of the dying, and then dead, notary” (Fido 2004, 62). It is precisely this “nested” 
structure – by which narrative interactions between two parties are themselves 
recursively narrativized, are contextualized or recontextualized by being subject to 
another layer of joint attention – that imparts to the tale as a whole an ambiguity and 
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interpretive instability.4 4  At each level, the communicative situation of the next level 
(a narrative, a conversation, a confession, a sermon) is held up as an object of 
attention and interpretation. The relationship between the levels is not directly 
“communicative”, but interpretative. The cognitive process whereby  the reader 
moves between the levels does not involve dyadic relations between codes and 
meanings, but, rather, triadic interpretations of dyadic communications. 
 Thus in progressing through the story, the reader passes through a succession 
of contextualizations and re-contextualizations: the textual framing of the narration; 
the narrator Panfilo introducing and narrating his tale to his listeners; Ciappelletto 
overhearing the Florentine brothers discussing their dilemma; the Florentine 
brothers overhearing Ciappelletto’s confession to the friar; the reader and Panfilo’s 
listeners overhearing the friar’s address to the parish congregation. Millicent Marcus 
has described the sequence in terms of a scale of deception and demystification: 
 Panfilo stands midway between two diametrically opposed publics: the 
 deceived parish within the story, and the demystified reading public. The 
 narrator knows the lie of Ciappelletto’s sainthood, yet he insists on seeing that 
 forgery as proof of divine benevolence. Though Panfilo is aware of one level of 
 deception, he is still the dupe of a kind of logic which insists on reading divine 
 motivation into all human events. (Marcus 1979, 19)  
But this progression through levels of joint attentional framing is not a 
straightforward linear one. There is also a non-linear, destabilizing oscillation 
between inside and outside that is an important part of the tale’s openness and 
indeterminacy. The heart of the tale is the celebrated comic scene of Ciappelletto’s 
confession. Listening to the confession are the Florentine brothers, who are amazed 
by the insouciance with which he deftly hoodwinks the friar: 
                                                 




 [T]hey were so amused that every so often they nearly exploded with mirth, 
 and they said to each other: 
“What manner of man is this whom neither [. .] fear of the death which 
 he sees so close at hand, nor even the fear of God, before whose judgement he 
 knows he must shortly appear, have managed to turn from his evil ways, or 
 persuade him to die any differently from the way he has lived?” (Boccaccio 
1972 [1353] 79). 
As Marcus has observed, this innermost circle of the Ciappelletto story projects back, 
beyond the tortuous justifications of the narrator, to “the demystified perspective” of 
the reader (Marcus 1979, 22). The “outside” of the tale’s many layers of joint 
attentional re-contextualization is to be found, too, at its very “inside”.  
The complex perspectivalism of the first story sets a tone by which the rest of 
the book is intended to be read. Tzvetan Todorov, in Grammaire du Décaméron, 
calls this interaction between internal and external perspectives the “problème du 
témoin”: “Boccaccio,” he observes, “is always concerned to introduce a character, 
often a secondary character, who serves as a witness, and with whom the reader can 
identify” (Todorov 1969, 15). In the story of Ciappelletto, the two Florentine brothers 
play exactly this role of an internal witness who is also a stand-in for an external 
observers at a higher textual level. These internal witnesses constitute a problem for 
Todorov because they lie outside his structuralist analysis of the tales’ story 
grammar. This self-imposed restriction means that Todorov puts aside the cornice 
entirely and treats the tales as freestanding narrative entities.4 5  The same is true – in 
a different way, and from a quite different theoretical perspective – of Wayne C. 
Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction. Booth is at pains to show how Boccaccio’s narratives 
are shaped by the demands not of mimesis but of rhetoric: hence the importance of 
                                                 
45 “The material to be analy sed will not, strictly speaking, be the Decameron as a book, but the 
hundred stories which it contains: none of the problems posed by the framing will be taken into 
consideration here” (Todorov 1969, 13). 
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the evaluative commentaries which preface the tales and lay out the terms by which 
the narrative is to be understood (Booth 1983 [1963], 15). Rhetorical, narratorial 
particularity, he argues, is the hallmark of the Decameron: 
Boccaccio’s artistry lies not in adherence to any one supreme manner of 
narration but rather in his ability to order various forms of telling in the 
service of various forms of showing. (16) 
Citing Erich Auerbach’s well-known critique of the Decameron in Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Booth observes that “[t]he 
standards of judgment change so radically [. .] that it is difficult to discern any figure 
in Boccaccio’s carpet” (15). Booth’s purely rhetorical approach, which places great 
weight on the figure of the “narrator”, means that the Decameron becomes – as it 
does for Todorov, though for quite different reasons – a splintered, broken work. 
 The dimension that is missing in Booth’s analysis is the presentation of the 
rhetoric, the embedding of it in a context which makes it, itself, an object of joint 
attention. The tendency of this perspectivalism is towards the undermining of any 
fixed viewpoint. Thus Millicent Marcus has argued that Boccaccio’s approach to 
narrative “implies more a way of interpreting than the end results of that 
interpretation” (Marcus 1979, 5). The key to this new “way of interpreting”, according 
to Marcus, is an open-endedness achieved through the generation of a “new, non-
dogmatic fictional space” for the narrative – a space that makes room for ironic 
reworkings of the medieval exemplum tradition: 
 [P]rior to Boccaccio, prose narrative was used to exemplify eternal, fixed 
 truths [. . .] Fictions were always pressed into the service of external dogma, 
 and the narrative word was seen as a vehicle of the divine order it exemplified. 
 But Boccaccio makes a radical break from this exemplary tradition, freeing his 
 stories from any absolute interpretive systems, and clearing a new, non-
 dogmatic fictional space [. . .] The author must disabuse his public of the 
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 tendency to interpret stories in exemplary terms by making the exemplum 
 discredit itself. (Marcus 1979, 11-12)4 6  
In Book XIV of Genealogia Deorum Gentilium, a defense of fiction and poetry that 
he wrote after the Decameron, Boccaccio describes how stories have meanings that 
transcend their purely linguistic, textual properties (their “surface”): 
 There was never a maundering old woman, sitting with others late of a 
 winter’s night at the home fireside making up tales of Hell, the fates, ghosts, 
 and the like - much of it pure invention - that she did not feel beneath the 
 surface of her tale, as far as her limited mind allowed, at least some meaning - 
 sometimes ridiculous no doubt - with which she tries to scare the little ones, 
 or divert the young ladies, or amuse the old, or at least show the power of 
 fortune. (Boccaccio 1956 [1360-74] quoted in Marcus 1979, 4)) 
Boccaccio is concerned here with the process of meaning rather than its end result. 
As developmental psychologist John Shotter has observed, meanings “[cannot] exist 
independently and in isolation from the processes in which they are produced as a 
human activity [. . .] ‘[M]eaning’ is best thought of as a verb, not a noun”  (Shotter 
1978, 46). 
But as Marcus’s description of a new interpretive “space” reminds us, there is 
a non-linear aspect to this process of meaning-making, an aspect constituted by re-
contextualization, by the embedding of action or narration in different forms of joint 
attention. It is precisely this non-linear aspect that is missing in the accounts of 
Todorov and Booth – both of whom, in different ways, are committed to essentially 
linear approaches: in Todorov’s case, the linearity of narrative “syntax”; in Booth’s 
case the linearity of a dyadic communication between narrator” and listener/reader.  
 
                                                 
46 Marcus is here summarizing the argument of Salvatore Battaglia, Giovanni Boccaccio e la riforma 
della narrativa (Liguori, Naples, 1969). 
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3. Joint Attentional Semiotics and the Prism of Character 
 In Section Two I was concerned with how the writing of narrative offers 
affordances for recursive embedding, for a non-linear architecture to the narrative. 
In this section I bring this perspective to bear on the development of character. In 
particular, I take as a case study Don Quixote, tracing in particular how character 
and action are mediated by a dense system of interacting perspectives. This approach 
to Don Quixote is not new, of course, but what I hope to demonstrate is the 
congruence of this Cervantine criticism with the joint attentional approach developed 
in the first two sections of this chapter. In subsection 3.1 I show how the frame of 
Don Quixote differs importantly from that of the Decameron in that the context 
incorporated into the text here is not the oral telling of stories but the reading and 
looking at manuscripts and books: this frame seeps deep into the substance of the 
narrative, not least in the person of Don Quixote himself. In subsection 3.2 I aim to 
demonstrate the profound intersubjectivity, the mediation, of perception in Don 
Quixote: indeed, I suggest, the relationship between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, 
the spine of the narrative, represents a distinctly joint attentional drama, composed 
as it is of the consonances and dissonances within their shared perceptions of the 
events unfolding around them. In subsection 3.3 I look at how this concept of 
mediated perspective has been carried forward in the work of René Girard and Rick 
Altman, and also highlight its divergence from purely objectivist views of character.  
3.1 From Manuscript to Print: The Case of “Don Quixote” 
 If the Decameron is a book that enacts the passage from orality  to writing, 
Don Quixote is one that is concerned above all with the dissemination of writing 
through print. In the former, the central figure is that of the oral narrator; in the 
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latter, it is that of the solitary reader. Don Quixote himself springs to life directly out 
of his private reading of chivalric romances: we learn little about his life before the 
moment, nearing the age of fifty, when he is overcome by bibliomania. And that 
bibliomania involves, crucially, the desire not just to imitate what he has read, but 
also that he himself should be read about and become famous in the same way. 
Before setting out on his first expedition, he invokes the “sage” who will one day 
write his history: 
As our brand-new adventurer journeyed along, he talked to himself, saying: 
‘Who can doubt that in ages to come, when the authentic story of my famous 
deeds comes to light, the sage who writes of them will say, when he comes to 
tell of my first expedition so early in the morning [. . . ]’ (Cervantes 1950 
[1605/15], 36) 
 Along with the shield, lance and helmet that will become physical symbols of his new 
identity, he selects pseudonyms for himself and for his horse: his actions are to be 
inscribed as something to be read by others. Indeed, he is introduced not just as a 
reader, but as someone who has considered writing romances himself, and “[n]o 
doubt he would have done so, and perhaps successfully, if other greater and more 
persistent preoccupations had not prevented him” (32). Quixote is a creature of 
reading – of the reading he has done, and of the reading he anticipates (correctly, 
though not quite in the way he imagined) will be done of him. To use the term that 
Cervantes employs, the history of Don Quixote is not a fully presented biographical 
life, but a “caso” – a “case” of reading.4 7  
                                                 
47 As Edward Dudley  writes: “[T]he focus [. .] is the case/story of his madness. The narrative opens 
with the protagonist’s decline into madness and closes with his recovery. There is no interest in the 
life of the person who becomes Don Quixote but only in the case of his madness and the telling of the 
tale of the case” (Dudley 1997, 123). 
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 It is not just the story of Don Quixote that it is a story about reading: the 
same is true of “the story of the story” (Dudley 1997, 195) – the story of how, through 
various acts of interpretation, translation and compilation, by a variety of “authors”, 
“translators” and “narrators”, the “history” of Don Quixote comes to take the form of 
a book.4 8   This story is one that seems to begin straight-forwardly enough: 
In a certain village in La Mancha, which I do not wish to name, there lived 
not long ago a gentleman – one of those who have always a lance in the 
rack, an ancient shield, a lean hack, and a greyhound for coursing. 
(Cervantes 1950 [1605/15], 31) 
 Here, surely, we have a “narrator” in command of his materials – with direct access 
to the people, places and events he describes; with the ability to mediate those things 
to his audience (like the narrators in the Decameron) by orienting them according 
their frames of reference (“one of those who . .”); with a narrator’s prerogative of 
selection from his materials (“which I do not wish to name”). But at the end of 
Chapter Eight, at the climax of Don Quixote’s battle with the Basque, there is a crisis 
in the “story of the story” with the appearance of a new character, an “author of this 
history”. 
 But the unfortunate thing is that the author of this history left the battle 
 in  suspense at this critical point, with the excuse that he could find no 
 more records of Don Quixote’s exploits than those related here. It is 
 true that the second author of this work would not believe that such a 
 curious history could have been consigned to oblivion, or that the learned 
 of La Mancha could have been so incurious as not to have in their archives 
 or in their registries some documents relating to this famous knight. So, 
 strong in this opinion, he did not despair of finding the conclusion of this 
 delightful story and, by the favour of Heaven, found it, as shall be told in 
 our second part. (74-5) 
The next chapter then begins: 
                                                 
48 “The story of the story underwrites all of Don Quixote’s adventures like the invisible attraction of a 
rarely  seen planet”  (Dudley  1997 , 195).  
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 In the first part of this history we left the valiant Basque and the famous 
 Don Quixote with naked swords aloft [. . .] At this critical point our 
 delightful history stopped short and remained mutilated, our author 
 failing to inform us where to find the missing part. This caused me great 
 annoyance, for my pleasure from the little I had read turned to displeasure 
 at the thought of the small chance there was of finding the rest of this 
 delightful story. (75) 
This “I” then tells how he goes off in search of other sources, and discovers in a street 
market in Toledo an Arabic manuscript, which, when a “Spanish-speaking Moor” 
begins to translate it for him, turns out to be an account of Don Quixote written by 
“Cide Hamete Benengeli, Arabic historian”. The remainder of the novel consists of 
the account by this “I” of an oral translation from the Arabic of Cide Hamete’s 
manuscript, which itself is a reading and gathering together of other sources. 
 This ambiguous transition has given rise to conflicting interpretations 
(Mancing 1982, 192-3). James Parr (1988), for example, offers an interpretation that 
adheres to classical narratological categories of “narrators” and “narrative levels”. 
According to this interpretation, the last paragraph of Chapter Eight marks a 
fundamental break in the narration. At this point, Parr argues, “the speaker of the 
first eight chapters falls silent” (Parr 1988, 10): this final paragraph of the chapter is 
an interpolation by a figure he calls the “supernarrator”. This “supernarrator” 
interrupts the “author” of the first eight chapters and introduces (through the 
reference to “the second author of this work”) a quite different voice who then takes 
over as the “narrator” who discovers the Cide Hamete manuscript and relates the rest 
of the story.4 9  Parr’s belief that “[a] reasoned approach to the art of the Quixote must 
begin by identifying the narrative voices and then proceed to establish a hierarchy of 
                                                 
49 Parr adds that behind this “second author” the “supernarrator” continues to be present as an 
“anony mous editorial voice” that “decides when to begin and end chapters [. .] [and] has added the 
chapter headings” (Parr 1988, 11). 
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authority among them” leads him to the view that “Cide Hamete” (or, more 
accurately, Cide Hamete’s text, his “history”) is “not to be taken seriously as a part of 
the fiction” because he is “not a narrator” (Parr 1988, 9). Because he is “never 
permitted to speak in his own voice” (22), he cannot be accorded a place in the 
hierarchy of voices.5 0  
 But it is possible to read the reference in the final paragraph of Chapter 
Eight to the “second author” in a different way. For Carroll B. Johnson (1990) there 
is a continuity in the narration. The term “second author”, according to Johnson, is 
merely a self-reference. (And in the next, final sentence of the chapter this “narrator” 
is thus merely referring to himself in the third person.) This “narrator” is, then, 
identical to the “I” of the opening of the next chapter, where the “narrator” has 
reverted to the first person to describe himself. According to this interpretation, the 
term “second author” does not mean “coming second” in a linear sequence, but 
rather something more like “secondary”, in the sense of “dependent on”, an 
“interpreter of” – secondary, that is, in a non-linear rather than linear sense 
(Johnson 1990, 51).  
 Johnson’s interpretation, which is more elegant and parsimonious than 
that of Parr, has an implication that he doesn’t, however, explore. It is true, as Parr 
points out, that there is a shift in the narration with the last paragraph of Chapter 
Eight. But it is not a switch between one “narrator” and another: it is the action of a 
reader putting down a book (and then going out into the streets to look for another 
one). According to this reading of the passage, the reference in the first sentence to 
                                                 
50 This exclusion seems perverse in v iew of the frequency with which Cide Hamete’s text is mentioned 
by  the narrator (often to praise it, occasionally to criticise or mock it), and in v iew of the associations 
that are suggested between Cide Hamete and the “sage enchanters” whom Don Quixote imagines to be 
manipulating his perceptions.  
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“this history” (i.e. to the one that breaks off in the middle of the battle with the 
Basque) is merely to one of the many sources that this reader has already alluded to 
as having been consulted by him.5 1  If, then, a “narrator” is defined as having 
privileged, unmediated access to the diegetic world, then Johnson is mistaken in 
describing the “I” who announces himself in the opening sentence of the novel as a 
“narrator”: he is, rather, a reader who reports on his reading. Indeed, in this sense 
there can be said to no “narrator” in Don Quixote at all – there is merely a reader 
who (a) in the first eight chapters reports on his reading of various different sources, 
including the truncated manuscript; (b) surfaces briefly as an active agent at the 
beginning of Chapter Nine, when he goes out in search of new reading material; and 
(c) thereafter reports on his reading of Cide Hamete’s manuscript, as mediated by the 
Moorish translator. The “narrator” of Don Quixote does not narrate events (though 
of course for long stretches he may seem to): he narrates a reading of texts. Don 
Quixote, as Edward Dudley has written, “is constituted as a product of reading, and 
the identifying activity of the narrator is that of a reader of texts” (Dudley 1997, 




                                                 
51 In the second paragraph of Chapter One we read: “They  say that his surname was Quixada or 
Quesada – for there is some difference of opinion amongst authors on this point” (31). And in the 
following chapter: “There are authors who say that the first adventure he met was that of the pass of 
Lapice. Others say  it was the windmills. But what I have been able to discover of the matter and what I 
have found written in the annals of La Mancha, is that he rode all day  [. . .]” (Cervantes 1950 
[1605/15], 37). 
52Dudley  argues that this interpretive dimension of Don Quixote , by  which “narration” and 
reading/interpretation are mutually involved, connects the novel  with the “hermeneutics of romance” 
in way s that go bey ond the merely parodic: chivalric romance involved the “translation” of originally 
Celtic tales, and the “quest” of the hero is paralleled by the quest for an authentic source for the story. 
(Dudley  1997). 
90 
 
3.2 Leaping off the Page: Ekphrasis and Character in Don Quixote 
 Don Quixote, then, is resistant to reading in terms of narrators 
transmitting information. Rather, it is a form of writing – one that represents a form 
of attention to an object (Cide Hamete’s manuscript, for most of the book) that is 
shared between the writer, his Arabic translator and, through the mediation of print, 
the reader:5 3  it is a description of an object, a manuscript. This joint attention on, 
and description of, the object is foregrounded: 
On the first sheet was a very life-like picture of Don Quixote’s fight with 
the Basque. Both were shown in the very postures the story describes, with 
swords aloft, the one covered  by his shield, the other by his cushion, and 
the Basque’s mule so life-like that you could tell from a mile off that is was 
a hired one. (Cervantes 1950 [1605/15], 77) 
Don Quixote leaps off the page by a process of ekphrasis – the “speaking out” of the 
object. Under the form of attention and language directed towards it, the description 
made of it, the object “speaks forth” in its own “voice”: it shakes off the inertia of 
objecthood and joins the lived temporality of the thoughts and language of those who 
are attending to it.5 4  In Part One, Cervantes literalizes this process around the long 
                                                 
53 The theme of joint attention on textual objects is pursued throughout the novel – most obviously in 
the scenes in Part One in which the merits of chivalric romance literature are debated (the burning of 
Don Quixote’s library (Part 1  Chapter 6); the discussion between the innkeeper and the priest (Part 1  
Chapter 32); the discussion between the priest and the canon (Part 1  Chapters 47  and 48)), and, in 
Part Two, the various discussions between readers of the published Part One and the false 
continuation of it by  “Avellaneda”. A related form of “textuality” – one in which ekphrasis takes the 
form of action – can be seen in the many  scenes in which characters, in order to humour or deceive 
Quixote, re-enact topoi from chivalric romance. These re-enactments begin in the very first 
expedition, when the first innkeeper knights Don Quixote (Part 1  Chapter 3). The principle such 
episode in Part One is the extended ruse by  which the priest and the barber (co-opting Dorothea as 
“the princess Micomicona”) “enchant” Quixote and lure him back to his v illage (Part 1  Chapters 37 , 46, 
47 , 49 and 52). In Part Two, such re-enactments dominate Quixote’s stay in the castle of the Duke and 
Duchess (Part 2 Chapters 31 -41, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52 and 55-7). 
54 Mario Klarer  has noted that usage of the term “ekphrasis” has narrowed since its classical origins: 
“According to the rhetorical handbooks of late Antiquity, the term “ekphrasis” (Latin descriptio) 
subsumed any  verbal description of v isual phenomena, including depictions of battles, plagues, 
fortifications, funerals and artefacts [. . .] In contrast [. .], contemporary word and image scholarship 
defines the term as a literary description of real or imagined pieces of art” (Klarer 2005, 133).  By  
contrast, contemporary usage is ty pically in terms of a literary de scription of a real or imagined pieces 
of art: ekphrasis has come to be seen as a form of self-reflexivity – a “double representation”, the 
verbal representation of a v isual representation. In aligning the term ekphrasis with the concept of 
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series of embedded narratives that begins with the Goatherd’s story of the unrequited 
passion of the dead Chrysostom for Marcela (Part One Chapter 12) and continues 
through Cardenio’s story of his thwarted love for Lucinda (Part One Chapters 24 and 
27); Dorothea’s tale, which interlinks with that of Cardenio, of her betrayal by Don 
Ferdinand (Part One Chapter 28); the story of “Princess Micomicona” (Part One 
Chapter 30); “The Tale of Foolish Curiosity” (Part One Chapters 33-5); and the tale of 
the escape of the Christian captive (Part One Chapters 39-41). In each of these cases, 
with the exception of the “Tale of Foolish Curiosity” (a “found manuscript”), the 
narrative “speaks out”, crossing the line from narrative “object” to living presence:5 5   
either it is one of the protagonists of the tale who stands before the listeners as 
narrator, or one of the characters from the tale subsequently appears in the diegetic 
world.5 6  Marcela, the cold-hearted femme fatale of the goatherd’s tale, steps forward 
at Chrysostom’s funeral to defend herself before a hostile crowd (Part 1 Chapter 14); 
Cardenio, Dorothea, Lucinda and Don Ferdinand are reunited and reconciled to their 
rightful partners (Part 1 Chapter 36); the Christian captive is reunited with his 
Moorish protector and lover Zoraida (Part 2 Chapter 47). When Don Quixote makes 
                                                 
joint attention, I am reverting to the older, broader conception of the term, which focusses on the joint 
construction by  writer and reader, through words, of (v isually perceived) objects, rather than 
restricting those objects to artistic representations. (The latter case can be accommodated within the 
model I propose by seeing the representational quality of the object as a further, “nested” level of joint 
attention within the jo int attention summoned by the verbal ekphrasis.) David Herman has argued 
that “the area of overlap between narrative and description can [. .] be substantial” since “descriptive 
and narrative functions can be fulfilled by one and the same textual structure – and reciprocally, many 
different structures can serve, say , a descriptive function – depending on the particularities of 
communicative contexts” (Herman 2009, 89-90). 
55 In the ironic digression that opens Part 2 Chapter 44, the one exception to this rul e, the “Tale of 
Foolish Curiosity”, is reported as having been picked out by Cide Hamete as an example of his habit in 
Part One of “resort[ing] to short tales [. .] which are, in a sense, separate from the story” – an 
indulgence which, reluctantly, he anno unces himself to be foregoing in Part Two. 
56 The sense of these characters being narrative “objects” which have come to life is supported by the 
generically “fictional”  nature of the embedded tales, which draw on familiar topoi from pastoral 
literature and By zantine romance. 
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contact, literally, with the anguished, self-lacerating Cardenio, the moment is marked 
by silent, deep communion: 
 Don Quixote [. .] advanced to embrace him, and held him for some time 
 clasped in his arms, as if he had known him for a long while. The other [. .] 
 after allowing himself to be embraced drew back a little and, placing his 
 hands on Don Quixote’s shoulders, stood gazing at him, as if to see 
 whether he knew him [. . .] (191) 
Cardenio’s antics in the mountains inspire Don Quixote to “imitate Amadis, and to 
act here the desperate, raving, furious lover” (203): direct contact with the quasi-
fictional Cardenio releases his creative energies. 
 This ekphrasis, this “speaking out” of a narrative, textual object, is echoed 
at the beginning of Part Two when Quixote and Sancho themselves, as physical, 
embodied beings, are encountered by those, such as the Bachelor Sampson Carrasco, 
who have hitherto known them only as “characters” in a book. Just as Quixote clasps 
Cardenio in his arms, so Sampson Carrasco goes down on his knees before the “real” 
Don Quixote and says: “Give me your hands, your Mightiness, Don Quixote de la 
Mancha” (486).  Of these physical encounters between Don Quixote and his readers, 
Richard Predmore writes: “Nowhere in the novel is the illusion of Don Quixote’s and 
Sancho’s autonomous reality more successfully sustained than in the opening 
chapters of Part II. Here most convincingly knight and squire seem to stand outside 
the book that gave them life” (Predmore 1967, 12). As we shall see below, the process 
of ekphrasis by which Don Quixote leaps forth from the printed page into the hands 
of Sampson Carrasco suggests to the reader, through the embedded perspective they 




 Thus characters in Don Quixote can spring to life by a process of 
ekphrasis: the object “speaks out” through the linguistically mediated joint attention, 
the description, directed towards it. But characters in Don Quixote are not just the 
objects of joint attention: they are also, simultaneously, subjectivities that subject 
further objects (including other characters) to episodes of joint attention with the 
reader/writer and other characters. The central image of Don Quixote, captured in 
Picasso’s famous sketch, is that of the hidalgo and Sancho Panza ambling side-by-
side down the road on their mounts, deep in conversation. The narrative moves from 
one adventure (such as the famous battle with the windmills) to another, but in 
terms of length of text these descriptions of action are dwarfed by the debates 
between Don Quixote and his squire as to the meaning and significance of the events 
they are witnessing and taking part in.5 7  (As a crude indication of this, a significant 
number of the chapter headings advertise not an incident or piece of action but “the 
Pleasant Conversation”, “the sensible conversation”, “the delectable Conversation” 
etc between the two characters.)5 8  During these dialogues, both Quixote and Sancho 
attempt to align each other to their own particular interpretation of the events. 
Quixote looks at them in terms of how they can be accommodated within the topoi of 
chivalric romance (battles with giants, rescuing damsels, righting wrongs etc), and of 
how discrepancies between “reality” and these topoi can be explained by the 
machinations of “enchanters”. Sancho, by contrast, argues the case for “reality”, and 
for his master’s “madness” in believing such things. These episodes of joint attention 
between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, directed at the characters and events that 
                                                 
57 Diderot’s “Cervantine” novel Jacques the Fatalist (1765-80) extends this topos of the mobile 
dialogue between master and servant. 
58 The quotations here are from the chapter headings to Part 1  Chapters 10, 19 and 31. See also the 
headings to Part 1  Chapters 18 and 49 and Part 2 Chapters 3, 7 , 42, 43,  
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they meet along the way, is a constant thread running through the novel from the 
beginning of Quixote’s second expedition (Part 1 Chapter 7), when Sancho is 
persuaded to ride with him, to their final journey back to their village at the end of 
Part Two. As Howard Mancing has observed, “[t]he most important single event in 
Cervantes’ novel, after the original exposition, is the introduction of Sancho Panza” 
(Mancing 1982, 49).5 9  The relationship between the views of events of Quixote and of 
Sancho do not remain fixed in the archetypal relation outlined above, but are 
dynamic and interactive.  
 One form that this interactivity takes is through the narrative’s aligning of 
the reader’s view with the views of Quixote and Sancho taken together as a single 
perspective, creating moments of ambiguous common-ground where the phenomena 
are equally susceptible to Quixotic or common-sense interpretation. This can be seen 
if we compare, as Carroll Johnson has done, the points of view expressed in the 
windmill scene (Part 1 Chapter 8) with the way the adventure of the nocturnal 
religious procession and the corpse (Part 1 Chapter 19) is introduced (Johnson 1990, 
92-3). At the beginning of the former episode we are told straightforwardly that “they 
caught sight of some thirty or forty windmills, which stand on that plain” (Cervantes 
1950 [1605/15], 68). By the time of the adventure of the corpse, things are becoming 
more uncertain: 
 [T]hey saw coming towards them on their road a great number of lights, 
 which looked more like stars in motion than anything else [. . .] The squire 
 checked his ass, and Don Quixote his horse, and they stopped still, peering 
 attentively to make out what it could be. (142-3) 
                                                 
59 In The Western Canon, Harold Bloom writes: “[T]he loving, frequently irascible relation between 
Quixote and Sancho is the greatness of the book, more even than the gusto of its represent ation of 
natural and social realities” (quoted in Bandera 2006, 177).   
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Such occasions will multiply as the novel goes on, and as the deceptions practiced on 
them create “realities” that seem to anticipate Don Quixote’s chivalric imaginings.6 0  
 But there is a larger sense in which the joint attention between Quixote 
and Sancho towards the world around them unfolds in a dynamic and interactive 
manner: this is the process, long noted and analyzed by commentators, by which 
during the course of the novel Quixote becomes “sanchified” and Sancho 
“quixoticized” (Segre 1979 181-6). In Part One Sancho quickly internalizes Quixote’s 
chivalric language and thought (Mancing 1982, 72-80) – it is he, for example, who 
comes up with the appropriately chivalric moniker of “Knight of the Sad 
Countenance” for his master (Part 1 Chapter 19). In Part 2 it is Sancho who will, in 
his own mind, achieve the goal that constitutes his stake in the pair’s collective 
chivalric goal, when he is granted his longed-for “governorship of an isle” (Part 2 
Chapters 45, 47, 49, 51).  
 As Cesare Segre has observed, despite their physical separation (Quixote 
remains in the palace of the duke and duchess), Sancho and Quixote are never as 
close as during this episode when Sancho takes governorship of his isle (Segre 1979 
181-6). It is Sancho who gets to put into practice Quixote’s chivalric wisdom 
(embodied in the Mirror for Princes that Quixote writes for him (Part 2 Chapters 42-
43, 51)), while Quixote is on an opposite trajectory, one of a nagging, melancholy 
skepticism that will begin to undo his chivalric dreams even before their cataclysmic 
defeat at the hands of the Knight of the White Moon (Part 2 Chapter 64). Before he 
                                                 
60 The problem of “reality” in Don Quixote has been treated by Richard Predmore, who has analyzed in 
detail the proliferation throughout the text (and in connection with a range of char acters, not just 
Quixote and Sancho) of linguistic markers of perceptual and epistemological uncertainty such as 
parecer (“to seem”, “to appear”) (Predmore 1967, 57-83). Predmore is following in the footsteps of the 
“perspectivist” critical approach to Don Quixote, associated above all with Américo Castro and Leo 
Spitzer, which emphasises the way in which Cervantes’ ambiguous text is composed of multiple 
viewpoints (Close 1978, 255).  
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sets out for his “isle” Sancho voices his suspicion about the  deception being practiced 
on them by the duke and duchess, and tells Quixote that on his journey he will see if 
he can “discover any other sign to confirm or dispel my suspicion”: 
 “So you must, Sancho,” said Don Quixote, “and inform me of all you 
 discover about the matter [. . .]” (747) 
In a subsequent letter to Sancho, Quixote returns to this subject of deception, and 
links it, if only by conjunction, to his own restlessness in the gilded cage of the Duke 
and Duchess’ palace, despite (or perhaps because of) it being the place where all his 
dreams of acclamation as a true knight-errant seem to be being realized (801).6 1  
 The shifting dynamic of joint attention between Quixote and Sancho is 
itself often embedded in the joint attention that others are paying to them. In scenes 
such as the debate at the inn about whether the barber’s basin is really Mambrino’s 
helmet (Part 1 Chapter 44), this embedding of perspectives achieves a comic-baroque 
complexity – a complexity, however, that can be reduced to a collision between three 
distinct groups: 
 those who are falsely adopting quixotic speech and behaviour in 
order to deceive Quixote and Sancho 
 Quixote and Sancho themselves – who, as indicated above, move in 
relation to one another as a unit, on a spectrum of credulity and 
skepticism 
 others who witness the interaction of these two joint perspectives, 
i.e. see apparently sane people adopting the same perspective as a 
seeming madman and his sidekick 
                                                 
61 Another area where we see an emerging common ground between Quixote and  Sancho – this time 
on the  credulous rather than sceptical end of their mental spectrum – links Quixote’s anxieties 
concerning his dream in Montesinos’s cave with Sancho’s belief in the reality of their journey on the 
“fly ing horse” Clav ileño. After Sancho’s “quixotic” description of his experiences, Quixote goes up to 
his squire and whispers in his ear: “‘Sancho, if y ou want me to believe what y ou saw in the sky , I wish 
y ou to accept my  account of what I saw in the Cave of Montesinos. I say  no more’” (735 ). 
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The beginnings of this process of embedding can be seen in the very first expedition, 
before Sancho has joined Quixote, when the innkeeper at the first inn acts as a 
mediator between Quixote’s fantasies and the quotidian reality around him.6 2  
Further affordances for Quixote’s chivalric view of the world are provided by 
Sancho’s supposed visit to Dulcinea and by the extended ruse by which the priest and 
the barber (co-opting Dorothea as “Princess Micomicona”) “enchant” Quixote and 
lure him back to his village.  
 It is in the context of this latter deception that the debate over Mambrino’s 
helmet takes place, with the priest, the barber and the others who are deceiving 
Quixote taking Quixote’s side against the astonished second barber and various 
onlookers who have happened on the scene. Sancho Panza is aligned with Don 
Quixote because he wants the barber’s pack-saddle, claiming that it is a horse’s 
harness. But this alignment is not unequivocal – when challenged on the pack-
saddle, Don Quixote admits that “It looks like a pack-saddle to me” and attributes the 
confusion to the “enchantment” that is directing events at the inn. Don Ferdinand, 
who is in league with the priest and the barber in their deception of Don Quixote, 
begins to take a secret vote among those present on whether the pack-saddle is a 
horse’s harness, but the laughter that this move engenders soon turns to fighting as 
the argument continues among the various factions: “So the whole inn was full of 
tears, shouts, screams, amazement, fear, alarm, dismay, slashings, punches, blows, 
kicks and effusions of blood” (407). Ironically it is Don Quixote, the original cause of 
the discord, who raises his voice to call for peace, claiming that they are all the 
victims of the “enchantment” that has overtaken the “castle”. 
                                                 
62The innkeeper Gornemont’s mediating role in this episode (which culminates in his crucial 
“knighting” of Quixote) has been explored in depth by Edward Dudley  (1997, 142-50). 
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 The debate and fighting over the barber’s basin in Part  One is an early and 
spectacular instance of the way in which the people Don Quixote meets “become 
contaminated by his madness” (Bandera 2006, 282).6 3  In Part Two, the Duke and 
Duchess’ elaborate trickery and mockery of Don Quixote and Sancho lead them to 
adopt the very patterns of behaviour that they had set out to ridicule: 
 In fact Cide Hamete says that he considers the mockers were as mad as 
 their victims, and the Duke and Duchess within a hair’s breadth of 
 appearing fools themselves for taking such pains to play tricks on a pair of 
 fools. (916) 
When he is being led through the streets of Barcelona, a passer-by cries out: 
 “The devil take Don Quixote de la Mancha! [. . .] If you had been mad in 
 private and behind closed doors you would have done less harm. But you 
 have the knack of turning everyone who has to do with you into madmen 
 and dolts.” (871) 
Never mind that the Duke and Duchess and all the others who act “madly” in order to 
deceive Don Quixote are supposedly doing so in the name of  “sanity”: Cervantes 
offers a pragmatic view according to which thoughts and ideas are judged according 
to their consequences in the form of the further thoughts or behaviour that they 
engender. It is this ceaseless pragmatics – whereby real actions engender fictional 
interpretations, which themselves become real actions – that underlies the 
opalescence between fiction and reality in Don Quixote: 
 Every real conflict is a potential piece of poetic fiction, and every poetic 
 fictional conflict carries with it the possibility of becoming real, that is to 
 say, of being taken for real, of being imitated in real life. (Bandera 2006, 
 250) 
                                                 
63 The same metaphor is used by  René Girard in his discussion – which will be returned to below – of 
mediated or “triangular” desire in Don Quixote: Don Quixote’s imitation of Amadis of Gaul – whereby 
Amadis becomes his mediator, to whom he has surrendered the choosing of the objects of his desire – 
is an “ontological sickness” that is “contagious” (Girard 1965, 96-8). 
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This interpretive energy running through Cervantes’ novel, born of the dynamics of 
joint attention, bears out Terence Doody’s general observation on the modern novel 
that “[i]n a linguistic medium, interpretation is the basic, or the principal, or perhaps 
the only form of action that finally counts” (Doody 1998, 105). Events are 
immediately swallowed up by interpretations – and interpretations themselves are 
events. (The originary event of the narrative – Quixote’s madness – is itself an event 
that is simultaneously an interpretation (Quixote’s reading of the romances).) The 
battle in the courtyard of the inn over the barber’s basin is a striking comic figuration 
of this process whereby interpretation and fiction become – and hence are – 
themselves fact and reality.6 4  
3.3 Two Views of Character: Mediated Desire vs Objectivity 
 Characters, then, are embedded subjectivities of the narrative. They 
present an “outside” that can be described as an object – “objectively”: in the 
intertextual world of Don Quixote it can be their very status as textual/semiotic 
objects that, through processes of joint attention and ekphrasis, can lead to their 
animation. But simultaneously they present an “inside” whereby, through that 
character, attention is directed towards specific objects.  In Among Other Things: A 
Description of the Novel (1998), Terence Doody draws attention to this Janus-faced 
quality of character through his argument that (to quote the title of one of his 
chapters) “A Character Is Also a Sign” (Doody 1998, 92). He points out that, 
etymologically, “character” denoted a sign – “a distinctive mark impressed, 
                                                 
64 Javier Marías, a contemporary Spanish novelist also much concerned with the power of 
interpretation in narrative, writes: “[R]eal life [. .] bears a closer relation to films or literature than is 
normally recognized and believed. It isn’t, as people say , that the former imitates the latter or the 
latter the former, but that our infinite imaginings belong to life too [. . .] [I]maginings are already facts 
[. . .] (Marías 2006, 16) 
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engraved, or otherwise formed” – long before it became “a description, delineation or 
detailed report of a person’s qualities”. Later definitions of character such as “the 
face of features betokening moral qualities”, he argues, are extrapolations of that first 
sense: 
It is hard to defend character as a substance, when historically it has always 
been a sign. Not a human being, but a mark in language to represent human 
qualities” (Doody 1998, 104-5).  
For Doody, therefore, character is a sign in that it is both “something we read and 
something we read-with” (Doody 1998, 104).  Characters, above all, read other 
characters – and, indeed, it is in the interaction with other characters that character 
emerges in the mind of the reader. This “character” is both subject and object:  
 As an act of interpretation or of reading, character has [. .] both an active 
 and a passive aspect. Passively, it is the sum of attributes, motives, beliefs, 
 and behaviors which we interpret in one another. Actively, it is the 
 principle  behind our own attributes, motives, beliefs, and behaviors which 
 gives us the ability to make our interpretations as we do, and thereby be 
 interpreted ourselves by others. Our characters read and are read by other 
 characters. (Doody 1998, 105)  
The recognition and attribution of “character” or “characteristics” in another, 
whether in fiction or reality, is thus simultaneously a self-attribution and self-
definition. As in the disastrous/heroic case of Don Quixote, a reader’s own character 
may be molded by his or her reading of fictional characters.6 5  
                                                 
65 This self-definition by the reader inherent in the text’s attribution of character is recognised in 
rhetorical criticism’s concept of the “mock” or “implied” reader. For Walker Gibson, for example, the 
persuasive force of the “mock reader” (seen most nakedly in “subliterary genres crudely com mitted to 
persuasion, such as advertising and propaganda”) raises ethical and existential questions for the 
reader: “For the student, the problem of what mock reader – or part of a mock reader – it is proper for 
him to accept, and what to reject, involves the whole overwhelming problem of learning to read and 
learning the enormously difficult job of becoming the mock reader of Paradise Lost, or Antigone, or 
Wallace Stevens. The student’s hesitation is no more than a part of a larger question that possibly n o 
teacher can presume to answer for him: Who do I want to be?” (Gibson 1996 [1950], 156, 160).  
101 
 
 This interactional, intersubjective quality to character is highlighted by the 
concept of “mediated desire” that René Girard develops in Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel (1965). In mediated desire, character is determined by the internalizing of the 
desires of others: choice of the object of desire is relinquished to another, the 
mediator. To take the example that forms Girard’s starting point (his other main 
texts are from Stendhal, Dostoevsky and Proust), Don Quixote takes as his model the 
figure of Amadis of Gaul, whom he vows to emulate in all things (Girard 1965 [1961], 
1).6 6  Action (Don Quixote’s setting off on his adventures) is engendered by 
interpretation, character by the reading of another character. A similar emphasis on 
the importance of mediation for character is to be found in Rick Altman’s account, in 
his Theory of Narrative (2008), of what he calls “single-focus” narratives – that is, 
narratives that for the most part follow a single character through time:6 7  such 
narratives commonly begin with the protagonist being provoked to pursue the object 
of his desire by a catalyst such as a teacher, a tempter or Girard’s “mediator” (Altman 
2008, 147-54). 
 Two themes emerge from the “triangular” approach to character taken by 
Girard and Altman: mediation and motivation or desire. In the first place, their 
accounts underline how “representations” are always mediated and how objects 
cannot be disentangled from their mediation: Don Quixote sees the world as he 
                                                 
66 As has been shown above, Don Quixote, with a ty pically “Cervantine” twist, is in fact doubly inspired 
to set out on his first expedition – not just by  the example of Amadis, but by his imagining himself 
reading the future account that will be written of his own adventures.  
67 Altman distinguishes between “single-focus” narratives (e.g. the saint’s life, the bildungsroman); 
“dual-focus” narratives, in which the narrative switches, for different purposes, between two 
characters or sets of characters (e.g. the romantic comedy, the Western); and “multiple -focus” 
narratives, in which the narrative switches between a large number of characters in order to 
emphasise their joint participation in or dependence on a supra-personal event or principal (e.g. battle 
or crowd scenes (Book 2 of War and Peace , the opening of Hugo’s Notre Dame de Paris) and 




imagines Amadis of Gaul saw it; the “writer” of Don Quixote sees Don Quixote as he 
describes Cide Hamete as seeing him; the reader sees Cide Hamete’s manuscript 
through the “writer” of Don Quixote’s description; and so on. The reader also sees the 
secondary characters – from Sancho Panza through to the Duke and Duchess in Part 
II – in relation to Quixote. Specifically, these secondary characters are seen, in a 
reflective turn, through the representations that they make of Quixote: in single-
focus narratives, as Altman shows, the tendency is for the perspectives of secondary 
characters to reflect back on the protagonist. (Not for nothing does Quixote’s nemesis 
in Part II go under the nom de guerre “The Knight of the Mirrors”.) The protagonist’s 
search for self-definition, according to Altman, characteristically takes a narcissistic 
turn whereby others are viewed as aspects of the self: desire for the opposite sex, for 
example, comes to represent “veiled narcissism, a thinly masked desire for selfhood 
and transcendence” (Altman 2008, 120). In single-focus narratives, the “narrator”, 
too, is caught in the magnetic field of the protagonist’s subjectivity: 
 [T]he narrator of Pride and Prejudice appears to have accepted voluntary 
 submission to the whims of Miss Elizabeth Bennett, following her 
 wherever she goes [. . .] [The narrator] seems less like the creator of a 
 story, or even the objective recorder of history, than the amanuensis of the 
 heroine [. . .] By usurping the dominant position in the following-pattern, 
 the protagonist becomes the subject in relationship to whom all other 
 characters and things remain objects. (Altman 2008, 122-3) 
As we have seen, single-focus narratives, in Altman’s account, begin with the 
protagonist breaking away – geographically and/or psychologically – from the world 
of stable values that had been affirmed in dual-focus narratives. One feature of this 
process of breaking-away and self-creation is a desire to tell one’s own story, to 
become the “author” of one’s own destiny (Altman 2008, 121 -2), just as Don Quixote 
vows to “write” his own story through deeds that will be read (about) by future 
generations, invoking the sage who will one day write his history (and thereby 
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invoking the notion that he himself is the “author” on whom the narrator depends) 
(Cervantes 1950 [1605/15], 36). 
 In addition to this perspectivalism, the accounts given by Girard and 
Altman also underline that perspectives – “representations” – are motivated, are 
inextricably connected with intentionality or desire. According to Altman, it is the 
single-focus protagonist’s desire – the choice he makes to break away from the stable 
world of dual-focus narrative – that motivates not only the representations that he 
makes, but also the representation that is made of him, the framing that is made of 
him: “the narrator’s decision to follow the protagonist to the near exclusion of others 
clearly reveals the force and function of the central character’s desire” (Altman 2008, 
121-2). It is what one might call this “desire for the desire” that motivates the 
representation of “Don Quixote” (i.e. the novel Don Quixote): without the fascination 
that the “case” of Don Quixote holds for writer, reader and other mediators 
(including the characters in the story) – without, that is, their desire for his desire – 
there would be no novel. Perspectives, or “representations”, are not merely bundles 
of information, but embody a certain intentionality towards the object: a 
representation (i.e. a semiotic object available for joint attention) communicates, as 
an integral part of the perspective that it offers, an intentionality, a desire, directed at 
the object. 
 The construction of character, then, involves an active engagement with 
what Wolfgang Iser (1978) calls the “shifting viewpoints of the narrative”. It demands 
not just a passive reception and processing (“decoding”) of information, but an 
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interaction whereby the intentionality of the reader changes.6 8  In this context it is 
worth recalling Terence Doody’s account of the two faces of character as sign:  
 As an act of interpretation or of reading, character has [. .] both an active 
 and a passive aspect. Passively, it is the sum of attributes, motives, beliefs, 
 and behaviors which we interpret in one another. Actively, it is the 
 principle  behind our own attributes, motives, beliefs, and behaviors which 
 gives us the ability to make our interpretations as we do, and thereby be 
 interpreted ourselves by others. Our characters read and are read by other 
 characters. (Doody 1998, 105) 
As I shall now show, it is this second, (inter)active aspect that is underplayed in some 
recent cognitive accounts of fictional character-construction that draw on concepts of 
“Theory of Mind” (Zunshine 2006; Vermeule 2010).  
 Like Alan Palmer’s (2004) exploration of the “fictional mind”, these 
models focus on the construction of “characters” through various forms of mental 
representation – for example, the ascribing of particular properties (beliefs, states of 
mind, intentions) to another mind. The form of these representations is 
propositional, and their function is to provide causal explanations for the current 
behavior – and predictions concerning the future behavior – of others. “Theory of 
Mind” (ToM) (or “mindreading”) is the label that has become current among 
cognitive psychologists to describe the capacity to ascribe states of mind, beliefs and 
intentions to others. According to the influential account of Simon Baron-Cohen 
                                                 
68 In The Act of Reading (1978), Wolfgang Iser characterizes the development of the novel since the 
eighteenth century in terms of an increase in this interactivity, through an ever-greater multiplicity of, 
and differentiation between, perspectives. I n the eighteenth century “character perspectives [. .] were 
organized in a hierarchical pattern, with the hero at the apex  and the minor characters below” (Iser 
1978, 203-4). The interposition of a reliable, omniscient narrator represented an elaboration of this 
basic hierarchical structure (204).  The nineteenth and twentieth centuries, by contrast, saw a 
“levelling” of these hierarchies – through the emergence of the “unreliable” narrator, for example – 
with the reader required to make greater and more frequent shifts betwee n textual perspectives: 
“[T]he reader’s v iewpoint became less clearly oriented, which meant correspondingly greater demands 
on his own structuring activity. With this multiple combination of equal -ranking perspective 
segments, patterns of interaction became a good deal more open” (205). 
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(1995), ToM is a distinct and innate module of the human brain whose impairment 
with autism causes difficulties with recognizing the mental and emotional states of 
others. The healthy deployment of a functioning ToM can be seen in children who 
pass (generally around the age of four) a “false belief” test involving recognizing the 
(false) beliefs held by others.6 9  There are two competing versions of ToM – “Theory 
Theory” and “Simulation Theory”. The former holds that “mindreading” involves 
reference to a body of folk psychology – a “theory” concerning the relationship of 
beliefs, states of mind and intentions. “Simulation theory”, which has drawn on the 
discovery of “mirror neurons” for support, involves the idea that the representation 
of other minds takes the form of “off-line” simulations that allow one to project 
oneself into the situation of the other. 
 In her application of the notion of Theory of Mind to fiction, Lisa 
Zunshine pays particular attention to the embedding of mental representations in 
one another. She highlights the significant difference between, on the one hand, 
sequences such as “A gave rise to B, which resulted in C, which in turn caused D, 
which led to E, which made possible F, which eventually brought about G, etc.,” and, 
on the other hand, sequences requiring the attribution of states of mind, such as, “A 
wants B to believe that C thinks that D wanted E to consider F’s feelings about G” 
(Zunshine 2006, 29).7 0  The latter kind of sequence requires more cognitive effort – 
                                                 
69 In one common version of this test, the child being tested observes “Mary” put a toy  in a hiding 
place and then leave the room. In Mary’s absence, someone else comes into the room and moves the 
toy  to a different hiding place. The children are asked where Mary will look for the toy when she 
comes back in. Passing the test involves recognising that she will look not where the toy actually is, but 
where she (falsely ) believes it to be.  
70 On the subject of these two sequences , Zunshine quotes Uri Margolin’s Reader’s Report: “[The] 
reason for the difference is that the first [sequence] is linear or sequential, unfolding step by  step with 
all the members being on the same level, while the second is hierarchical and simultaneous and needs 
to be grasped in its totality or unpacked in reverse order of presentation” (Zunshine 2006, 170). The 
importance of the relation between linear and non-linear sequences for fictional narrative will be 
explored below in Chapter Two. 
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but, Zunshine argues, it also represents an evolutionary adaption that is crucial to 
human sociality: she illustrates its importance in fictional narrative with a wide range 
of instances (including Virginia Woolf and Nabokov), but her examples gravitate 
towards the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (especially Samuel Richardson 
and Jane Austen).7 1  
 Zunshine adopts the term “metarepresentation” (that is, a “representation 
of a representation”) for the kind of relation that makes up the second sequence:  
[A] metarepresentation consists of two parts: The first part specifies a source 
of representation, for example, “I thought . . .,” or “Our teacher informed us . . 
.” The second part provides the content of representation, for example, “. . . 
that it was going to rain,” or “. . . that plants photosynthesize. (Zunshine 2006, 
47) 
Monitoring the sources of representations (“source-tagging”) is of crucial importance 
for characters in, and readers of, fictional narratives. Thus, for example, Don 
Quixote, according to Zunshine, suffers from “a selective failure of source-
monitoring”: 
 He takes in representations that “normal” people store with a restrictive 
agent-specifying source tag such as “as told by the author of a romance” as 
lacking any such tag. He thus lets the information contained in romances 
circulate among his mental databases as architectural truth, corrupting his 
knowledge about the world that we assume has hitherto been relatively 
accurate. (Zunshine 2006, 75). 
The perspective that Zunshine offers on mental representations (by readers of 
characters, and by characters of other characters (and of their mental 
representations) is a detached, third-person one, in which the only connection 
between observer and object are the “streams of information” (60) that form the 
                                                 
71 A similar historical bias can be detected in Blakey  Vermeule 2010. 
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basis of the representations. This Cartesian view of mental life, as something apart 
and of a different kind from the world, and in which the world is only “represented”, 
is well-captured in a formulation that she quotes from Uri Margolin:  
 [S]ince we cannot but conceive of narrative agents as human or human-like, it 
is a basic cognitive requirement of ours that we attribute to them information-
processing activities and internal knowledge representations. (Zunshine 2006, 
78 quoting Margolin 2003, 284) 
In The Embodied Mind (1991), one of the earliest and most influential proposals for 
an enactive view of cognition, Francisco Varela and his colleagues define classical 
cognitivism thus: 
 cognitivism consists in the hypothesis that cognition – human cognition 
 included – is the manipulation of symbols after the fashion of digital 
 computers. In other words, cognition is mental representation: the mind is 
 thought to operate by manipulating symbols that represent features of the 
 world or represent the world as being a certain  way. (Varela et al 1991, 8) 
As philosopher Mark Johnson has characterized it, this “representational theory of 
mind”, characteristic of “first-generation”, computational cognitivism, is based on 
the claim that “the ‘mind’ operates on ‘internal representations’ (ideas, concepts, 
images) that can re-present (and thereby ‘be about’) external objects and events” 
(Johnson 2007, 112).  
 Arguing against these representationalist versions of how minds understand 
each other, Shaun Gallagher points out that “[t]here are good reasons [. .] to view 
beliefs as dispositions that are sometimes ambiguous even from the perspective of 
the believer. To have a belief is not to have an all-or-nothing mental representation, 
but to have some more-or-less-complete set of dispositions to act and to experience 
in certain ways” (Gallagher 2006, 214). Alan Palmer, in Fictional Minds, in part 
adopts this enactivist, non-Cartesian perspective, pointing out the importance in 
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fictional narrative of a blurring between thought and action (such that, for example, 
thought becomes a form of mental action, or action becomes the physical expression 
of thought): “The more the distinction between fictional mind and action is blurred, 
the more it can be seen that the real object of study is the mind in action” (Palmer 
2004, 131-7). But his account is placed in a theoretical framework that is third-
person and representational rather than first-person and phenomenological: 
character is described as “a non-actual being who exists in a possible world and who 
can be ascribed physical, social and mental properties” (Palmer 2004, 38). Fictional 
minds are constructed with the help of mental frames such as the “continuing 
consciousness frame” (175-83) which enables the reader to link up different 
appearances of the character in the text to construct “the whole of a character’s 
various perceptual and conceptual viewpoints, ideological worldviews, and plans for 
the future considered as an individual narrative that is embedded in the whole 
fictional text” (15).7 2  
 It is precisely this kind of propositional, objectivist knowledge that is tested in 
the “false belief” test for “Theory of Mind”. But as Shaun Gallagher points out, 
although the ability to articulate this kind of knowledge marks a significant stage in 
development, “[p]rior to this, [. .] the basis for human interaction and for 
understanding others has already been laid down by certain embodied practices – 
practices that are emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual” 
(Gallagher 2006, 223-4). From soon after birth, babies imitate facial expressions – a 
                                                 
72 The notion of character as “embedded narrative” has also been put forward by Marie-Laure Ry an 
(1991), and an earlier allusion to the idea can be found in Tzvetan Todorov’s essay “Narrative Men” 
(1967 ): “[A] character is a potential story that is the story of his life. Every  new character signifies a 
new plot” (Todorov 1977, 70). In Social Minds in the Novel (2010) Palmer abandons the term 
“embedded narrative” in favour of “cognitive narrative” for fear of confusion with the use of the term 
for “framed” narratives (Palmer 2010, 12). It is precisely this “confusion” that is pursued in this 
chapter, with the claim that the same cognitive/semiotic processes of joint attention underlie both 
phenomena.   
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form of “primary intersubjectivity” (Trevarthen 1979) in which “[t]here is [. .] a 
common bodily intentionality that is shared across the perceiving subject and the 
perceived other” (Gallagher 2006, 225). Long before the acquisition of language, 
infants are also able to imitate gestures, to follow the direction of another’s look, and 
to engage in a number of other activities that manifest a perception of the other’s 
bodily movements as intentional, goal-directed actions and of the other as an 
independent agent – a form of “body-reading” rather than “mind-reading” (226-7). 
 The most ubiquitous of such actions and gestures is pointing, which in 
Western societies children begin to engage in around the ages of 11 -12 months. 
Pointing is used in a wide variety of contexts, but classic accounts identify two basic 
types of motivation: (1) imperative (requesting things) and (2) declarative (sharing 
experiences and emotions). Michael Tomasello has modified this classic account by 
positing three “general classes of social intention or motive” behind pointing:  
(1) sharing (they want to share emotions and attitudes with others);  
(2) informing (they want to help others by informing them of useful or 
important things); and 
(3) requesting (they want others to help them in attaining their goals) 
(Tomasello 2008, 123) 
What Tomasello wishes to highlight in this classification of motivations behind 
pointing by human infants is the element of cooperation, of “helping” and “sharing” 
that underlies them all: it is this cooperative principle, he argues, that marks the 
crucial evolutionary step from primate to human gestures, and that underpins all 
human communication, including language (c.f. Grice 1957, 1975). Primate gestures 
such as ritualized “intention-movements” (e.g. raising arms to initiate play) or 
“attention-getters” (e.g. slapping the ground) are individually learned behaviors that 
elicit desired responses in the other (Tomasello 2008, 20-30). When they interact 
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with humans, primates learn new gestures if these gestures produce desired 
responses from the humans – most notably, they quickly learn (without specific 
training) to point to out-of-reach food (34-5). But significantly, the use of pointing by 
primates with humans is limited to this imperative motivation, for what primates 
crucially lack, according to Tomasello, is the sense of cooperation, of shared attention 
and intentionality towards objects, that one finds in human pointing: primate 
gestures remain at the level of a dyadic interchange of signals between individuals, 
rather than, as we find in the human case, an intersubjectivity based, triadically, on a 
common ground of shared attention and intentionality. 
 Thus in tracing back the origins of our pre-conceptual, pre-representational 
understanding of others, we find ourselves back in the joint attentional situation 
which was identified, at the beginning of this chapter, as the birthplace of narrative: 
the intersubjectivity that is distinctively human, and that forms the basis of human 
“cooperative communication”, finds its most characteristic expression in what 
Jerome Bruner calls, in his thesis concerning two distinct modes of thought, the 
“narrative” mode of thought (Bruner 1986). Where the “paradigmatic” mode of 
thought “attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description 
and explanation”, employing “categorization or conceptualization” (Bruner 1986, 12), 
narrative deals with “the vicissitudes of human intentions” (16). Whether it be in the 
shared tension-and-release of a “proto-narrative” such as withholding-and-releasing 
an object or playing peekaboo, or in a verbal narrative recounting a breach in a 
habitual chain of events, these experiments in the “vicissitudes of human intentions” 
both presuppose and dramatize the sense of shared intentionality that is the basis of 
all human communication. 
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In the paradigmatic mode, Bruner writes, “arguments convince one of their 
truth”. A narrative, by contrast, “establishes not truth but verisimilitude” (Bruner 
1986, 11). With the exception of certain highly specific situations (a psychology 
laboratory, perhaps, or the interview room of a police station) most human 
interaction is not of the third-person variety that involves propositions and 
inferences about the other’s beliefs, intentions and mental states: it is immediate and 
automatic, “read” directly from the actions of the other. The verisimilitude of 
narrative lies in its aligning of readers’ attention and intentionality with the various 
forms of attention and intentionality (embedded narratives, embedded perspectives) 
expressed within the text. It is in establishing these various alignments that the 
dynamic mechanism of joint attention plays a crucial role. 
 
4. Situated Semiotics 
 In Section One, above, we saw how joint attention has an intrinsically triadic 
structure: in the case of the original joint attentional situation in ontogeny, the triad 
is composed of the child, the carer and the object, where the object is seen through 
the attention that the adult directs towards it, or, by reversal, the adult  is directed to 
see the object through the intention or attention of the child (Rodríguez 2007). In 
Sections Two and Three, a recurrent theme was the inadequacy of conventional 
narratological categories of communication – based on a dyadic (“speech-circuit”) 
Saussurean model of oral communication – to account for important aspects of the 
text: the implication of these examples is that there is something more complex going 
on in the semiotics of the narrative text than is captured by the Saussurean model. 
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 In this final section of the chapter I draw together these two strands by 
pointing, historically, to two conceptions of semiotics, belonging to the same period 
as Saussure, which have been overlooked by narratology and which are congruent 
with the triadic conception of the sign suggested by the account of joint attention: I 
am referring to C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards’ The Meaning of Meaning (1923) and 
Karl Bühler’s Theory of Language (1934). Though there are significant differences 
between the approaches of the two books, as I shall outline, they share a contextual 
or situational view of language, in which language mediates between the producer of 
the sign, the receiver of the sign, and the “reference” that both producer and sign 
take the sign to be referring to (this reference could be a physical object, but could 
equally be another sign, such as a concept). In both cases, too, this mediation is seen 
as analogous to the way a tool mediates between, on the one side, the agent who 
handles the tool, and, on the other side, the material on which the tool is worked. 
And crucially, words, as tools, can serve different functions, just as a hammer can be 
used for different purposes: the functional model of language put forward by Karl 
Bühler, in particular, forms an important transition to the dynamic model of 
narrative (based as it is on the concept of polyfunctionality) which I put forward in 
Chapter Two. 
 Before turning to the theories of Ogden and Richards, and of Bühler, it would 
be useful to have a reminder of Saussure’s model of linguistic communication. In 
Chapter Three of the Course in General Linguistics, Saussure illustrates this model 





In A’s brain, Saussure writes, a “mental fact”, a “concept”, “unlocks a corresponding 
sound-image in the brain”. This process of translation between concept and sound-
image (or as he will come to call them later, signified and signifier) Saussure 
describes as a “purely psychological phenomenon”. It is followed by a “physiological 
process: the brain transmits an impulse corresponding to the image to the organs 
used in producing sounds.” After the sound waves have travelled to the ear of B (by a 
“purely physical process”), “the order is reversed: from the ear to the brain, the 
physiological transmission of the sound-image; in the brain, the psychological 
association of the new image with the corresponding concept” (Saussure 1966 [1915], 
11-12). If B speaks, the cycle is reversed. To clarify further this circuit, Saussure 





The circles in this diagram correspond to the “psychological parts” of the speech-
circuit, which Saussure will later equate with language (langue), as opposed to speech 
(parole), which is equated with the “physiological” and “physical” parts of the circuit. 
The translations between concept and sound-image occupy a purely “psychological” 
domain between the physiological and physical domains on either side.7 3   
 Ogden and Richards’ The Meaning of Meaning (1923) was an attempt to lay 
the foundations for a new “science of Symbolism” by sweeping away centuries of 
philosophical obfuscation about language, establishing the study of “meaning” 
instead on the grounds of the newly emerging behaviorist psychology.7 4  As Richards’ 
biographer, John Russo, observes, The Meaning of Meaning is “many books in one”, 
wandering over a wide territory and amassing a variety of theories that do not always 
sit well with each other (Russo 1989, 110). But as he also points out, there is one 
over-riding theme that Ogden and Richards keep coming back to: this theme, as 
Russo summarizes it, is the idea 
that words are not part of and do not correspond to things, but rather to 
thoughts and to emotions and feelings. They are neither signs for objects, nor 
events, nor universals and they cannot be fully defined by normative uses, 
proper and “essential” meanings, or grammatical categories. Language by 
convention can be fitted to a thing, a concept, a grammar, to anything, but it 
inevitably wriggles out from all restrictions. Words “‘mean’ nothing by 
themselves”: “It is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for 
anything.” Only context, that is, has meaning. (Russo 1989, 110; quoting 
Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923], 9-10) 
                                                 
73 There is a notable congruence between Saussure’s model and the model which underlies classical 
cognitivism. As in classical cognitivism, mental processes are sandwiched (in a “black box”) between 
phy sical inputs and outputs. Saussure’s second illustration anticipates the flow diagrams that would 
be developed by British psychologist Donald Broadbent in the 1950s, and that would become a staple 
of “computational” accounts of the mind.  
74 For background to, and a detailed reading of the book, see Russo 1989, 11 0-45.  
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In the passage quoted by Russo, Ogden and Richards go on to say that words are 
“instruments” which serve different “uses” or “functions” according to contex t (10). It 
is these notions of context and function that form the focus of our interest in Ogden 
and Richards’ work here. 
 Given this fluid and contextual view of meaning – and glancing back at the 
diagrams above, with their “concepts” and “sound-images” locked together in tidy 
mentalist boxes – it comes as no surprise that Ogden and Richards are dismissive of 
Saussure’s model:  
A sign for de Saussure is twofold, made up of a concept (signifié) and an 
acoustic image (significant) [. .] Without the concept, he says, the acoustic 
image would not be a sign. The disadvantage of this account is [. .] that the 
process of interpretation is included by definition in the sign! (Ogden and 
Richards 1946 [1923], 5) 
Saussure’s answer to the problem of “meaning”, the problem of this “process of 
interpretation” that is included by definition in the sign, is the concept of “ la langue” 
as opposed “la parole” – “language” (understood in a certain way) as opposed to 
“speech”. Scattered through Chapter Three of the Course is a long list of attributes 
for “la langue”: it is “a well-defined object” which can be localized “in the limited 
segment of the speaking-circuit where an auditory image becomes associated with a 
concept”; it is “the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create 
nor modify it by himself,” and which “exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed 
by the members of a community”; it is “homogeneous”, a “system of signs that 
expresses ideas”, in which “the only essential thing is the union of meanings and 
sound-images” (Saussure 1966 [1915], 14-15); it is “a self-contained whole and a 
principle of classification” (9); it is constituted by a “social bond” consisting of “the 
sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals”; it is a “storehouse filled 
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by the members of a given community” and a “grammatical system that has a 
potential existence in each brain, or, more specifically, in the brains of a group of 
individuals” (13-14). 
For Ogden and Richards’, the concept of “la langue” is, considered as a 
guiding principle for the young science of semiology, “fantastic” (5). It represents, for 
them, a prime example of hypostatization, the obfuscatory turning of words into 
things, and they set about it with iconoclastic zeal: Saussure “obeys blindly the 
primitive impulse to infer from a word some object for which it stands, and sets out 
determined to find it.” He “does not pause [. .] to ask himself what he is looking for, 
or whether there is any reason why there should be such a thing. He proceeds instead 
in a fashion familiar in the beginnings of all sciences, and concocts a suitable object – 
‘la langue,’ the language, as opposed to speech” (Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923], 
4). 
For Ogden and Richards, Saussure’s theory of signs, “by neglecting entirely 
the things for which signs stand, was from the beginning cut off from any contact 
with scientific methods of verification” (6). Rather than consign meaning to the 
abstract and nebulous realm of “la langue”, they locate it in a context of reference. 
Where Saussure sees meaning as arising purely from differences within la langue 
(“language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but 
only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system” (Saussure 
1966 [1915], 120)), for Ogden and Richards, meaning is embedded in perception and 
behaviour. In Russo’s summary of their approach, “the symbol is an absence that 
receives its meaning from its reference outward to the world. A symbol is of 




Language, in Ogden and Richards’ conception, connects to the  world of 
perception and behaviour in different ways. In the characterization by Russo that I 
have just quoted, he picks out the distinction they make between, on the one hand, 
the “symbolic” use of language, which makes “an act of reference” to a “referent” 
(Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923], 11), and, on the hand, to the “emotive” use, where 
words serve as “signs of emotions, attitudes, moods, the temper, interest or set of the 
mind in which the references occur” (223): 
In speaking a sentence we are giving rise to, as in hearing it we are confronted 
by, at least two sign-situations. One is interpreted from symbols to reference 
and so to referent; the other is interpreted from verbal signs to the attitude, 
mood, interest, purpose, desire, and so forth of the speaker, and thence to the 
situation, circumstances and conditions in which the utterance is made. (223) 
Ogden and Richards, as I will discuss in a moment, add other functions of language 
to these two, but their main focus throughout The Meaning of Meaning is on the 
symbolic (i.e. the “referential” (10) or “propositional” (74)) use. In the first chapter, 
titled “Thoughts, Words and Things” they depict diagrammatically the particular 
triangular relationship by which one passes, in the symbolic use, “from symbols to 





The references to “causal relations” on the left and right legs of this “Triangle of 
Interpretation” reflect the behaviorist viewpoint with which Ogden and Richards 
framed their theory. To take the left leg: the use of particular referential symbols 
(which Ogden and Richards define broadly, as “words, arrangements of words, 
images, gestures, and such representations as drawings, or mimetic sounds” (23)) is 
caused “partly by the reference we are making and partly by social and psychological 
factors – the purpose for which we are making the reference, the proposed effect of 
our symbols on other persons, and our own attitude” (10-11). And equally, on the 
part of the hearer, “the symbols both cause us to perform an act of reference and to 
assume an attitude which will, according to circumstances, be more or less similar to 
the act and attitude of the speaker” (11). 
There is a clear congruence between this account of language and the account 
given by the joint attentional perspective (subsection 2.1). In the joint attentional 
situation, too, language mediates the triadic relationship between speaker, hearer 
and object in such a way that, through the words, the speaker causes the hearer both 
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to “perform an act of reference” to the object, and “to assume an attitude” toward the 
object “more or less similar to the act and attitude of the speaker”. In the words 
already quoted above, from Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan, “within [the] 
primordial sharing situation there arises reference in its initial, nonrepresentational 
form [. . .] [T]he act of reference emerges not as an individual act, but as a social one: 
by exchanging things with the Other, by touching things and looking at them with the 
Other (Werner and Kaplan 1963, 42-3).  
Ogden and Richards’ “triangle of reference” also reflects the strong influence 
of Charles Peirce – or more accurately, the influence of a particular interpretation of 
Peirce (Russo 1989, 116-17). According to Peirce’s triadic, pragmatic semiotics, the 
sign (the representamen) and its object are represented as sign-and-object by a third 
term (the interpretant) that is itself a sign, either in another mind or in the same 
mind.7 5  As Thomas L. Short puts it in his commentary on Peirce’s semiotic: 
“Significance [. .] is a triadic relation wherein, in one respect, the sign mediates 
between object and interpretant and, in another respect, the interpretant mediates 
between sign and object” (Short 2007, 30). Diagrammatically, the triad can be shown 
thus: 








                                                 
75 A “sign”, for Peirce, may take an overt physical form, for example as a movement of the body or a 
word, but it may  equally take the form of a thought. 
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Object    Sign (Representamen) 
Figure 4 
This is a genuine triad, in that it cannot be broken down into dyadic relations: the 
relationship between sign and object is only realized by the interpretant; the 
relationship between the interpretant and the object is mediated by the sign; and the 
sign is only a sign to the interpretant because it is a sign of something, an object. 
 In his early writings, Peirce stressed the intersubjective, “pragmatic” nature of 
this process. A sign, he writes in 1897, “is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign; or perhaps a more developed sign.” The sign 
does not stand for the object in all respects, but only  “in reference to a sort of idea, 
which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen” (Peirce 1955, 99).  
This “ground” is intersubjective, involving a kind of mediation through joint 
attention – it is a sense of “idea”, he writes,  
very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one 
man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls 
what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea. (99) 
Through this intersubjective “ground” shared by the sign and its interpretant, the 
sign is able to perform its principle function of mediation. As Russo writes of the 
close dependence of Ogden and Richards’ ideas on those of Peirce: “[t]he triadic 
nature of sign interpretation in Peirce entails the principle of mediation: ‘A sign 
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mediates between the interpretant sign and its object’; even ‘private’ thinking 
involves the triadic process of mediation. [Ogden and Richards] everywhere insist on 
the mediation of thought or reference in the relation between words and things” 
(Russo 1989, 117).7 6  
 Ogden and Richards’ “Triangle of Interpretation” represents only one function 
of language – the “symbolic” or “referential” function. In Chapter One of The 
Meaning and Meaning, as noted above, they make a basic distinction between this 
symbolic function and the “emotive” function, under which words serve primarily as 
signs of emotions or attitudes: it is for this basic distinction that The Meaning of 
Meaning is most well-known as regards the functions of language (Russo 1989, 121). 
But in a later chapter, “Symbol Situations”, Ogden and Richards introduce a more 
nuanced “context theory of interpretation” (Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923], 209) 
that identifies, rather than just the “emotive” function, four main kinds of function in 
addition to the basic “symbolic” function: (1) There are “situations which derive from 
attitudes, such as amity or hostility, of the speaker to his audience”: where these 
attitudes may be expressed in speech by manner and tone, in written language 
manner and tone are “replaced by the various devices, conventional formulae, 
exaggerations, under-statements, figures of speech, underlining, and the rest familiar 
in the technique of letter-writing” (224). (2) Words may also express the attitude 
towards the referent, the object: Ogden and Richards cite “aesthetic judgments” as an 
example (225). (3) The “structure of our symbols” may also be determined by  “our 
Intention, the effects which we endeavor to promote by our utterance” (225). (4) A 
                                                 
76 As Russo points out, Peirce later in his career turned against the “subjective” or “psychologi cal” 
interpretation of the process described above, coming to see it as fundamentally a process of logic, on 
which psy chology was dependent. Ogden and Richards adhered to the earlier, “pragmatic” Peirce: The 
Meaning of Meaning, Russo observes, “suppresses Peirce’s logic, while adopting Peircean concepts in 
semiotics towards the development of its own instrumental concept of language” (Russo 1989, 117).  
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symbol may reflect “the Ease or Difficulty” involved in calling it to mind: thus, to cite 
Ogden and Richards’ eccentric example, the difference between “I seem to remember 
ascending Mount Everest” and “I went up Everest” (225-26).7 7  
 Having introduced these varied functions, Ogden and Richards observe that 
“speech on almost all occasions presents a multiple, not a single, sign situation” 
(230): the reference of a symbol “is only one of a number of terms which are relevant 
to the form of a symbol. It is not even the dominant factor in most cases” (233). Any 
single reference may have any number of symbols which could accompany it, each 
expressing a different nuance of function (attitude towards the reference, for 
example, or towards the audience), and a single symbol may simultaneously fulfill 
more than one function (233-34). The effect of this “plurality of functions which 
language has to perform” – which means, for example, that “non-symbolic functions 
may employ words [. .] in a symbolic capacity, to attain the required end through the 
references produced in the listener” – is a “plasticity of speech material under 
symbolic conditions” (226). Context is of key importance: as one’s interpretation 
moves from “simple symbols” (the single word) to “complex symbols” (sentences and 
wider stretches of discourse), the process is one of recursive recontextualization. All 
“discursive symbolization” involves a “weaving together of contexts into higher 
contexts”:  interpretation of such complex symbols is of the same nature as that of 
                                                 
77 Russo notes that Richards would later expand on this list of functions. “By 1955 Richards had 
enumerated eight functions, all more or less simultaneously present within the stream of any  given 
speech act” (Russo 1989, 120). “More than any  other concept in The Meaning of Meaning,” he later 
observes, “the plurality of functions enriched all of Richards’ later criticism. It also anticipated aspects 
in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein and in the ordinary language philosophy of J.L. Austin” (Russo 
1989, 137). With regard to the latter, Russo observes that “like Richards, Austin recognizes that 
linguistic func tions operate simultaneously or with varying degrees of force” (720 n.100).  
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simple symbols “with the difference only that the members of these higher contexts 
are themselves contexts” (220).7 8  
 Having introduced these suggestive ideas of “plurality of functions” and 
“context”, Ogden and Richards return to their more basic distinction between 
symbolic and emotive uses of language, comparing it with the distinction between 
prose and poetry (235-42). Unfortunately, as Russo points out, this crude distinction 
subsequently dominated discussion of Ogden and Richards’ work (giving rise to 
ideological debates over “science” vs “poetry” etc), and “drew attention away from 
the instrumentality of language, the inner theme that develops most fully in the 
exposition of the functions” (Russo 1989, 120-21): Ogden and Richards are at their 
most impressive, Russo judges, “when they link their twin themes, instrumentality 
and contextualism” (132). 
 The path that we have traced in The Meaning of Meaning is from a 
contextualist, triadic view of signification to a concept of the multiplicity and 
simultaneity of linguistic functions. In Chapter Two subsection 1.1 I will discuss how 
the Czech structuralists developed this latter concept. First, though, I conclude this 
chapter by looking briefly at Karl Bühler’s Theory of Language (1934), not least 
because Bühler’s work provides a direct link, in terms of acknowledged influence, 
with the ideas of the Czech structuralists.7 9  Bühler presents what he calls an 
“Organon” model of language, taking this term from Plato. In Cratylus a name is 
                                                 
78 Russo provides the following gloss on the account of “context” in The Meaning of Meaning: “The 
meaning of a word is only  fully comprehended when it has been ‘contextualized,’ and  meaning is 
found to be a complex function of its components. Instead of one or even a dozen meanings, 
numberless shades of meaning fall across the spectrum of a word. Or perhaps it is better to withhold 
the idea of a word’s meaning and say  only that the c ontext has meaning” (Russo 1989, 112). 
79 For Bühler’s influence on the Prague school see Galan 1985, 70-3 and Innis 1982, 4.  
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defined as a tool, an instrument (“Organon”) for informing another about 
something: 
SOCRATES: Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish 
things according to their natures? 
HERMOGENES: Certainly we do. 
SOCRATES: Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of 
distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the 
web. (Plato 1961, 426) 
In Bühler’s gloss on Plato, language is “an organum for the one to inform the other of 
something about the things” (Bühler 1990 [1934], 30). Bühler then illustrates the 
idea with a diagram (31): 
Figure 5 
The simplest illustration of the model, Bühler writes, is the case when the “one” and 
the “other” share a sensory stimulus in the same perceptual field: 
Thus for example: two people in a room – the one notices a drumming, looks 
to the window and says, “it’s raining” – the other, too, looks to the window, 
whether directly on hearing the expression or because his gaze is directed to it 
by looking at the speaker. That can happen, and then the process elegantly 
makes a full circle. If one wishes, the process can be repeated in this closed 
circle as on an endless screw [. . .] [I]f the incident has ample “appeal” to them 
(as a very apt expression has it), then they will indulge in observant probing 
and discussion of the affair in dialogue form. (32) 
This situation is, then, precisely what we have described above in developmental 






Bühler thus identifies three factors that come into play in any linguistic 
communication: the sender of the communication, the receiver, and the referent (the 
object/state of affairs/event(s) that are being talked about). Corresponding to these 
factors Bühler identifies three “semantic functions” of language depending on which 
of these factors the words are oriented to: the referential or representative function 
is oriented towards the object; the expressive or emotive function is oriented towards 




The sign (indicated by the circle S) encompasses these three facets or semantic 
functions of language, according to whether it functions as a symbol (in coordination 
with objects or states of affairs), as a symptom (an “index” of the state of the sender) 
or a signal (an appeal to the receiver “whose inner or outer behaviour it directs”) 
(35). 
  Thus Bühler’s notion of the functionality of language – its character as a tool, 
an “Organon” – arises directly out of his conception of it as a “mediating 
phenomenon” (37) in the triadic, joint attentional situation. But the important point 
126 
 
in the context of the argument I will develop in the next chapter (the argument that 
the triadic joint attentional semiotics I have described in this chapter create a non-
linearity in narrative fiction) is Bühler’s insistence that the three functions, these 
“largely independently variable semantic relations”  (35), coexist rather than enjoy 
any kind of exclusivity. The representational function is dominant, for example, in 
science, and yet “[t]he chalk marks drawn by the mathematicians and logicians on 
the blackboard still contain an expressive residue” (39). Despite the ubiquity and 
obvious salience of this representational function (to which the bulk of Bühler’s 
Theory is devoted), Bühler argues that the “appeal” is even more fundamental to 
human and animal communication, as can be seen in the way insects are able to alter 
their co-species members’ behaviour through signals (38). Particular instances of 
language-use are “phenomena of dominance, in which one of the three fundamental 
relationships of the language sounds is in the foreground” (39). In section one of the 
following chapter I will examine how Jan Mukařovský and other members of the 
Prague Linguistics Circle developed Bühler’s polyfunctional model of language, 
combining it with some ideas inherited from Russian Formalism, into a model of 
language as a dynamic, non-linear system.  
 
 
 
